I believe that I have shown that the theory of selection by no means leads—as is always assumed—to the denial of a teleological Universal Cause and to materialism, and I thereby hope that I have cleared the way for this doctrine, the importance of which it is scarcely possible to over-estimate. Many, and not the most ill-informed, do not get so far as to make an unbiassed examination into the facts, because they are at the outset alarmed by the to them inevitable consequence of the materialistic conception of the universe. Mechanism and teleology do not exclude one another, they are rather in mutual agreement. Without teleology there would be no mechanism, but only a confusion of crude forces; and without mechanism there would be no teleology, for how could the latter otherwise effect its purpose?[314]
Von Hartmann correctly says:—“The most complete mechanism conceivable is likewise the most completely conceivable teleology.” We may thus represent the phenomenal universe as such a completely conceivable mechanism. With this conception vanish all apprehensions that the new views would cause man to lose the best that he possesses—morality and purely human spiritual culture. He who, with Von Baer, considers the laws of nature as the “permanent expressions of the will of a creative principle,” will clearly perceive that a further advance in the knowledge of these laws need not divert man from the path of increasing improvement, but must further him in this course—that the knowledge of truth, whatever may be its purport, cannot possibly be considered a backward step. Let us take our stand boldly on the ground of new knowledge, and accept the direct consequences thereof, and we shall not be obliged to give up either morality or the comforting conviction of being part of an harmonious world, as a necessary member capable of development and perfection.
Any other mode of interference by a directive teleological power in the processes of the universe than by the appointment of the forces producing them, is however, at least to the naturalist, inadmissible. We are still far removed from completely understanding the mechanism by means of which the organic world is evoked—we still find ourselves at the very beginning of knowledge. We are, however, already convinced that both the organic and the inorganic worlds are dependent only upon mechanical forces, for to this conclusion we are led, not only by the results of investigators who have restricted themselves to limited provinces, but also by the most general considerations. But although the force of these arguments may not be acknowledged, and although one might maintain that the inductional proofs against the existence of a “phyletic vital force” have been directed only against points of detail, or have never been completely demonstrated, i.e. for all points, it must nevertheless be conceded, that for the naturalist the mechanical conception of Nature is the only one possible—that he is not at all justified in abandoning this view so long as the interference of teleological forces in the course of the processes of organic development has not been demonstrated to him. Thus, it will not be immaterial whether a conception of Nature which to many seems inevitable is consistent with the idea of universal design, or a final directive universal principle, since the value which we may attach to our own lives and aims, essentially depends thereon. The final and main result of this essay will thus be found in the attempted demonstration that the mechanical conception of Nature very well admits of being united with a teleological conception of the Universe.
THE END.
[FOOTNOTES]
[1] A most minute and exact description of the newly hatched larva of Chionobas Aëllo is given by the American entomologist, Samuel H. Scudder. Ann. Soc. Ent. de Belgique, xvi., 1873.
[2] I am aware that this certainly cannot be said of philosophers like Lotze or Herbert Spencer; but these are at the same time both naturalists and philosophers.
[3] “Über die Artrechte des Polyommatus Amyntas und Polysperchon.” Stett. ent. Zeit. 1849. Vol. x. p. 177–182. [In Kirby’s “Synonymic Catalogue of Diurnal Lepidoptera” Plebeius Amyntas is given as a synonym and P. Polysperchon as a var. of P. Argiades Pall. R.M.]
[4] “Die Arten der Lepidopteren-Gattung Ino Leach, nebst einigen Vorbemerkungen über Localvarietäten.” Stett. ent. Zeit. 1862. Vol. xxiii. p. 342.
[5] [Eng. ed. W. H. Edwards has since pointed out several beautiful cases of seasonal dimorphism in America. Thus Plebeius Pseudargiolus is the summer form of P. Violacea, and Phyciodes Tharos the summer form of P. Marcia. See Edwards’ “Butterflies of North America,” 1868–79.]