But independently of the intrinsic value of this sacred union, we have to consider its importance from the social point of view. It is the first stage in our progress towards that which is the final object of moral education, namely, universal love. Many writers of the so-called socialist school, look upon conjugal love and universal benevolence, the two extreme terms in the scale of affections, as opposed to each other. In the second chapter, I pointed out the falseness and danger of this view. The man who is incapable of deep affection for one whom he has chosen as his partner in the most intimate relations of life, can hardly expect to be believed when he professes devotion to a mass of human beings of whom he knows nothing. The heart cannot throw off its original selfishness, without the aid of some complete and enduring affection. And conjugal love, concentrated as it is upon one object exclusively, is more enduring and complete than any other. From personal experience of strong love we rise by degrees to sincere affection for all mankind; although, as the scope of feeling widens, its energy must decrease. The connexion of these two states of feeling is instinctively recognized by all; and it is clearly indicated by the Positive theory of human nature, which has now placed it beyond the reach of metaphysical attacks. When the moral empire of Woman has been more firmly established by the diffusion of Positivist principles, men will see that the common practice of looking to the private life of a statesman as the best guarantee of his public conduct had deep wisdom in it. One of the strongest symptoms of the general laxity of morals to which mental anarchy has brought us, is that disgraceful law passed in France thirty years ago, and not yet repealed; the avowed object of which was to surround men’s lives with a ‘wall’ of privacy; a law introduced by psychologist politicians who no doubt needed such a wall.[8]
Conditions of marriage. Indissoluble monogamy
The purpose of marriage once clearly understood, it becomes easy to define its conditions. The intervention of society is necessary; but its only object is to confirm and to develop the order of things which exists naturally.
It is essential in the first place to the high purposes for which marriage has been instituted, that the union shall be both exclusive and indissoluble. So essential indeed are both conditions, that we frequently find them even when the connexion is illegal. That any one should have ventured to propound the doctrine that human happiness is to be secured by levity and inconsistency in love, is a fact which nothing but the utter deficiency of social and moral principles can explain. Love cannot be deep unless it remains constant to a fixed object. The very possibility of change is a temptation to it. So differently constituted as man and woman are, is their short life too much for perfect knowledge and love of one another? Yet the versatility to which most human affection is liable makes the intervention of society necessary. Without some check upon indecision and caprice, life might degenerate into a miserable series of experiments, each ending in failure and degradation. Sexual love may become a powerful engine for good: but only on the condition of placing it under rigorous and permanent discipline. Those who doubt the necessity for this, have only to cast a glance beyond Western Europe at the countries where no such discipline has been established. It has been said that the adoption or rejection of monogamy is a simple question of climate. But for this hypothesis there is no ground whatever. It is as contrary to common observation as to philosophic theory. Marriage, like every other human institution, has always been improving. Beginning in all countries with unrestricted polygamy, it tends in all to the purest monogamy. Tracing back the history of Northern Europe, we find polygamy there as well as in the South; and Southern nations, like Northern, adopt polygamy as their social life advances. We see the tendency to it in those parts of the East which come into contact with Western civilization.
Monogamy, then, is one of the most precious gifts which the Middle Ages have bequeathed to Western Europe. The striking superiority of social life in the West is probably due to it more than to any other cause. Protestant countries have seriously impaired its value by their laws of divorce. But this aberration will hardly be permanent. It is alien to the purer feelings of women and of the people, and the mischief done by it is limited to the privileged classes. France is now threatened with a revival of the metaphysical delusions of the Revolution, and it is feared by some that the disastrous example of Germany in this respect will be imitated. But all such tendencies, being utterly inconsistent with the habits of modern life, will soon be checked by the sounder philosophical principles which have now arisen. The mode of resistance to these errors which Positivism adopts will render the struggle most useful in hastening the adoption of the true theory of marriage. The spirit of Positivism being always relative, concessions may be made to meet exceptional cases, without weakening or contradicting the principle; whereas the absolute character of theological doctrine was incompatible with concession. The rules of morality should be general and comprehensive; but in their practical application exceptions have often to be made. By no philosophy but the Positive can these two conditions be reconciled.
Perpetual widowhood
To the spirit of anarchy, however, Positivism yields nothing. The unity essential to marriage, it renders more complete than ever. It develops the principle of monogamy, by inculcating, not as a legal institution, but as moral duty, the perpetuity of widowhood. Affection so firmly concentrated has always been regarded with respect even on man’s side. But hitherto no religion has had sufficient purity or influence to secure its adoption. Positivism, however, from the completeness of its synthesis, and from the fact that its rules are invariably based on the laws of nature, will gain such influence, and we find little difficulty in inducing all natures of delicate feeling to accept this additional obligation. It follows from the very principle which to the Positivist is the object of all marriage, the raising and purifying of the heart. Unity of the tie which is already recognized as necessary in life, is not less so in death. Constancy in widowhood was once common among women; and if its moral beauty is less appreciated now, it is because all systematic morality has been forgotten. But it is none the less, as careful study of human nature will show, a most precious source of moral good, and one which is not beyond the reach of nobler natures, even in their youth. Voluntary widowhood, while it offers all the advantages which chastity can confer on the intellectual and physical as well as on the moral nature, is yet free from the moral dangers of celibacy. Constant adoration of one whom Death has implanted more visibly and deeply on the memory, leads all high natures, and especially philosophers, to give themselves more unreservedly to the service of Humanity; and thus their public life is animated by the ennobling influence of their innermost feelings. Alike from a sense of their own truest happiness and from devotion to public duty, they will be led to this result.
Deep as is the satisfaction in this prolongation of the sacredness of marriage, it may be carried by those who recognize its value yet further. As the death of one did not destroy the bond, so neither should the death of both. Let, then, those whom death could not divide be laid in the same grave together. A promise of this solemn act of perpetuation might be given beforehand, when the organs of public opinion judged it merited. A man would find a new motive for public exertion, if it were felt to be a pledge that the memory of her whom he loved should be for ever coupled with his own. We have a few instances where this union of memories has taken place spontaneously, as in the case of Laura and Petrarch, and of Dante and Beatrice. Yet these instances are so exceptional, that they hardly help us to realize the full value of the institution proposed. There is no reason for limiting it to cases of extraordinary genius. In the more healthy state of society to which we are tending, where private and public life will be far more closely connected than they have been hitherto, this recompense of service may be given to all who have deserved it, by those who have come within their circle of influence.
Such, then, are the consolations which Positivist sympathy can give. They leave no cause to regret the visionary hopes held out by Christianity, hopes which now are as enfeebling to the heart as to the intellect. Here, as in all other respects, the moral superiority of Positivism is shown, for the comfort which it gives to the bereaved implies a strengthening of the tie. Christian consolation, of which so much has been said, rather encourages a second union. By so doing it seriously impairs the value of the institution; for a division of affection arises, which indeed seems hardly compatible with the vague utopia of a future life. The institutions of perpetual widowhood and of union in the tomb have found no place in any previous system, though both were wanting to make monogamy complete. Here, as elsewhere, the best reply which the new philosophy can give to ignorant prejudice or malignant calumny, is to take new steps forward in the moral advancement of Man.
Thus the theory of marriage, as set forward by the Positivist, becomes totally independent of any physical motive. It is regarded by him as the most powerful instrument of moral education; and therefore as the basis of public or individual welfare. It is no overstrained enthusiasm which leads us to elevate the moral purity of marriage. We do so from rigorous examination of the facts of human nature. All the best results, whether personal or social, of marriage may follow, when the union, though more impassioned, is as chaste as that of brother and sister. The sexual instinct has no doubt something to do in most cases with the first formation of the passion; but it is not necessary in all cases to gratify the instinct. Abstinence, in cases where there is real ground for it on both sides, will but serve to strengthen mutual affection.