The noblest task of moral action is to strive for the welfare of future generations.
Altruism and Egoism.—Properly understood, altruism and egoism do not form an antinomy, or only quite a relative antinomy. It is absolutely wrong to found social order by letting loose all our egoistic appetites without restriction. But it is quite as wrong to oppose them with an exaggerated and unnatural asceticism, which reflects in our eyes an erroneous ideal of altruism.
When a bee or an ant disgorges the honey from its stomach for the benefit of its companions, it enjoys it. By sacrificing its life for the hive or the nest, it satisfies an altruistic or social instinct. Cannot man also be more happy in giving than receiving? How can we explain the great sacrifices, the martyrs who suffer and die for their country, for their family, for science, for an idea, if enthusiasm—an expanded sentiment of pleasure—did not lead man to disinterested sacrifice, or if an inner obsession did not find its satisfaction in the welfare of humanity?
Let us seek all measures which by social adaptation can ennoble our human egoism, reduce it to its indispensable and just measure, and maintain it in proper equilibrium, by the aid of an active altruism; that is to say, by social habits of self-sacrifice for the benefit of the community. We shall then obtain a paradise on earth, no doubt very relative, but far preferable to our present anarchy based on the strife of personal interests.
The chief thing wanting is a good hereditary quality among human individuals, a quality which is still entirely left to chance, by the most deplorable selection; the second requisite is the education of character and will in our children. Our religion and our schools have shown themselves incapable of raising the bulk of the people above barbarism, that is to say from apathy, vulgarity of sentiment, routine, ignorance and prejudice. No doubt intellectual culture and religious ethics have accomplished a certain amount of moral progress, but the methods employed in our churches and schools have not advanced with science. They are in no sense adapted to our present moral wants and still less to the exigencies of the future.
It is on the basis of a natural human morality, such as we have just described, that we must found sexual morality or ethics, and it is not difficult to form clear ideas on this subject, if we take the trouble to examine the facts explained in the first fourteen chapters of this book.
From the social and moral point of view we may consider an action as positive or useful, neutral or indifferent, and negative or harmful. But the same action may be at the same time positive, negative or indifferent, relatively to one or more groups of individuals. But in ethics it is not only a question of the action in itself, but especially the inner motives which lead to it; for, to leave the good and ill of society to chance and ignorance, is to deny the possibility of progress. It is difficult for a man to accomplish positive social actions, when the moral sentiments of conscience and duty are wanting. On the other hand, a narrow-minded individual, with false judgment, will accomplish negative social actions through moral motives, while in certain cases an individual may accomplish positive social acts fortuitously through perverse motives. Through vengeance, a generous legacy may be left which injures an individual, while profiting the public. Without being perverse, motives may be simply egoistic and lead to good by calculated egoism.
By altruist, we understand a man animated by powerful moral sentiments which preside over social humanitarian volitions. By the term pure egoist, we designate one in whom self forms the exclusive object of sentiments of sympathy. In himself, the egoist is indifferent from the moral point of view, so long as he injures no one, and the altruist himself cannot live without a certain amount of egoism. The ideal of social sentiment therefore consists in the combined action of egoistic and altruistic sentiments, adapted to the wants of society and its members. As among certain ants, there should exist a complete compensatory regulation between the egoistic sentiments and appetites on the other hand. The antagonist of altruism is not the egoist, but the perverse individual whose acts are by instinct almost constantly negative from the moral point of view. Egoism urges a man in such an irresistible way to abuse and harm others in order to satisfy himself, that a pure egoist can rarely remain indifferent from the moral point of view. These considerations suffice to show the impossibility of basing social order on pure egoism, as so many people desire.
Sexual Morality.—Sexual morality depends upon what we have just said. By itself, the sexual appetite is indifferent from the moral point of view. A great confusion of ideas, based on religious misunderstanding, has led to the term morality being more and more identified with that of moral conduct in the sexual domain. In short, ethics has been more or less confounded with sexuality. From this point of view, a sexually anæsthetic individual is regarded as extremely "moral," while he is perhaps in other respects a knave. In reality his sexual indifference has not the least moral value. For the same reason an invert is not virtuous because he does not seduce girls.
From the Protestant point of view it is immoral to burden one's wife with continual pregnancies, while from the Catholic point of view it is immoral to interfere with these pregnancies by preventive measures.