The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp

by Augustus C. Buell

Structurally, the art of naval architecture has been exhausted in their design, and the skill of the best mechanics in the world was tried to the utmost in their construction. Whatever may have been their performance as to speed and time of passage, nothing is hazarded in saying that in safety, seaworthiness, and comfort they are not surpassed by anything afloat.

In the general public or patriotic sense the chief element of interest in these ships is the fact that they represent the inception of an effort to restore the prestige of the United States as a maritime commercial power. The condition of affairs existing at the time the new American Liners were projected was the culminating point of our feebleness on the ocean.

The Act of 1891 was framed to expire by its own limitation in ten years from its date. Taken in connection with the Act of 1892, already referred to, it brought about the construction of two first-class American trans-Atlantic greyhounds (the “St. Louis” and “St. Paul”). Other companies or lines running to the West Indies, Mexico, and South America were also stimulated to build a few new ships, but, generally speaking, the effect of both these acts was limited, and produced no serious impression for the better on the American merchant marine in general.

This fact became evident very soon after these acts went into effect, and it became clear that a broader and more comprehensive policy must be adopted in the same direction if any great or lasting improvement of the condition of our merchant marine was to be expected.

This led to the framing of a new act, thoroughly comprehensive in its scope and universal in its application, on lines similar to those of the Dingley Bill of 1882, but broader.

Prior to 1891, Mr. Cramp had confined the statements, deductions, and arguments based upon his experience and observation wholly to hearings before committees of Congress, with now and then a newspaper interview, which in the nature of things must be transitory and soon forgotten. But in the fall of 1891 he determined to place his knowledge before the public in a more permanent form. This he began with a paper in the Forum for November of that year. The limits of this Memoir do not admit of the reproduction of this paper in its entirety. It filled sixteen pages of the Forum. The summary of the conclusion, however, may be reproduced. After an exhaustive analysis of the existing conditions and their causes, together with a survey of the probable effects of the act approved the previous March (March 3, 1891), Mr. Cramp summed up as follows:

“The commercial disadvantages resulting from a monopoly of our ocean-carrying trade by foreign fleets attracted public attention many years ago. From the first there was practical unanimity as to the existence of these disadvantages, and a like concurrence in the opinion that ‘something ought to be done’ to improve the situation; but upon the question of remedy there have always been wide divergences of view. It having been generally conceded that the remedy must at least begin in national legislation, the dispute has been simply as to what the character of that legislation should be. A certain faction contended that nothing was required beyond a simple repeal of the navigation laws, to permit the free importation and registry of foreign-built vessels; and bills to that effect have been introduced, and in many cases discussed, in nearly every Congress since 1870. In no case has a bill of this character passed both Houses of Congress, and but once has the measure received a majority in either House. That was in the Forty-seventh Congress, when a ‘Free Ship Amendment’ was proposed by Mr. Candler, of Massachusetts,—a bitter opponent of American ship-building,—to what was known as the ‘Dingley Shipping Bill,’ and Mr. Candler’s amendment was attached to the bill by a small majority. The result of this amendment was to kill the bill. It is not my purpose to discuss the merits of this proposition, further than to say that whatever increase in American tonnage might accrue from it would be gained at the expense of the destruction of American ship-building. That may be set down as an axiom to be observed as a necessary factor in every discussion of the subject. As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the ship-building industry in Great Britain has been developed to such enormous proportions, and the facilities of construction enlarged to such a scale, that our own comparatively few and feeble shipyards would be instantly overwhelmed in the competition the moment our market was thrown open to them to unload their old and worn-out wares on American ‘bargain-hunters.’

“This fact is now so well understood, that I think there is no hazard in saying that a large majority of the best minds of all parties are convinced that the experiment of trying to augment our merchant marine by a policy calculated to destroy our ship-building industry would not be conducive to the general public interests.

“The other mode of remedy advocated has been that of adopting, in behalf of our own shipping, a policy similar to the one which has produced such striking results elsewhere; that is to say, public encouragement to the ownership and operation of American-built vessels in the foreign trade. This subject has for many years claimed a large share of the attention of Congress, commercial organizations, and the press. Its discussion has taken a wide scope, involving several exhaustive inquiries by congressional committees, numerous petitions and resolutions from boards of trades and chambers of commerce, with almost innumerable papers in the public prints, and speeches in our public halls; the whole forming what may be called the ‘Literature of our Merchant Marine.’ Its volume is so vast, that but the barest reference to its details can be made here. Suffice it to say, that it covers every conceivable point at issue; and it has been so universally published, that no person of ordinary intelligence and education can have excuse for ignorance or misinformation on the subject.

“The results of this agitation and discussion have been bills in Congress from time to time, providing for a more liberal and enlightened policy on the part of the government toward the national merchant marine. Some of these bills proposed special compensations to particular lines for carrying the mails. Such bills have failed in consequence of the objection that they involved the principle of special legislation. Other measures proposed a general bounty based upon tonnage and distance actually travelled in foreign trade. This plan at the outset seemed more popular than any other, and there was at one time strong probability of its enactment into law. But it finally failed, partly on account of clashing of diverse interests, and partly by reason of ‘party exigencies,’ real or supposed, in the House of Representatives. It is hardly pertinent at this time to point out the benefits that would have accrued, directly and incidentally, to every branch of our national life and industry, from a tonnage law properly administered. I have never hesitated, and do not now hesitate, to declare that ten years of its operation would result in placing our merchant marine in the foreign trade on a footing second only to that of Great Britain in amount, and vastly superior to it in character and quality of vessels. And I still hope to see such a policy adopted at no distant day.