The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp

by Augustus C. Buell

“In my judgment, it is hardly possible to overvalue the importance of homogeneity in fleet organizations, and I am sure that the very first and perhaps greatest lesson taught by an encounter between fleets of modern battleships will be the advantage of similarity of type and equality of performance in the units of action.

“To this element of the art of naval warfare, then, I would invite your most earnest and penetrating attention and study.

“Assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and the material of the fleet in the most effective possible condition, so far as relation of units to each other and to the sum-total is concerned, we have still left for consideration the difference between men, the lack of uniformity in personnel. Homogeneity of material may be attained by adherence to a wise programme of design and construction; but homogeneity of personnel, in the sense of uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals, is beyond human art or science to produce, because the difference between men is the decree of a higher power. The existence of this college is itself a devout recognition of that great fact, because its whole objective is to mitigate or minify as much as possible this inherent human frailty, by exhausting the resources of training and study, of precept and example.

“I do not by any means argue that the commander of a ship should be a naval architect or constructor. But, having familiarized himself with the principles of that art which touch directly and immediately his function of handling his ship under sea conditions of common occurrence, and having gained sufficient knowledge of her traits, he should be able to form an instant and correct judgment as to her point of best behavior in any sea-way. It goes without saying that sea experience is the only school in which these problems can be worked out.

“Knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by study of the experience of others. Close and earnest attention to this course of, at best partial, information cannot serve as a substitute for experience of one’s own. At most it can only provide a sound basis on which to take quick advantage of one’s own experience, when confronted with an actual situation.

“This brings me to the proposition that the modern battleship, with all its complexities, weights, and peculiarities of design and model, entails upon commanding officers a new requirement which I can find no better terms to describe than ‘battleship seamanship.’ It is a development of the seafaring art which, as events have proved, is by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most actively exercised navy of the world; therefore it would be too much to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude and, hence, less means for distribution of opportunities to gain experience.

“It therefore follows indisputably that navies of the lesser magnitude should constantly exhaust their means of enabling officers to gain sea experience by keeping all their large ships in active evolution all the time.

“Having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical unit herself, we may profitably pass to brief consideration of the great number and variety of mechanisms composing her. In the strict professional or technical sense, these mechanisms concern mainly the engineer and the electrician. But as the foundation of all warlike efficiency in personnel is discipline, and as the foundation of all discipline is the inevitable principle of a single head, one commander, who is to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch, it should follow that ‘the king can do no wrong.’

“I have already remarked that the captain need not be a naval architect or constructor to comprehend and be able to apply the group of principles of that art which touch his functions directly in managing his ship as a whole; likewise, I would say here that he need not be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control are essential to the efficiency of his command.

“But, if he really commands, he must know enough about the instruments that do his work to know when they are doing it well and when not; to know whether his subordinates immediately in charge of the several devices are operating them properly or not; to know when defects exist and when they have been made good. If he does not know or cannot learn these things, he must depend wholly on subordinates immediately in charge; and their reports will be law to him, or if not law, at least decisions from which he has no appeal. Manifestly such a situation is utterly incompatible with the independent and self-relying autocracy which is the essential and fundamental principle of naval command, without which discipline must sooner or later vanish into mere empty form or conventional myth. These facts, even more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity of type, previously touched upon, so that in learning the traits of one battleship the officer acquires experience and knowledge applicable at once to the discharge of his duties in another.