Hard upon twenty years ago, a friend and opponent who stands high in these matters, and who is not nearly such a sectary of Aristotle and establishment as most, wrote to me as follows: "It is said that next to the man who forms the taste of the nation, the greatest genius is the man who corrupts it. I mean therefore no disrespect, but very much the reverse, when I say that I have hitherto always considered you as a great logical heresiarch." Coleridge says he thinks that it was Sir Joshua Reynolds who made the remark: which, to copy a bull I once heard, I cannot deny, because I was not there when he said it. My friend did not call me to repentance and reconciliation with the church: I think he had a guess that I was a reprobate sinner. My offences at that time were but small: I went on spinning syllogism systems, all alien from the common logic, until I had six, the initial letters of which, put together, from the
names I gave before I saw what they would make, bar all repentance by the words
RUE NOT!
leaving to the followers of the old school the comfortable option of placing the letters thus:
TRUE? NO!
It should however be stated that the question is not about absolute truth or falsehood. No one denies that anything I call an inference is an inference: they say that my alterations are extra-logical; that they are material, not formal; and that logic is a formal science.
The distinction between material and formal is easily made, where the usual perversions are not required. A form is an empty machine, such as "Every X is Y"; it may be supplied with matter, as in "Every man is animal." The logicians will not see that their formal proposition, "Every X is Y," is material in three points, the degree of assertion, the quantity of the proposition, and the copula. The purely formal proposition is "There is the probability α that X stands in the relation L to Y." The time will come when it will be regretted that logic went without paradoxers for two thousand years: and when much that has been said on the distinction of form and matter will breed jokes.
I give one instance of one mood of each of the systems, in the order of the letters first written above.
Relative.—In this system the formal relation is taken, that is, the copula may be any whatever. As a material instance, in which the relations are those of consanguinity (of men understood), take the following: X is the brother of Y; X is not the uncle of Z; therefore, Z is not the child of Y. The discussion of relation, and of the objections to the extension, is in the Cambridge Transactions, Vol. X, Part 2; a crabbed conglomerate.
Undecided.—In this system one premise, and want of power over another, infer want of power over a conclusion.