to turn up the letter which he sent me (Sept. 12, 1847) with the book. Part of it runs thus: "I congratulate you on your success in your logical researches [that is, in asking for the book, I had described some results]. Since the reading of your first paper I have been satisfied as to the possibility of inventing a logical notation in which the rationale of the inference is contained in the symbol, though I never attempted to verify it [what I communicated, then, satisfied the writer that I had done and communicated what he, from my previous paper, suspected to be practicable]. I send you Ploucquet's dissertation....'
It now being manifest that I cannot be souring grapes which have been taken from me, I will say what I never said in print before. There is not the slightest merit in making the symbols of the premises yield that of the conclusion by erasure: the thing must do itself in every system which symbolises quantities. For in every syllogism (except the inverted Bramantip of the Aristotelians) the conclusion is manifest in this way without symbols. This Bramantip destroys system in the Aristotelian lot: and circumstances which I have pointed out destroy it in Hamilton's own collection. But in that enlargement of the reputed Aristotelian system which I have called onymatic, and in that correction of Hamilton's system which I have called exemplar, the rule of erasure is universal, and may be seen without symbols.
Our first controversy was in 1846. In 1847, in my Formal Logic, I gave him back a little satire for satire, just to show, as I stated, that I could employ ridicule if I pleased. He was so offended with the appendix in which this was contained, that he would not accept the copy of the book I sent him, but returned it. Copies of controversial works, sent from opponent to opponent, are not presents, in the usual sense: it was a marked success to make him angry enough to forget this. It had some effect however: during the rest of his life I wished to avoid provocation; for I
could not feel sure that excitement might not produce consequences. I allowed his slashing account of me in the Discussions to pass unanswered: and before that, when he proposed to open a controversy in the Athenæum upon my second Cambridge paper, I merely deferred the dispute until the next edition of my Formal Logic. I cannot expect the account in the Discussions to amuse an unconcerned reader as much as it amused myself: but for a cut-and-thrust, might-and-main, tooth-and-nail, hammer-and-tongs assault, I can particularly recommend it. I never knew, until I read it, how much I should enjoy a thundering onslought on myself, done with racy insolence by a master hand, to whom my good genius had whispered Ita feri ut se sentiat emori.[[718]] Since that time I have, as the Irishman said, become "dry moulded for want of a bating." Some of my paradoxers have done their best: but theirs is mere twopenny—"small swipes," as Peter Peebles said. Brandy for heroes! I hope a reviewer or two will have mercy on me, and will give me as good discipline as Strafford would have given Hampden and his set: "much beholden," said he, "should they be to any one that should thoroughly take pains with them in that kind"—meaning objective flagellation. And I shall be the same to any one who will serve me so—but in a literary and periodical sense: my corporeal cuticle is as thin as my neighbors'.
Sir W. H. was suffering under local paralysis before our controversy commenced: and though his mind was quite unaffected, a retort of as downright a character as the attack might have produced serious effect upon a person who had shown himself sensible of ridicule. Had a second attack of his disorder followed an answer from me, I should have been held to have caused it: though, looking at Hamilton's genial love of combat, I strongly suspected that a retort in kind
"Would cheer his heart, and warm his blood,
And make him fight, and do him good."
But I could not venture to risk it. So all I did, in reply to the article in the Discussions, was to write to him the following note: which, as illustrating an etiquette of controversy, I insert.
"I beg to acknowledge and thank you for.... It is necessary that I should say a word on my retention of this work, with reference to your return of the copy of my Formal Logic, which I presented to you on its publication: a return made on the ground of your disapproval of the account of our controversy which that work contained. According to my view of the subject, any one whose dealing with the author of a book is specially attacked in it, has a right to expect from the author that part of the book in which the attack is made, together with so much of the remaining part as is fairly context. And I hold that the acceptance by the party assailed of such work or part of a work does not imply any amount of approval of the contents, or of want of disapproval. On this principle (though I am not prepared to add the word alone) I forwarded to you the whole of my work on Formal Logic and my second Cambridge Memoir. And on this principle I should have held you wanting in due regard to my literary rights if you had not forwarded to me your asterisked pages, with all else that was necessary to a full understanding of their scope and meaning, so far as the contents of the book would furnish it. For the remaining portion, which it would be a hundred pities to separate from the pages in which I am directly concerned, I am your debtor on another principle; and shall be glad to remain so if you will allow me to make a feint of balancing the account by the offer of two small works on subjects as little connected with our discussion as the Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum, or the Lutheran dispute. I trust that by accepting my Opuscula you will enable me to avoid the