| 25 : 16 :: rq 20 : rq 8.192: and (rq 8.192)2 × | π 4 | = 8.192 × .78125 = 6.4 |
will be the second number; therefore rq(15.625 × 6.4) = rq 100 = 10, is the required mean proportional.... Now, my good Sir, however competent you may be to prove every man a fool [not every man, Mr. Smith! only some; pray learn logical quantification] who now thinks, or in times gone by has thought, the 'Squaring of the Circle' a possibility; I doubt, and, on the evidence afforded by your Budget, I cannot help doubting, whether you were ever before competent to find two mean proportionals by my unique method."—(Nut, pp. 47, 48.) [That I never was, I solemnly declare!]
All readers can be made to see the following exposure. When 5 and 20 are given, x is a mean proportional when in 5, x, 20, 5 is to x as x to 20. And x must be 10. But x and y are two mean proportionals when in 5, x, y, 20, x
is a mean proportional between 5 and y, and y is a mean proportional between x and 20. And these means are x = 5 ³√4, y = 5 ³√16. But Mr. Smith finds one mean, finds it again in a roundabout way, and produces 10 and 10 as the two (equal!) means, in solution of the "famous old problem." This is enough: if more were wanted, there is more where this came from. Let it not be forgotten that Mr. Smith has found a translator abroad, two, perhaps three, followers at home, and—most surprising of all—a real mathematician to try to set him right. And this mathematician did not discover the character of the subsoil of the land he was trying to cultivate until a goodly octavo volume of letters had passed and repassed. I have noticed, in more quarters than one, an apparent want of perception of the full amount of Mr. Smith's ignorance: persons who have not been in contact with the non-geometrical circle-squarers have a kind of doubt as to whether anybody can carry things so far. But I am an "old bird" as Mr. Smith himself calls me; a Simorg, an "all-knowing Bird of Ages" in matters of cyclometry.
The curious phenomena of thought here exhibited illustrate, as above said, a remark I have long ago made on the effect of proper study of logic. Most persons reason well enough on matter to which they are accustomed, and in terms with which they are familiar. But in unaccustomed matter, and with use of strange terms, few except those who are practised in the abstractions of pure logic can be tolerably sure to keep their feet. And one of the reasons is easily stated: terms which are not quite familiar partake of the vagueness of the X and Y on which the student of logic learns to see the formal force of a proposition independently of its material elements.
I make the following quotation from my fourth paper on logic in the Cambridge Transactions:
"The uncultivated reason proceeds by a process almost entirely material. Though the necessary law of thought
must determine the conclusion of the ploughboy as much as that of Aristotle himself, the ploughboy's conclusion will only be tolerably sure when the matter of it is such as comes within his usual cognizance. He knows that geese being all birds does not make all birds geese, but mainly because there are ducks, chickens, partridges, etc. A beginner in geometry, when asked what follows from 'Every A is B,' answers 'Every B is A.' That is, the necessary laws of thought, except in minds which have examined their tools, are not very sure to work correct conclusions except upon familiar matter.... As the cultivation of the individual increases, the laws of thought which are of most usual application are applied to familiar matter with tolerable safety. But difficulty and risk of error make a new appearance with a new subject; and this, in most cases, until new subjects are familiar things, unusual matter common, untried nomenclature habitual; that is, until it is a habit to be occupied upon a novelty. It is observed that many persons reason well in some things and badly in others; and this is attributed to the consequence of employing the mind too much upon one or another subject. But those who know the truth of the preceding remarks will not have far to seek for what is often, perhaps most often, the true reason.... I maintain that logic tends to make the power of reason over the unusual and unfamiliar more nearly equal to the power over the usual and familiar than it would otherwise be. The second is increased; but the first is almost created."
Mr. James Smith, by bringing ignorance, folly, dishonesty into contact with my name, in the way of conditional insinuation, has done me a good turn: he has given me right to a freedom of personal remark which I might have declined to take in the case of a person who is useful and respected in matters which he understands.
Tit for tat is logic all the world over. By the way, what has become of the rest of the maxim: we never hear it