Some A is not B and EveryB is A
Some A is not B and NoB is A
Some A is not B and SomeB is A
Some A is not B and SomeB is not A.

We find then, including converses, which are not identical with their direct propositions, six different ways of asserting or denying, with respect to agreement or non-agreement, total or partial, between A and, say X: these we write down, designating the additional assertions by U and Y.

Identical.Identical.
A Every A is XENo A is XISome A is XO Some A is not X
U Every X is ANo X is ASome X is AY Some X is not A

We shall now repeat and extend the table of page [8] (A), &c., meaning, as before, the denial of A, &c.

From A or (O)followA,(E),I(O)
From E or (I) (A),E,(I),O,(U),Y
From I or (E) (E)I
From O or (A) (A), O
From U or (Y) (E)I, U(Y)
From Y or (U) (U)Y

Having thus discussed the principal points connected with the simple assertion, we pass to the manner of making two assertions give a third. Every instance of this is called a syllogism, the two assertions which form the basis of the third are called premises, and the third itself the conclusion.

If two things both agree with a third in any particular, they agree with each other in the same; as, if A be of the same colour as X, and B of the same colour as X, then A is of the same colour as B. Again, if A differ from X in any particular in which B agrees with X, then A and B differ in that particular. If A be not of the same colour as X, and B be of the same colour as X, then A is not of the colour of B. But if A and B both differ from X in any particular, nothing can be inferred; they may either differ in the same way and to the same extent, or not. Thus, if A and B be both of different colours from X, it neither follows that they agree, nor differ, in their own colours.

The paragraph preceding contains the essential parts of all inference, which consists in comparing two things with a third, and finding from their agreement or difference with that third, their agreement or difference with one another. Thus, Every A is X, every B is X, allows us to infer that A and B have all those qualities in common which are necessary to X. Again, from Every A is X, and ‘No B is X,’ we infer that A and B differ from one another in all particulars which are essential to X. The preceding forms, however, though they represent common reasoning better than the ordinary syllogism, to which we are now coming, do not constitute the ultimate forms of inference. Simple identity or non-identity is the ultimate state to which every assertion may be reduced; and we shall, therefore, first ask, from what identities, &c., can other identities, &c., be produced? Again, since we name objects in species, each species consisting of a number of individuals, and since our assertion may include all or only part of a species, it is further necessary to ask, in every instance, to what extent the conclusion drawn is true, whether of all, or only of part?

Let us take the simple assertion, ‘Every living man respires;’ or, every living man is one of the things (however varied they may be) which respire. If we were to inclose all living men in a large triangle, and all respiring objects in a large circle, the preceding assertion, if true, would require that the whole of the triangle should be contained in the circle. And in the same way we may reduce any assertion to the expression of a coincidence, total or partial, between two figures. Thus, a point in a circle may represent an individual of one species, and a point in a triangle an individual of another species: and we may express that the whole of one species is asserted to be contained or not contained in the other by such forms as, ‘All the △ is in the ○’; ‘None of the △ is in the ○’.

Any two assertions about A and B, each expressing agreement or disagreement, total or partial, with or from X, and leading to a conclusion with respect to A or B, is called a syllogism, of which X is called the middle term. The plainest syllogism is the following:—