During the late engagement Maou-lin and Ling-ho had particularly distinguished themselves. In vain had my two friends and the Corsican and Sardinian officers attempted to compete with their valour. Foremost in every assault Maou-lin or his adopted brother made themselves conspicuous. All had received spear-wounds in the mêlée, but, fortunately, none were very severe, and under the soothing influence of the herbal decoctions the Chinese surgeons so well understand the use of, they soon became healed. Our total loss in killed and wounded was less than two thousand, while that of the enemy was immense: the whole battle-field and line of retreat was literally covered with their slain, while hundreds had perished in the waters of the Poyang Lake.
Hu-kau had been a military depôt of the Imperialists, and in it we captured considerable stores of grain and war material. After an occupation of several weeks, the object of the expedition in the defeat of the Imperialist army, having been so successfully accomplished, the Chung-wang abandoned that place, and sending back the divisions that had joined him in Ngan-whui with large convoys of grain, and the sick and wounded of the army, to be carried to Nankin, he advanced with his first division through the southern part of Ngan-whui into the province of Che-kiang, upon a march of observation, preparatory to the grand campaign of the summer, that had been decided upon at Nankin by the military council.
I returned with the larger portion of the army to Nankin, and took my friends with me, as it was my intention to communicate with agents at Shanghae and transact various affairs connected with forwarding the Ti-ping cause. The Chung-wang was so pleased with the effectiveness of my little field battery that he kept it with him, and before parting with him I received his best thanks, whilst each of my friends were given a certificate for their gallantry in the action and the capture of the stockade.
CHAPTER X.
Prospects of the Ti-pings in 1860.—Their Operations.—Relief of Nankin.—Rout of the Imperialists.—Ti-ping Successes.—British Interference.—Ti-pings advance on Shanghae.—The Chung-wang's Address.—Mr. Bruce's Notification.—Mr. Bruce's Dispatch.—The Future of China.—The Chung-wang's Dispatch.—Mr. Bruce's Inconsistency.—Missionary "Holmes."—His Statement.—His Uncourteous Behaviour.—His Inconsistencies.—Suppressed Missionary Reports.—Rev. Griffith Johns' Report.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Shanghae Massacre of Ti-pings.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Author's Reflections thereon.
Gloomy, indeed, were the prospects of the Ti-pings at the opening of the year 1860. The garrison of Nankin, reduced to less than 20,000 men by the continual reinforcements despatched to the armies in Kiang-si, Ngan-whui, and the north bank of the Yang-tze—a proceeding rendered necessary by the shortness of supplies in the capital—was cut off from all communication with its armies in the field by a series of works forming a complete line of circumvallation from the Tsin-hwai river, which enters the Yang-tze a few miles above Nankin, to Yentzeke, a position about five miles below the city, and situated on the Yang-tze river. Large fleets of Imperialist war-junks blockaded the river communication of the city from below, while, far as the eye could reach, over hill and valley, the many-bannered hosts of the besieging army occupied the whole surrounding country. It seemed but a question of a few weeks more whether the Imperialists would have the courage to storm the city, or whether starvation would exterminate the noble and patriotic band of the first Christian movement in China. It was then the power and organization of the Ti-pings were displayed to their fullest extent; at no time, since the erection of their standard of liberty, had their cause been threatened by so imminent a danger, and at no time had their movements been so skilfully conducted, as during the three months preceding the relief of Nankin. The tactics first adopted were those of distracting the attention of the besiegers, and obliging them to detach portions of their force. In accordance with this project, the army in the Eastern province of Ngan-whui, commanded by Le, the Chung-wang (formerly general of the first Northern expedition), and the army in Kiang-si, commanded by the I-wang (the Tien-wang's brother Shih-ta-kae), by forced marches placed themselves upon the rear of the besieging army, and seriously threatened its lines of communication.
The Chung-wang, starting from the vicinity of Wuhu and Tai-ping-foo, on the south bank of the Yang-tze, by a flank march in a south-easterly direction, placed himself immediately in the rear of the grand army of Imperialists encamped before Nankin. Detaching a strong column to threaten the cities of Soo-chow and Chang-chau, the principal depôts of the enemy, he hurried his main body by forced marches to the provincial capital Hang-chau, and, after heavy fighting, upon the 19th of March mined the walls, and obtained possession of the outer city. The Manchoo garrison, after holding out in the inner or Tartar city for six days, were succoured by a considerable force from Kiang-su, which joining them, recovered the city; the Ti-pings retiring, after inflicting severe loss amongst their opponents.
In the meanwhile, the I-wang, concentrating his forces upon the Kiang-si frontier, also invaded the Che-kiang province, but from a point more to the south. After capturing the prefectural cities Ku-chau and Yen-chau, and descending the Tsien-tang river to within a short distance of Hang-chau, he suddenly turned north, and effected a junction with the Chung-wang.