At the time this unparalleled breach of faith took place at Shanghae, England was bound by every tie, legally or theoretically binding, to maintain a strict neutrality between the two contending powers. Not only by Sir George Bonham's, Consul Meadows', Lord Elgin's, and Mr. Bruce's guarantees was the nation pledged to a neutral position; there was also an Ordinance of Neutrality passed by Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong-kong, in 1855, the principal clause of which is as follows:—

"That it shall be a misdemeanour punishable by not more than two years' imprisonment, &c., for any British subject within any part of China to assist either the existing Chinese government, or any or either of the different factions at present engaged, or who may be hereafter engaged in opposition to the government, by personal enlistment in the service of either of the said several parties, or by procuring other persons to enlist in such service, or by furnishing, selling, or procuring warlike stores of any description, or by fitting out vessels, or by knowingly and purposely doing any other act to assist either party, by which neutrality may be violated."

It is therefore highly improbable that Mr. Bruce dared upon his own responsibility to violate all these existing bonds and regulations: much more does it resemble the policy of secret instructions. A perusal of the despatches of the Minister at Pekin must lead to this conclusion, more particularly when a comparison is drawn between the following extracts from a despatch of Mr. Bruce to Lord Russell, dated Shanghae, June 10th, 1860, and his defence of Shanghae only a few weeks later:—

"Without discussing" (he is discussing with Earl Russell, therefore the plan of intervention was undoubtedly submitted to him) "whether intervention, under the peculiar circumstances of the civil contest in China, be justifiable or not, or whether it would be expedient, with a view to opening the Yang-tze river to trade, to recapture towns, such as Nankin and Chin-kiang, which command it, I am inclined to doubt the policy of attempting to restore by force of arms the power of the Imperial government in cities and provinces occupied, or rather overrun, by the insurgents."

Yet scarcely two months elapse when Mr. Bruce acts in direct contradiction to this opinion!

The following passage from the same despatch speaks in the very strongest terms against intervention:—

"The Chinese officials, pressed for money, and relying on foreign support, would become more than ever cruel, corrupt, and oppressive; and the Chinese, deprived of popular insurrection, their rude but efficacious remedy against local oppressors, would with justice throw on the foreigner the odium of excesses which his presence alone would render possible. The consequence would be, popular hostility, reprisals, and that train of events which would render it necessary to appropriate permanently the province occupied, or to retire from it, leaving behind a bitter ill-will among the people. No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation, as to lend our material support to a government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness." (!!!)

Such is the opinion of a resident British minister, an opinion constantly reiterated. The people of England may then well wonder at conduct in such direct opposition to the reports of the Government representative in China. The observations of Col. Sykes, M.P., &c., in his advocacy of a high principle, are worthy of attention. At page 18 of his valuable little work "The Taeping Rebellion in China," he states:—

"Incredible as it may appear, while we were shooting down those who asked for our friendship, and were defending a city belonging to a government with which we were at war, and collecting custom duties by Mr. Lay and other British subjects, on account of the Emperor of China, that very emperor was sanctioning British and French officers and soldiers being tortured and put to death at Pekin, and the Prince Kung, the brother of the emperor, in whom we are now placing such implicit confidence, was at that time in such a position at Pekin as to have been able to prevent the cruelties perpetrated upon our officers and men."