Far brighter dawned the spring of 1861 upon the Ti-ping cause than did the opening of the previous year. In nearly every direction the revolutionists were victorious: the principal forces of the Manchoo emperor were completely routed, and a considerable portion of the most valuable territory in China had fallen into their hands, and was fast becoming thoroughly consolidated as a part of their possessions. It seemed as though at last their heroic struggles were about to receive their well-merited reward. So great was the prestige of their late triumphs that, wherever they marched, whole armies of Imperialists vanished away without striking a blow, or, if unable to seek security in precipitate flight, defended themselves with the wild unorganized desperation of despair.
The extent of country entirely under the Ti-ping rule was very considerable. Along the line of the great Yang-tze river, from N.E. to S.W., their territory extended from its banks below Chin-kiang into the central part of the province of Kiang-si, south of the Poyang lake, a distance of more than 360 miles; while from the boundaries of their possessions N.W. of the river to the opposite limits in the S.E., an irregular breadth of 200 to 250 miles included the whole of their settled dominions, forming an area upwards of 90,000 square miles, and containing a population of some 45,000,000. Besides this, large portions of the provinces of Hoo-peh, Hoo-nan, Fu-keen, Che-kiang, and the distant Sze-chuan, were occupied by powerful Ti-ping armies. The lowest approximate strength of their forces at this time might be estimated at 350,000; but a large proportion consisted of mere boys. This force was divided into five principal armies, the remainder doing garrison duty at Nankin, Soo-chow, and many other of the most important cities within their jurisdiction. One of the five armies in the field was commanded by the Ying-wang in the province of Hoo-peh: the Chung-wang commanded a large force in the southern districts of Ngan-whui; the Shi-wang, with a very powerful army, was operating in the central part of Kiang-si; and the Kan-wang, having proceeded to the province of Hoo-nan, was joined by upwards of 40,000 insurgents from the old seats of rebellion against the Manchoo dynasty,—the provinces in the southern limit of the empire, Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, and Kwei-chow; and, besides this force, far away upon the western boundary of China, Shih-ta-kae (I-wang), the Ti-ping emperor's brother, in command of a large army, was successfully operating in Sze-chuan. In fact, north, south, east, and west, the star of the patriots shone brightly in the ascendant, while that of the Manchoos seemed setting in the gloom and darkness, through which, upwards of two hundred years ago, it had struggled into existence. The greatest empire in the world appeared at length about to be relieved from that incubus which for two centuries had paralyzed its hopes and energies; the enlightenment of China seemed approaching, step by step with the advent of Christianity, which, following rapidly on the expulsion of the Tartar, with its vast train of benefit and improvement, promised, not alone to place that empire upon the pedestal of greatness yet reserved for her, but to realize corresponding advantages for the whole civilized world. One dark cloud alone appeared to cast a shadow upon so bright an horizon—the policy of the British Government. Language can scarcely express how seriously the interests of the universe, and of England in particular, have been prejudiced by a persistence in the suicidal measures dictated by a policy so mistaken.
Forcibly as the moral effect of the general foreign policy of England has been denounced by statesmen, how few have been found to raise their voices in the British senate in protestation against the practical evils which that policy has engendered in the far East, a country abounding in tea and silk, and now paralyzed by opium instead of being enriched by the manufactures of Great Britain. The moral effect of bad statesmanship, however much it may weaken England's just influence and the future peace of Europe, cannot sensibly affect the present wealth and pursuits of the people. Trade, politics, civilization, and religion, are pretty well balanced and regulated throughout Europe; therefore, whatever evil might result from the foreign policy of the British Government, no particular improvement could be expected to take place in a state of affairs which we consider almost perfect. But very different are the results of our peculiar kind of foreign policy in the case of China. With that extensive empire present relations are unsatisfactory, and the mutual benefits to be derived from a free intercourse are yet hidden in the vale of futurity. Mutual benefit is hardly the correct expression, for from a country which may be regarded as the richest in the world in proportion to its extent and population, England would derive far greater commercial advantages than she could possibly bestow. Whenever a prospect of the most satisfactory relations offered, and whenever a free intercourse was not only offered, but actually established by any section or part of that innumerable people, it would be only natural for England to rejoice, if not for the sake of the Chinese, and the higher objects of humanity, at least for selfish motives. But this is exactly what the British Government has proved incapable of appreciating, by preferring temporary interests to those which were much greater and far more lasting.
The Ti-pings offered not only satisfactory relations and free intercourse, but every advantage that England could possibly wish for or be benefitted by. Christianity and civilization, as practised among ourselves, would have become morally and physically certain under their rule. The detestable opium trade would have been completely annihilated, and British produce would have taken its place, to the benefit of the Chinese, and the relief of the choked markets and distressed operatives of England. The fulfilment of the Ti-ping law, that European "brethren" should "go out or in, backwards or forwards, in full accordance with their own will or wish," whether for pleasure or "to carry on their commercial operations," did throw open the whole of their territory to free intercourse and trade, and would have done the same for the entire Chinese empire. The exclusiveness and hatred of the Manchoo Government to the "outer barbarians" and "foreign devils" was by the Ti-pings changed into friendship and kindness. Modern improvements would have been extensively introduced. The trade, at present restricted to a few treaty ports, would have become universal throughout the empire, and the vast stores of mineral riches, almost unknown to foreigners, would have yielded forth their mines of wealth, while a general and enormous commerce, perfectly free and unfettered (excepting opium), would have thrown open an empire richer in itself than all Europe. To England especially, as the greatest commercial power, an inexhaustible source of profit would certainly have been established, and would have produced, without aggression or usurpation of territory, a revenue far excelling any derived from India. All these and many other important advantages were partially established by the Ti-pings, and would undoubtedly have been completed upon the final overthrow of the Manchoos.
Strong as these inducements should have been to cause England to adopt a different policy towards China, and much as such a course would have tended to her own advantage, there was another and a higher consideration which she should have permitted to influence her. As a powerful and influential nation, a duty was cast upon her, if not to extend the hand of friendship to a people who were nobly struggling to follow her in the path of civilization and to learn the true religion, at least not to thwart such efforts, and, by untimely interference, render them hopelessly inoperative. Personal experience, the reports of men of intelligence and honour, all prove but too plainly how the friendly Ti-ping nation was crushed by British interference. It has been urged that the friendly professions of that people were not genuine, and that their undertaking would never have been performed. Had such a course, so opposed to their nature, been pursued, surely it would have been more grateful to the martial spirit of England to resort to arms for the purpose of enforcing an observance of good faith and honour, than for that of avenging the capture of a wretched opium smuggler.
Upon the 11th of February the expedition under command of Admiral Hope, started for the Yang-tze-kiang with the object of opening that river to foreign trade, in accordance with the treaty lately concluded at Pekin. In all respects this expedition was of the greatest importance, as well to the Chinese as the foreigners whom it most particularly interested. Its results were entirely prejudicial to the Ti-pings. The diplomatic and military authorities of the expedition mostly opposed the Ti-ping movement for its interference with the "carrying into due effect the terms of the treaty" just forced from the Manchoo at the cannon's mouth, and the almost certain prospects of its success, which would not only sadly affect the "China indemnity," but their own individual prospects of office and aggrandizement expected through their intercourse with the suddenly changed polite and obliging Manchoo mandarins. The deputation of the mercantile community attached to the expedition was utterly absorbed with its trading pursuits, and looked upon anything and everything likely to interfere with its immediate profits with no little amount of hostility: the future was completely ignored; its expectations were an uninterrupted trade for three years, and a return to England with a large fortune; therefore it is hardly to be wondered at that it looked with hatred upon the change progressing in the shape of the Ti-ping revolution. Besides the personal and spontaneous prejudice entertained by these two classes against the Ti-pings, it seems pretty certain that directly after all the efforts of the Manchoo Government to repel foreigners by force had failed, intrigues to deceive and induce them to act against the rebels they were unable to subdue, were successfully adopted. Even Mr. Bruce (who had stated in his despatches—"If there is one art of diplomacy understood by the Chinese it is that of separating interests which ought to be identical") seems to have been thoroughly imposed upon, while the false professions of the Manchoos, in order to obtain the assistance of the British against the Ti-pings, have had no small share in consummating that gross outrage. Again discussing the policy of assisting the Imperialists (which the latter had requested, making great protestations of "friendship," "mutual commercial interests," &c.), he says:—"It is evidently for the interest of the Chinese authorities to induce us to embark in a course of action which will embroil us with the insurgents."
Yet, eventually, Mr. Bruce chose to place implicit faith in their professions, and took one occasion out of many, in that disgraceful affair of the Anglo-Chinese fleet (depending upon the truth of the truthless Prince Kung, whose hands yet reeked with the blood of our murdered countrymen), to give his favourable opinion to the British Government; and the British people, depending upon their representatives, who depended upon the Government, who depended upon Mr. Lay, who depended upon Wan-siang, president of the Manchoo Foreign Office, who depended upon Prince Kung, who depended upon some one else, actually permitted the very laws of the land to be set aside, by allowing the ordinance of neutrality to be broken, and the Foreign Enlistment Act to be declared null and void. Fortunately the disgraceful affair terminated in the most ignominious manner, and the British sailors were saved the degradation (that had been thrust upon the soldiers) of becoming the mercenary braves of a corrupt and sanguinary despotism.
Upon the opening of the Yang-tze to trade, and the selection of the cities of Han-kow, Kiu-kiang, and Chin-kiang as the treaty ports, it became necessary to enter into some agreement with the Ti-pings, who commanded the river throughout its principal positions; in fact, by their possession of Nankin, Wu-hoo, Tae-ping-foo, the cities of Seaou-shan, Tung-shan, and several others, this trade was almost as completely in their power as the valuable silk trade had been since May, 1860. In consequence of this, Admiral Hope (ignoring, with all the arrogance of superior strength, the fact that the murderous repulse of the Ti-pings from Shanghae had given them a perfect right to make it a casus belli, and to retaliate upon British commerce, lives, or any other possession) communicated with the Ti-ping authorities at Nankin, and pledged the neutrality of the British nation once more.
The Earl of Elgin's instructions to Admiral Hope contain the following:[35]—
"It is obvious, however, that before British vessels can navigate the river in safety, some understanding must be arrived at with the rebels, who are believed to be in possession of certain points upon it. It is with the view of obtaining your assistance towards the accomplishment of this object that I now address myself to your Excellency.