"COMMUNICATION MADE BY COMMANDER APLIN TO THE TAEPING
AUTHORITIES AT NANKING.
"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces of her Majesty the Queen of England in China, to acquaint you that it is his intention to have beacons put up on the river-side between Woo-sung and Fu-shan....
"That the Governments of England and France having ordered that any attempt of the Taeping army to enter Shanghae or Woo-sung shall be repelled by force; and it being clear, therefore, that the presence of the Taeping troops in that vicinity can be productive of no good to them, and may lead to collision, it is very desirable that they should not approach within two days' march of these places, and the Commander-in-Chief requests that orders may be sent to the officers in command of their troops to this effect; copies to be supplied to me. Should this be done, he will exert his influence to prevent any hostile expedition issuing from these places for the purpose of attacking the Taeping troops."
With regard to this document, in the first place, the statement that the English Government had "ordered" Shanghae and Woo-sung to be defended vi et armis, is simply untrue. The Foreign Secretary's first "orders" with regard to the defence of Shanghae, or any other treaty port, bear date, "Foreign Office, July 24th, 1861," and are given to Mr. Bruce:—
"I have received from the Admiralty, together with other papers, a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you of the 8th of May.... I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral Hope's measures should be approved; and I have now to instruct you to endeavour to make arrangements to secure the neutrality of all the treaty ports against the rebels. The Government of Pekin will probably make no difficulty in abstaining from using the treaty ports as bases of operations against the rebels, provided the rebels on their side refrain from attacking those ports.... You will understand, however, that her Majesty's Government do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case, except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects.
"I am, &c.,
"(Signed) J. Russell."
If then orders had been issued to Admiral Hope or any one else, they must have been secret orders, for none are upon record to such effect as stated in the communication to the Ti-ping authorities. Moreover, the condition upon which the neutrality of the treaty ports was proposed in the Foreign Secretary's despatch was not observed. The Pekin Government was never asked to abstain from using Shanghae as a base of operations against the Ti-pings; on the contrary, they were not only assisted to make it one by the moral and indirect support of the British authorities, but by the actual assistance of British soldiers and sailors in the field, chiefly headed by Admiral Hope, who almost before the ink of his guarantee was dry openly violated it. What renders this flagrant disregard of all truth and honour still more to be deplored is the fact that the Ti-pings, in their wonderfully earnest endeavours to cultivate the friendship of Europeans, complied with every requisition of even Admiral Hope and his colleagues. They agreed not to attack Shanghae for the space of one year, upon the special understanding that the British upon their part would prevent the Imperialists from using that city for any aggressive or belligerent purposes; and although not even the shadow of an attempt was made by Admiral Hope, or any other British authority, to fulfil the pledges given upon the part of England, with an almost incredible forbearance and good faith, the Ti-pings to the very day, nay, nearly to the very hour, faithfully, but entirely to their own prejudice, refrained from any attack upon Shanghae. As for the orders with regard to Woo-sung, they can only be attributed to the exuberant imagination of the diplomatic Admiral, such place having never upon any occasion been referred to by the "orders" from the Foreign Secretary.
It is difficult indeed to consider Admiral Hope's communication, either in accordance with the public instructions of Lord Elgin and Earl Russell, or other than in direct opposition to them. Of course it would be idle to suppose that either Mr. Bruce, the minister to Pekin, Admiral Hope, Mr. Parkes, the diplomatic agent, or any of the consuls, would have dared to systematically violate the orders of their Government; it can therefore only be concluded that secret orders were given.
To those who cannot reconcile Admiral Hope's and Mr. Parkes's communications with the Ti-pings, with the explicit instructions they had each received, and can neither approve of their idea of "strict neutrality," it must appear that the Admiral's communication at Nankin was simply a very unsailor-like trap to catch the Ti-pings. The plot was doubtless very creditable to the ingenuity and diplomatic finesse of those who planned it; but those admirable politicians, though remarkably indifferent moralists, cannot easily reconcile it with honour and justice. Had the drama been enacted nearer to home, it would from its very clumsiness have attracted attention; but as it occurred so far away, scarcely a soul but those personally interested either knew or cared anything about it.
The intention evidently was to induce the Ti-pings to promise not to attack Shanghae, and then, by converting that city into a base and nucleus for the Manchoos, to compel them to do so for their self-preservation. The theory was a bold one, and would have been realized were it not for the extraordinary forbearance of the Ti-pings, which forced Admiral Hope, and the others, to commence hostilities themselves. The conditions upon which the insurgents had agreed not to attack Shanghae, the violation of the British pledges, and the true position of affairs, of course, formed no part of the programme to be made public; and it was correctly considered that China was too far away, and the British people not sufficiently interested to scrutinize matters very closely. Thus it is that a few unprincipled officials have been able to attempt the justification of their conduct, upon the pleas, that the Ti-pings broke faith and attacked Shanghae, and that the leaders of this great Christian and patriotic movement were a horde of banditti who desolated everything, and meditated the destruction of Shanghae, &c. &c. &c.