"I endeavoured to make clear to them the objects of British policy in China; (?) that our interests here were strictly commercial, and that they must disabuse their minds of an impression which I fancied they entertained, that we, like themselves, sought the possession of territory, and therefore that our interests were opposed to theirs. It was for the protection of our commerce, and for that purpose only, that we stationed a force at Shanghae."
Mr. Parkes had ample room to dilate on this subject, for it is difficult to imagine in what light, save that of an usurpation of territory, the Ti-pings could behold the seizure of Shanghae, Woo-sung, Ningpo, &c.
"Experience," continues Mr. Parkes, "had proved to us that we could not trust to the Imperial Government to protect the place, either against the Taeping forces, or the inferior bodies of insurgents...; that experience had also shown that, owing to their imperfect organization and discipline, plunder and violence marked the progress of the Taepings; and consequently, to secure the safety of our people and their property, it was necessary we should protect ourselves. (!!) That this mode of protection was perfectly efficient, but as it put us to expense and inconvenience, we should be glad when it was rendered no longer necessary by the restoration of the country to order, whether this was effected by its becoming wholly Taeping, or by reverting to Imperial rule, and when Shanghae or any other place that the English Government might see fit to protect, would revert to the hands of the governing power.... They (the Taepings) wished to know, however, in which way the Admiral would 'use his influence' to prevent their being attacked by the Imperialists from Shanghae; and whether one of their officers would be allowed to visit Shanghae to learn what arrangements were made in this respect."
This very singular extract is much open to objection. 1. If "experience had proved" that the Imperialists were unable to withstand the Ti-pings, how is it that Mr. Parkes states, with regard to the defence of Shanghae, &c., "we should be glad when it was no longer rendered necessary by the restoration of the country to order," particularly when the policy that was pursued naturally prolonged the struggle and delayed that result? 2. The inaccuracy of the statement that, "to secure the safety of our people and their property, it was necessary we should protect them ourselves," is thoroughly proved by the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings on the 9th December, 1861, when not the slightest particle of British property was touched, and all foreigners were treated as "brothers" by the Ti-pings; and, moreover, by the fact that not a single case is upon record in which the Ti-pings have ever retaliated upon European life or property when they might have done so with every justification. 3. Then, with regard to the "any other place that the English Government might see fit to protect," when the whole of the province, with the exception of Shanghae, was in the possession of the Ti-pings, and when the entire silk and a great proportion of the tea trades were also in their undisturbed possession, why was not Shanghae surrendered to the rising and triumphant power, as Ningpo had been; particularly when we are told that "it was rendered no longer necessary, by the restoration of the country to order," to pursue the policy of defending the treaty ports, or any other place, "that the English Government might see fit to protect"?
Mr. Parkes continues his report thus:—
"I then said that our discussion had chiefly related to Shanghae, and to the warning given them by the Admiral not to approach that port; but I was anxious to learn how far the friendly dispositions they professed" (more than the Imperialists ever did) "would induce them to abstain from obstructing our commerce, and whether they were disposed to agree to propositions of the following nature:—
"1. No Taeping force to advance within 100 li of any Chinese port or place open by treaty to British trade, provided that the Tartar government do not send out expeditions from those parts or places to attack the Taepings." (It was upon this condition the Ti-pings promised not to attack Shanghae during the "present year," 1861.)
"2. The Taeping authorities or forces not to obstruct the transit of native produce to the aforesaid ports or places, nor to prevent British merchandise passing from thence into the interior." (This clause always was, and has been, faithfully and regularly observed; and such being the case, upon what grounds but the extraction of the "indemnity" from the Imperial customs at Shanghae, can the plea of injury to trade upon the capture of that city by the Ti-pings rest, seeing that elsewhere they never injured, but did their utmost, even amidst the sanguinary and fierce prosecution of civil war, to foster and preserve it?)