Although Ngan-king had been threatened by Imperialist forces during some eighteen months, until the spring of 1861 it had never been seriously menaced, the Manchoo braves having contented themselves with the ordinary phase of Chinese warfare—watching, flag-waving, and yelling at a safe distance from any probable vicious attempt of the dangerous Chang-maous.[38] Ngan-king, however, was a place of great strength for Chinese warfare; it formed the point d'appui of all Ti-ping movements either to the northern or north-western provinces, and previous to any attack upon their capital, Nankin, or its fortified outposts, its reduction was an absolute necessity. The city being built right on the brink of the great river, was absolute mistress of that important highway, without which, and its invaluable water communication, any extensive movement of the Manchoo armies in an easterly direction became impracticable. At last, therefore, the Manchoo warriors girded up their loins, that is to say, tucked up the bottoms of their petticoat inexpressibles, fiercely wound their tails around their cleanly-shaven caputs, made a terrible display of huge flags, roaring gongs, horridly painted bamboo shields, and a most extravagant waste of gunpowder, and moving forward with terrific cloud-rending yells, established themselves safely out of cannon-range of the walls, and proceeded to complete the investment of the doomed city by building themselves in with a formidable series of earth-works and stockades, from which they could neither climb out nor enemies climb in. As a rule, the Chinese never fight unless they are obliged to. Not that they are so cowardly as some Europeans have mistakenly seemed to believe, but rather from those singularly refined traits of reasoning which, with these peculiar people, border closely upon the absurd. For instance, having myself often spoken with Chinamen regarding their ineffective and almost childish, but for the merciless treatment of the vanquished, military tactics, I have always been answered to the following effect:—
"Hi-ya, how can? Two piecee man no can stop one place aller same time, spose nother piecee man must wantchee come, mi must wantchee go; spose mi must wantchee stop, nother piecee man no can come."
Singularly enough this principle is generally applied. If a determined resistance is certain, those who should attack content themselves by safely fortifying themselves at a distance, as in the case at Ngan-king; but should the determination of the defensive party be doubtful, then an attack, with no little impetuosity and daring, will almost surely take place.
Now, the Ti-pings have never been known as remarkable for the logic, cowardice, or whatever it may be termed, generally peculiar to the race of Chinese: upon the contrary, their reputation has ever been that of fighting men. In consequence of this certain prospect of hard knocks in the event of their being irrational enough to try and climb over the walls of Ngan-king when the Ti-pings were determined to try and prevent them, the Imperialists very wisely made themselves masters of the situation by establishing a complete cordon of stockades around the city, extending from the river above to a point just below its walls, calculating, with a perfect philosophy, that when the rice within the city became finished, those without might make a good breakfast, then scale the walls free from any "hard knocks," and, better than all, gather the heads of the helpless and famished garrison, ad libitum; thus capturing the city, obtaining the emoluments of a long and easy campaign, and winding up with the head-money, all without the danger of fighting.
Meantime, although the city was fast becoming straitened for provisions, the Ying-wang confined his efforts for its relief to distant operations, probably considering its garrison amply sufficient not only to maintain the place, but to prevent any complete blockade by sallying forth upon the Manchoos, as their strength, although less than half that of the besiegers, was considered such as would not be likely to diminish their possible chance of victory. In this case, however, too much was expected from a mostly newly-levied force, exposed to the attack of Honan braves and Tartar troops, the best forces in the service of the Manchoo emperor.
The Ying-wang, his plans, and the success attending his hitherto operations, became known to the Yang-tze expedition, under Admiral Hope, in March. Upon the 22nd of that month Mr. Parkes visited the Ying-wang at the city of Hwang-chow, situated upon the northern bank of the river, 50 miles from the treaty port Han-kow. In his report of the interview he states:—
"At the gate by which we entered I observed a proclamation in the name of the Ying-wang, assuring the people of protection, and inviting them to come and trade freely with the troops. Another proclamation, addressed to the latter, prohibited them from that date from wandering into the villages and plundering the people. A third notice, appended to the heads of two rebels, made known that these men had been executed for robbing the people of their clothes while engaged in collecting grain for the troops."
This statement, to those who know anything about the Ti-pings, appears perfectly true; how does Mr. Parkes reconcile it with his report that "plunder and violence marked the progress of the Ti-pings"?