[42] Commencement of the year 1865.


CHAPTER XIV.

Ti-ping Revolution in 1861.—Official Correspondence.—Its Review.—Professions of Neutrality.—How carried out.—Captain Dew's Interpretation.—Ti-ping Remonstrance.—Cause of British Hostility.—Mr. Bruce's Assertions.—Mr. Bruce's Second Despatch.—Mr. Bruce's Difficulty.—His Inconsistency.—Despatch No. 3.—Inconsistent Statements.—Ti-pings approach Ningpo.—Interview with Ti-ping Chiefs.—Mr. Hewlett's Interview with "Fang."—General Hwang's Despatch.—General "Fang's" Despatch.—Capture of Ningpo.—British Intervention.—Ti-ping Moderation.—Open Hostilities commenced.—Commander Bingham's Despatch.—Taeping Reply.—Commander Bingham's Rejoinder.

In order to form a just appreciation of the position of the Ti-ping revolution at the close of the year 1861, it becomes necessary to review briefly the political relations of each party engaged in it from the period of ratification of the Yang-tze expedition treaty of neutrality with the Ti-pings (by Admiral Hope), and the commencement of actual hostilities against them at the opening of the year 1862.

By the following review of the official correspondence (as given in Blue Book form of "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China" for 1861) men of every party, partial or impartial, may form an opinion as to British policy in China.

Exactly thirty-six days after his solemn pledges of non-intervention—given in accordance with his instructions from Lord Elgin—to the Ti-ping authorities, at their capital, Admiral Hope, upon hearing of the capture of Chapoo, penned the following orders, dated H.M.S. Scout, Nagasaki, May 8, to Captain Dew, H.M.S. Encounter:—

"You are further to put yourself in communication with the leader of the rebel forces, and to point out to him that the capture and destruction of the town of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally, and, therefore, that you require him to desist from all hostile proceedings against the town, and, without committing yourself to the necessity of having recourse to force, you will remind him of what took place last year at Shanghae, and the impossibility of his capturing the place should you find yourself compelled to assist in its defence, a course, you will add, you are unwilling to adopt, as placing you in a hostile position in regard to the Taepings generally, with whom we have no wish to quarrel."

In this despatch the Admiral states he has no "wish to quarrel" with the Ti-pings, yet, in violation of his own pledges, and his orders to "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality," he constitutes himself dictator over their operations—operations unavoidable during their expulsion of the Manchoos, and essential to their self-preservation, general interests, and military honour—and interferes between the belligerents and their natural rights; and then continues as follows:—