After deprecating any partial hostilities against the Ti-pings, the despatch continues:—
"And on the other hand, we should lose a favourable opportunity of placing our relations with the Emperor on a satisfactory footing, if we were deprived by some incidental event of the power of making our aid a matter of bargain with the Imperial Government.... The longer we are able to preserve an indifferent attitude between the two parties, the more inclined they will be to bid higher for our friendship and support."
What an accomplished frequenter of the Rialto the author of these creditable sentences would have made! This despatch was written on the 16th June, 1861; within seven months open hostilities were initiated against the Ti-pings by Admiral Hope, in direct violation of his Government's existing orders to maintain neutrality; and within nine months the British Government adopted the policy "of taking the open ports under our protection," and violated all pledges of neutrality by prosecuting a regular, though never openly declared, war upon the insurgents.
The following are the most important passages from despatch No. 3. They plainly state that our "commercial interests" would not suffer from the acts of the rebels, and that trade was not injured by them, although completely in their power.
After disapproving of any attack upon Nankin, Admiral Hope states:—
"The Taeping authorities will be open to easy access by us so long as Nankin remains the seat of Government; and from such experience as our short intercourse has afforded, I see a fair prospect of our acquiring sufficient influence with them to enable us to carry all points which are essential to our commercial interests, even to that of eventual abstinence from molesting the consular ports.
"It is further clear that we cannot afford to quarrel with them, as at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghae, at this time by far the largest portion of that from China."
Nothing can be more to the point than this admission that the Ti-pings did not injuriously affect our trading interests; but the opium traffic and indemnities were threatened, and to save them the treaty ports were held against the victorious patriots.
In his reply to the three despatches quoted from, Earl Russell wrote:—
"I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree with Admiral Hope in regarding an attack on Nankin as highly impolitic, but it might be expedient to defend the treaty ports if the Chinese" (Manchoos) "would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression."