Fall of Nankin.—Manchoo Cowardice.—Immense Booty.—Sir George Bonham's Arrival at Nankin.—"The Northern Prince."—The Ti-pings fraternize.—Sir George Bonham's Dispatch.—The Ti-ping Reply.—Further Communication.—Its Friendly Nature.—Ti-ping Literature.—Its Religious Character.—Bishop of Victoria and Dr. Medhurst's Opinions.—Ti-ping Publications.—The New Testament.—Monarchy Established.—Occupation of Nankin.—A Fatal Mistake.—Imperialist Advantages.—Advance of the Ti-pings.—Manchoo Operations.—The Tsing-hae Army.—The Retreat.—Tien-wang's Mistake.—His Opportunity Lost.—Manchoo Tactics.—Imperialist Outrages.—Ti-ping Moderation.—The Triad Rebels.—They Evacuate Amoy.—Captain Fishbourne's Description.—Triads Capture Shanghae.—Imperialist Aggressions.—Jesuits' Interference.—The French attack the Triads.—Shanghae Evacuated.—British Interference.—Its Consequences.
Upon the 19th of March, 1853, after a short siege of only eleven days, Nankin, the ancient capital of China, fell into the hands of the Ti-pings. Considering the importance of the city, and the strong garrison it contained, its capture was effected very easily. It was attacked from the river, upon the northern side, and while one division sprang a mine under the north-east angle of the wall, another blew down the I-Fung gate, both storming together and carrying the city with but little resistance. The Chinese troops in garrison are stated to have numbered about 15,000, though, considering the unusually large proportion of Tartar troops, it is probable their strength must have been greater. They made scarcely a show of opposition to the stormers, many taking to flight and escaping through the south and west gates, or surrendering and joining the Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops of the Eight Banners are estimated to have mustered at least 8,000, and including their families, not less than 20,000. Yet these men, who had already, in the wars with Great Britain, shown they could fight well and bravely, and who were now in a position to offer a stubborn defence, were killed with hardly an effort to defend themselves. It might naturally have been expected that, for the honour of their nation, for their emperor, for their wives' and their children's, and their own lives, in fact, for everything dear to them, they would at least have made a determined resistance. They well knew from the insurgents' proclamations, and their previous acts, that they would meet with little mercy, but seemed to have been completely paralyzed, and neither able to fight nor flee, throwing themselves on the ground before the victorious Ti-pings and crying "Oh Prince, Prince, spare us! spare us!"
Two days after the capture of Nankin, the Tien-wang announced by proclamation that he had established his court and seat of government there.
It is believed the Ti-pings were materially assisted in the capture of the city by confederates within the walls, who lighted signal fires and created confusion; while the fact of their finding confederates everywhere, even in the Imperialist camps, to post their proclamations with impunity, proves the wide-spread popularity of the movement at that time. With remarkable celerity, within twelve days after the capture of Nankin, the principal adjoining cities were taken and garrisoned. Chin-kiang, Yang-chow, and Kwa-chow fell into the hands of the Ti-pings without opposition, the garrisons having fled with precipitation on their approach.
The capture of these important cities was even of more moment than that of Nankin; for Chin-kiang being situated at the southern entrance of the Grand Canal into the Yang-tze, and Kwa-chow at the northern, gave them entire command of the canal itself, the great medium of communication between the southern provinces and the capital, and the route by which all the grain supplies were conveyed to the north. Immense booty was captured at these places, and conveyed to Nankin. At the latter city the military chest that fell into their hands alone contained about £120,000 sterling; while the stores of rice and provisions were enormous. At Kwa-chow they captured more than a thousand junks laden with tribute grain on its way to Pekin by the Grand Canal.
The singular panic of the Manchoos was probably caused by their fear of a retributive Providence having overtaken them for the indiscriminate slaughter of the Chinese by their ancestors; for in no other way is it easy to account for the helplessness with which they resigned themselves to their fate at Nankin.
The Chinese people at this time seemed to look upon the success of the rebellion as certain. Distant cities commenced to send tribute to the Tien-wang, and a deputation from Hang-chow was directed by the Ti-ping authorities to return, as they were not in want of money, and did not wish the people of Hang-chow to become compromised; thus displaying a praiseworthy consideration for their countrymen, whose fate they well knew would be sealed if they fell into the power of the Manchoos after offering allegiance to themselves.
Exaggerated reports of the Ti-ping successes had reached Shanghae, and it was rumoured they were on the point of attacking that city. In consequence of this, and to undeceive the Ti-pings with regard to the Manchoo proclamations which were diligently circulated, stating the foreign "barbarians" were about to send their war ships against the insurgents at Nankin, Sir George Bonham, H.M.'s plenipotentiary in China, decided to pay a visit to Nankin, partly to explain the British intention of perfect neutrality, and partly to ascertain the extent, creed, and objects of the revolutionists.
Before leaving Shanghae a meeting was held at the British Consulate, to consider the course of policy to be adopted in the event of an attack by the insurgents. Captain Fishbourne, R.N., senior naval officer upon the station, reports:—
"The question was raised as to whether we should undertake the defence of the city. Sir George Bonham, however, decided that it was incompatible with the line of policy he had determined on."