Towards the close of 1854, the detached armies of Ti-pings were gradually compelled to abandon their isolated positions, and retire closer upon their capital. During October, after forwarding all the supplies obtainable to the treasury and granaries of Nankin, the Western armies evacuated the important cities of Wu-chang, Han-yang, and Hankow, and collecting the garrisons of the many others between them and Nankin, retired quickly upon the latter, the siege of which the Imperialists were beginning to press with a vigour encouraged by the weakness of the garrison. This army falling rapidly upon the rear of the enemy's works, put them to flight with great slaughter, and completely raised the siege. After this, another force was marched to the relief of Chin-kiang, which was also invested by a considerable Imperialist army. At the close of the year, both Nankin and Chin-kiang were effectually relieved, and the besieging armies driven back upon the cities of Soo-chow and Shanghae in confusion. With the exception of the Northern army, in occupation of the north side of the Yang-tze from Ngan-king to Kwei-chow, nearly all the Ti-ping forces were concentrated in and about the cities of Nankin and Chin-kiang, when, again committing the error former experience should have taught him to avoid, the Tien-wang separated his forces, and despatched several armies upon widely divergent courses.
The principal operations were conducted towards the south, in the provinces of Kiang-su, Ngan-whui, and the borders of Che-kiang and Kiang-si, and towards the west, along the old route of the Yang-tze and beyond the Tung-ting lake. Early in 1855 the Western division, successful in all its operations, reached the city of Hankow, and Wu-chang, the provincial capital, was for the third time carried by storm, the Manchoo defenders suffering fearful loss. The Ti-pings now held the three cities for a longer period than before; but, although they obtained numerous recruits, they were unable to occupy the adjoining provinces permanently and rescue them from the Manchoo rule. The people at large, finding the revolution was to a certain extent stationary, naturally waited for some grand and combined movement likely to overthrow the Manchoo rule, and, however much they would have rejoiced at the change, were careful to avoid implicating themselves against the government until the prospect of success became more apparent. The fearful experience of former failures warned the nation to be cautious—in fact, the cautious alone remained in the land of the living, the indiscriminate massacres after the slightest attempt at rebellion having exterminated nearly every noble and patriotic spirit in China. Besides, many who might otherwise have hazarded the venture held back on account of the Ti-ping profession of Christianity (a change of the ancient national train of custom and ideas what they not only looked upon with suspicion, but with actual abhorrence). The hatred of the Manchoo must indeed have been intense—or rather, the hand of God powerful—to overcome the old and jealous prejudices of more than 2,000 years, and give the Tien-wang even any adherents.
The Southern army, breaking into several divisions during 1855, was mostly victorious; many cities were captured, and large supplies of every necessary and war material taken. Partisans were sent into all the southern provinces and many local insurrections stimulated, but all too feeble and desultory to be of any real assistance to the cause; though the prompt and savage punishments inflicted by the Manchoo authorities undoubtedly proved very damaging, the fear they inspired awing the people into submission, and terrifying them from rising in rebellion again.
For more than a year the Southern and Western armies maintained their position; but early in 1856 they were again forced to retire upon Nankin, which had become reinvested by the Imperialists. It will thus be seen that, while the Ti-pings were detaching small armies just able to overcome the local Manchoo authorities, the Imperialists, after reinforcing the provincial troops so as to enable them to dispute the ground with varying success, invariably concentrated all their reserves and spare forces before Nankin. Considering that the Imperialists had vastly superior numbers, and, moreover, held the whole of the revenue, and completely surrounded the insurgents upon every side, the greatly superior organization and courage of the Ti-pings is sufficiently proved by the fact that they were able to compete with their more advantageously situated enemy so successfully.
In the middle of the year, the Imperialists were attacked by the recalled Ti-ping forces, before the city of Chin-kiang, and were defeated with heavy loss; about the same time, their lines before Nankin were assaulted by another division and completely broken up.
In this year an event took place, the consequences of which have proved almost fatal to the Ti-ping revolution. From a period long anterior to the commencement of the movement, the position of Europeans in China was most unsatisfactory. The growing dread the Manchoos entertained of foreign intercourse urged them to the adoption of the most repulsive and arrogant behaviour upon all occasions, and it was just at the period this was becoming almost unbearable that the Ti-ping insurrection took place. It was therefore only natural that Europeans should regard the rising power favourably. Directly the organization and professions of the Tien-wang became fully known, it was almost the universal practice to warmly advocate his cause, and sound thrilling pæans in his praise. The clergy and religious world went half mad with joy; the societies for providing Bibles for the naked savages who could not read them, almost feared their work was coming to an end; and the mercantile part of the foreign world entered into the wildest speculations (excepting the opium smugglers). Eagerly the clerical expounders of mercy and goodwill wrote home glowing accounts of the success of their teaching—blessed by an overruling Providence!—eagerly the whole body of merchants, officials, adventurers, &c., watched for some favourable prospect of profit, or, as the thing is speciously termed, of "placing our commercial and political relations upon a satisfactory basis"! All these benevolent and large-minded Europeans waited a little, and when they found the profitable change would probably take a long time to perfect, while in the interval their gain might be diminished, it was absolutely wonderful how their sympathy—like Bob Acre's courage—oozed out at their fingers' ends. Events soon occurred that extinguished the last remnant of philanthropy. The missionaries (only a certain portion of them, be it remembered) found out they could not take all the credit of the rebellion to themselves,—or rather the religious element of it; therefore they gradually cooled down, and some of them began to revile it, at the same time taking precious good care not to put themselves to inconvenience by going to teach the Ti-pings where they were in error. The political and commercial body also found they would have to wait for their ambitious and profitable projects, which did not suit them at all.
It was at such a crisis, the seizure of the opium-smuggling lorcha Arrow afforded a pretext for an appeal to arms; and this furnished all those favourable circumstances, hitherto expected from the Ti-ping movement, by a shorter and more direct road. It was sufficient for a portion of the body mercantile, that they would get their nefarious opium traffic legalized, and their general trade increased; it was sufficient for the body politic that they would be able to place their diplomatic affairs upon a satisfactory standing, and so humble the power of the Chinese government as to be able to do with it whatever they liked, compelling it to conform to their will in every way—and all for nothing, as the Manchoo government would be made pay the expenses England would incur by an aggressive war. The Ti-pings were at once thrown overboard. It mattered not that their cause was righteous and holy; it was no longer profitable to the British trader or his government, and with the usual error of mean selfishness, they took it for granted that the Manchoos would always remain powerless, or else forget to retaliate when they became able, for the gross treatment they had received; neither could they perceive that although delays might interpose before the final success of the Ti-pings, yet that, after a short probation, the willing and unrestricted commerce the latter would encourage, would be more profitable than the unwilling and forced trade the Manchoos were coerced into. Although meanness is generally the result of ignorance, it seems almost a fatality that so large a portion of Englishmen should have acted so wrongfully, and have been so forgetful of their national fair-play. The whole affair speaks too plainly of avarice and incompetent statesmanship.
Commander Brine, R.N., in his valuable and fairly-expressed work, "The Taeping Rebellion," at pages 271-2, very truthfully observes:—
"The principal reason for the decline of the popularity of the rebellion amongst Europeans may be found in the great change that has occurred in our political relations with the Manchoo government."
Again, speaking of the treaty settled after the "lorcha Arrow war," he says:—