It may naturally be asked, What has this to do with England's policy towards China, and why should it affect the honourable neutrality she was pledged to maintain? The answer simply is—a misrepresentation of the acts and intentions of the Ti-pings might afford some colour of justification for a line of policy which could not be defended.

The Bruce dispatch further states:—

"But as the chief (Hung-sui-tshuen) is an ignorant fanatic, if not an impostor," &c.

We thus find this representative of the British Government not only volunteering his unsupported opinion against a weighty mass of evidence as to the religion, education, and acquirements of the chief, but actually constituting the same tribunal as the sole judge of a solemn question which must rest alone between Hung-sui-tshuen and his Creator.

About the middle of 1858, Hung-jin once more determined to try and join his relative, the Tien-wang, and with this intent started in disguise, and gradually made his way (by land) into the province of Hoopeh. In December of the same year, while Lord Elgin's expedition was at Hankow, he was heard from at a small town in the neighbourhood; in fact, he managed to put on board one of the vessels a letter for Mr. Chalmers, his teacher at Hong-kong. In the spring of 1859, he at last reached Nankin, and soon after was appointed to the high rank of Kan-wang (i.e., Shield Prince), in which position, and his subsequent one of Prime Minister, he became familiar to Europeans. A letter which he wrote to the Rev. Mr. Edkins, nearly a year later, contained the following passage relating to the Tien-wang:

"On meeting with his relative, the Celestial king, and having daily conversations with him, he was struck by the wisdom and depth of his teaching, far transcending that of common men."

Hung-jin—or rather the Kan-wang, as we must call him in future—joined his friends at a troublous time, more than usually so even to a man who, like him, had lived the prime of his life in difficulties and danger. Within a few months after his arrival at Nankin, that city was closely invested by a large and overpowering Imperialist army. Although since 1853, Nankin had frequently been in a state of siege, upon no previous occasion had it been so hardly pressed. Towards the close of 1859, the besieging forces were increased from 50,000 to upwards of 100,000 fighting men, all supplies were cut off from the city, and the Imperialists flattered themselves that a short time would see the garrison starved out. Darkly, though, closed that year around the Ti-ping capital—surrounded as it was by savage foemen, thirsting for the blood of its starving inhabitants—a danger, still more deadly, and more bitter, was looming in the distance, although at the time impalpable and scarcely conceived. It was a danger menacing the patriots from civilized and Christian men, men who, in other lands, have given their blood and treasure to causes far less deserving of their sympathy; in short, it was the creation of the "China indemnity" extortion. Evil as the effect of the Elgin treaty concluded in 1858 must have been to the Ti-pings, it is yet possible that the successes they shortly attained might have counteracted the prejudices so unjustly excited against them; but when to this was added the question of indemnity, the Ti-pings were doomed. It is probable that had they remained quiescent until such time as the love of gold was satisfied, they might then have been uninterfered with; unfortunately it was otherwise, a rapid series of victories threatened destruction to the Manchoo dynasty, and with it, of course, to the "China indemnity;" consequently, if the expenses of this "little war" were to be secured, immediate action became necessary, and the ruin of the Ti-pings inevitable.

In June, 1859, the British plenipotentiary, not satisfied with the route viâ Peh-tang, as proposed and decided upon by the Chinese authorities for his passage to Pekin, had the coolness to choose his own path, and when the mandarins naturally resisted such arrogance, to endeavour to force it at the cannon's mouth. What would Englishmen think, and do, if a Chinese fleet carrying an ambassador were to arrive in England, and, refusing to land their ambassador according to our customs, advance their fleet past all our fortifications without paying them the slightest respect? This would be a very similar case to the Taku fort disaster; and, moreover, it must be borne in mind that the affair took place just after peace had been concluded, which must have given it the complexion of a resumption of hostilities rather than that of a peaceful embassy.

The excuse generally made for this sort of thing is, that it is impossible to deal with semi-civilized nations as you would with civilized ones, that is to say, the civilized nation is to descend to the level of the semi-civilized one. This reasoning, illogical and dishonourable at all times, is in this case totally inadmissible, for it is at the least doubtful whether any cause for an appeal to arms existed. It appears, however, that elasticity of principle and inconsistency in action may be regarded as the important elements in the policy of England—can it be better illustrated than by her conduct to Germany and Denmark, to America and Brazil, to Russia and China?

Admiral Hope, a useful man to such a ministry, to use a nautical simile, "went stem on like a Nor'-west buffalo" to the Taku forts, and sacrificed a number of brave men needlessly. This led to the resumption of hostilities, and we find Lord John Russell writing upon November 18th, 1859, to Mr. Bruce:—