The same report concludes with this sentence:—
"After all was over, the village was set on fire,[1] and the foreign troops embarked for Shanghae."
What will those who falsely accuse the Ti-pings of devastating and destroying say to this? They have declared that the Christian patriots' "success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," &c.; but it appears that these totally destroyed places were reserved for Admiral Hope to burn down.
As this history progresses we shall find that although the Admiral made the damaging effect which the presence of the Ti-pings might have upon supplies one element of his casus belli, he actually destroyed the very supply of grain which he dreaded might be affected by the rebels!
There is a more serious matter to be deplored with regard to the numerous raids commenced and followed up by Admiral Hope, namely, the cruel slaughter of so many hundreds of his fellow-men. We have reviewed the unmeaning pretences invented by the Admiral and his co-adjutors, but even should it be admitted they were valid, is it possible any Englishman can be found willing to justify the massacre of thousands of human beings, because, although ever friendly to them, they affected the mercenary speculations of a few merchants? If, in order to maintain the immediate profit of their mercantile adventurers, any Englishman can attempt to justify or palliate these summary proceedings against the unfortunate Ti-pings, then I say, far better should that unholy traffic perish, cursed as it is by the slaughter of thousands of our fellow-creatures, whose blood has cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance upon their assailants.
Even the pretence that the revolutionists would have injured our "commercial interests" falls to the ground by the testimony of the very merchants themselves, for the leading mercantile house in China, Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co., in their business circular, dated "Kong-kong, 27th February, 1862," referring to Admiral Hope's first massacre of Ti-pings, state:—
"During the interval that has elapsed since the date of our last circular there is no particular change to notice in the state of matters about Shanghae; but the policy the Allied Commanders are adopting will, it is feared, lead to disastrous consequences.... Our interests call for a strict neutrality, but so far from this course being pursued, our last advices report a combined expedition of English and French marines and sailors in conjunction with a force of Imperialists, commanded in person by their respective Admirals, against a body of some 6,000 rebels, which of course they defeated with great slaughter.... The whole country being in the hands of the Taepings, should this suicidal policy be persisted in, must in the end materially interfere with, if not ruin, all trade, as it cannot do otherwise than exasperate a foe by no means to be despised."
What stronger condemnation of the policy pursued against the Ti-pings can be made, coming, as it does, from the principal representative of the very class whose interests it was pretended necessary to protect? That this opinion of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. was correct has at the present time been pretty well ascertained, for it did "in the end materially interfere with" trade, as the fall off of silk after the expulsion of the Ti-pings from the producing district proves. This, however, was not occasioned, as that firm expected, by the exasperation of "a foe by no means to be despised," for the Ti-pings (with a Christian humanity far excelling that possessed by their civilized enemies) never retaliated either upon the trade (entirely in their power) or the lives of Europeans. The decrease of silk was caused entirely by the ruthless nature of the war carried by British officers and Imperialists into the once happy districts of Ti-ping-tien-kwo. The Ti-ping patriots were either fools or saints, for by their mad forbearance they suffered themselves to be driven from their former possessions with incalculable loss of life; whereas, a system of retaliation on their part would have endangered the entire trade of the district, and consequently have forced the enemy to relinquish hostilities which so conclusively endangered the prospect of our "commercial interests."
As the first mercantile house in China considered the policy of the British Government "suicidal," we may safely pronounce the affected anxiety for commercial interests a shallow pretext. What then remains to constitute the real casus belli, unless it be "the temporary interest arising out of the indemnities," and the great revenue arising out of the vile opium traffic, the loss of which would have caused a deficit of many millions in the British treasury?
The seeming inconsistency of allowing the Ti-pings to take Ningpo and yet defending Shanghae against them is easily explained. At the capture of the former city no British force was present, and although the seven days' grace so cunningly obtained from the Ti-ping leaders seems to have been employed in endeavouring to raise a sufficient force to oppose their entrance, this, in the shape of H.M.S. Scout and several other vessels, arrived too late, having reached Ningpo some hours after its fall. Then, as Admiral Hope very wisely observed with regard to the policy of exasperating the Ti-pings, "We cannot afford to quarrel with them, as at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghae." Their wonderful forbearance had not at that time become assured; directly it was, hostilities were commenced. Before taking up the sword for good, it became necessary to try the temper of the Ti-pings. This Admiral Hope effectually did by his arrogance at Nankin; his "every obstruction" plan at Ningpo; his raids around Shanghae; an example followed by the British and French authorities by their unwarrantable notifications and defence of Shanghae Chinese city.