I had ample opportunity to notice the exceeding popularity the Chung-wang had attained among the country people, for everywhere we passed they turned out to welcome his arrival, and all I questioned declared him to be a good and just man, who respected and protected the rights of the meanest peasant of the land. Many of the Ti-ping chiefs were popular with the civilians, some were disliked, all were considered better than the Manchoo, but none were so beloved as the Chung-wang. Before the troops had been marched towards Shanghae, a day of thanksgiving was held at Hang-chow; and although the motive of the Ti-ping is that of justice and Christianity, I could not help thinking of the similar practice among Europeans, who never fail to return thanks to God for triumph over their weaker brethren, whether their cause be righteous or quite the reverse.
On our march to Nankin, the Chung-wang took a route which embraced all the principal cities captured during the last year, including Hoo-chow, Kar-shing-foo, Soo-chow, Wo-kong, Quin-san, Tat-san, &c., and at each thanksgivings were offered up for the late important success. About this time the Commander-in-Chief committed his first great error. His mistake consisted in breaking up a large proportion of his forces into garrisons for the numerous walled cities in Ti-ping possession, and in moving the rest of his troops to other quarters.[3] It is true, he had nothing to fear from the enemy, all their armies in the field (with the exception of those operating against the Ying-wang, on the line of the Yang-tze river, above Nankin) having been utterly dispersed; but no preparation whatever was made to resist the probable hostility of England and France, beyond such defence as the widely separated fortified towns might be able to make. This neglect, when the British scheme of intervention came into full play, proved fatal to the welfare of Ti-pingdom. City after city was captured in detail by British artillery and troops; when, had the patriots only concentrated their numerous but greatly scattered forces, the result might have proved very different. I wearied myself, the Chung-wang, and many other chiefs, by continually representing the danger in case of foreign hostility (which I felt certain would be the result of Lord Elgin's policy in China), but the poor Ti-pings seemed infatuated, and resolutely refused to believe that the unbrotherly so-called "foreign brethren" entertained such perfectly unprovoked and cruel intentions. Fatally have they been undeceived! Deeply responsible have England and France become for the consequences!
FOOTNOTE:
[3] This was, however, in accordance with the Tien-wang's orders.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Earl Russell's Despatch.—Its Effect.—"Taking the Offensive."—Official Reports.—General Staveley.—Attacks the Ti-pings.—General Ward.—Hope and Ward repulsed.—Che-poo attacked.—Its Capture.—Loot Regulations.—Kah-ding attacked.—Its Capture.—Ti-ping Loss.—Newspaper Comments.—Tsing-poo besieged.—Inside the City.—Ti-ping Losses.—Na-jaor besieged.—Cho-lin besieged.—Ti-ping Bravery.—Cho-lin captured.—The Chung-wang.—Kah-ding evacuated.—Consul Harvey's Despatch.—Despatch reviewed.—Ning-po threatened.—Captain Dew at Ning-po.—His Despatch.—The Reply.—Captain Dew's Rejoinder.—Preparation to attack Ning-po.—Captain Dew's Inconsistency.—His Ultimatum.—Official Despatches.—Ning-po attacked.—Ningpo evacuated.—Newspaper Reports.
After hostilities had been commenced by Admiral Hope, and upon hearing of the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings, Earl Russell endorsed the violation of British faith by approving the hostile maintenance of Shanghae and the other treaty ports against the Ti-ping belligerents, in the following despatch to the Admiralty, dated, "Foreign Office, March 11, 1862":—
"I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that Vice-Admiral Hope should be instructed to defend Shanghae, and to protect the other treaty ports not in the hands of the rebels, so far as it is in the power of Her Majesty's naval forces to do so."