"It might be expedient to defend the treaty ports, if the Chinese Government would consent not to use them."
Referring back to the only definite order of Her Majesty's Government at the time of the unparalleled breaches of neutrality, we find it to be that bearing date August 8, 1861:—
"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in China."
Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that hostilities were established against the Ti-pings, not only in violation of the pledged faith of England, but also in direct opposition to the public orders of her Government. Eventually the Government sanctioned and authorized a continuance of these raids, although they carefully avoided making any straightforward announcement of their policy. Their plan was always to approve the aggressive action of the officials in China, but never to order them publicly. The despatches approving General Staveley's unjustifiable attack upon innocent men respectively bear date—"Foreign Office, July 7, 1862," and "War Office, July 23." These documents, however, which take the odium and responsibility of the massacres from the active agents, and place them upon the British nation, could not have reached Pekin, and been communicated to the naval and military commanders at Shanghae, until late in September. We shall see what unauthorized and unnecessary hostilities were perpetrated previous to their arrival.
General Staveley, having assumed the principal command of the raiding expeditions, finding that the friendly Ti-pings would not come and fight him, went to fight them. Upon the 3rd of April a strong force of 2,207 British and French troops, with naval detachments under command of Admirals Hope and Protet, and thirteen pieces of artillery, moved out from Shanghae to continue "taking the offensive." The place doomed to destruction was a large, and for Chinese warfare, strong, entrenched Ti-ping camp at Wong-ka-dza, garrisoned by about 4,000 men. After a hot day's march, the whole force, including some hundreds of Imperialists dragging the guns, carrying portable bridges, extra loads of ammunition, and every requisite appliance of modern warfare, arrived at a deserted village within twelve miles from Shanghae, and about two from the Ti-ping camp. Here they encamped for the night. Early on the following morning the combined forces,[5] taking advantage of the cover afforded by a thick mist, moved on the position of the Ti-pings, establishing themselves within a few hundred yards of the defences just as the fog cleared away. The entrenched camp consisted of some ten or twelve stockades, each surrounded by a ditch, yet communicating with the others. The Ti-pings, as usual, waited for those they invariably looked upon as "foreign brethren" to take the offensive. They had not long to wait. Having taken up a position fairly within range of their Enfield rifles and artillery, but safely out of range of the useless gingalls and matchlocks of the Ti-pings, the "foreign brethren" opened a murderous fire upon the line of entrenchments. The devoted defenders replied as well they could, without artillery or effective fire-arms, and bravely held their stockades for nearly an hour, amid the storm of shrapnel-shell, rifle-balls, &c., poured in upon them with terrible effect. At length the irresistible foreign artillery drove them from the stockades with heavy loss, and played upon their retreating columns with deadly accuracy. During the attack and retreat the Ti-pings lost upwards of 600 killed and wounded (the wounded falling into the hands of the Imperialists were all put to death), while the allies had one man killed and another wounded.
Admiral Hope, who grounded his precious casus belli upon the possible destruction of supplies by the Ti-pings, states in his report of this and the following actions:—
"All these camps, which contained large quantities of rice collected from the surrounding country, were burnt, AND THE GRAIN DESTROYED."
A few days before the attack upon Wong-ka-dza, H.M. gunboat Flamer attacked and destroyed a fleet of 300 Ti-ping boats, "deeply laden with rice and live stock." Who, then, proved to be the devastator and marauder; the uncivilized Chinese, or the civilized Christian? Yet the principal pretence given for attacking the Ti-pings was that they might do what Admiral Hope and his colleagues so effectually did.
After chasing the fugitives so long as the Enfield would reach them, the allied force gave up the pursuit, and retired to the village of Che-poo, where they had rested the previous night. Meanwhile, those who escaped from this slaughter met with another enemy, in the shape of a strong contingent of the filibuster Ward's disciplined Chinese. This ally of Admiral Hope, chagrined at having lost this opportunity, determined to attack another fortified camp with his own men. The position assigned to this respectable person during the first engagement was to cut off and kill the Ti-pings as they fled from the fire of the British and French artillery. Fortunately for those unoffending people he arrived too late. When he did honour his worthy friends with his presence, history telleth not whether they were tired, or engaged looting, or making merry; but certain it is that they let him make his attack unassisted, except by Admiral Hope.
This PAR NOBILE, on valorous deeds intent, heedless alike of mud, heat, and fatigue, marched for several miles by intricate pathways, through creeks, ditches, and swampy paddy-fields, to the rebel camp near the village of Lu-ka-kong; and elated, doubtless, by the Admiral's narration of his chivalrous deeds at Wong-ka-dza, and assured by his loss of only one man, halted in front of the Ti-ping stockade.