Having noticed the particulars of the disastrous loss of Tait-san and Quin-san, we must now come to the still more unfortunate effect caused by the receipt of the intelligence at Nankin, and the further report that the ships of the Anglo-Chinese or "Vampyre" flotilla were arriving at Shanghae.
These events took place in the month of May, 1863, and immediately the Ti-ping Government heard of them, couriers were despatched in hot haste after the Chung-wang, recalling his army to the capital. At this time the Commander-in-Chief had advanced about four hundred miles in the direction of Pekin, having captured many cities from the enemy, and completely defeated several large Manchoo armies, one led by the Imperialist Prince Sung-wang, or San-ko-lin-sin, as he is known to Europeans. Upon receipt of the orders from Nankin, the Chung-wang was compelled to forsake all the important advantages he had gained, and derive no benefit from the series of victories he had achieved, by abandoning every captured position and precipitately returning to the capital.
The Ti-ping forces had quite lately reached a fertile part of the country, where they were recruiting and gradually recovering from the hardships endured throughout the previous march. From the edge of the river Yang-tze, in the vicinity where the army first crossed from Nankin, throughout a naturally sterile country, for a distance of more than three hundred miles, the retreating Imperialists had devastated everything far and near, so as to stay the advance of the Ti-pings by the deadly medium of famine. Every rice-field, farm, and plantation were destroyed and made a desert waste, so that not the smallest article of food could be obtained. Fortunately the Chung-wang's commissariat was well supplied, so his troops were able to traverse the desolated regions without very much suffering, and by quick movements to limit the devastation to an extent of three hundred miles.
At the time, however, when the Chung-wang received his orders to return to Nankin, the supplies of his army had become well nigh exhausted, and the urgent tone of the despatches made an immediate retreat so imperative, that no delay to gather in the standing crops or otherwise collect a sufficient quantity of provisions was possible.
Besides the fall of Tait-san, Quin-san, &c., and the presence of several "Vampyre" ships at Shanghae, where others were momentarily arriving, other dangers menaced the Ti-pings; namely, either the destruction of their best army by starvation, or the prevention of its retreat to Nankin, by the immense fleet of Imperialist gunboats threatening the city.
Since the fall of Ngan-king (towards the close of the year 1861), the Imperialists had gradually approached along both banks of the river, until at last they managed to capture every place up to the walls of Nankin. This result was accomplished entirely by the presence of the well-equipped and innumerable flotilla of row-galleys, just at the period the Ti-ping Government was alarmed by the loss of Tait-san and Quin-san. But though the revolutionists were unable to dispute the supremacy on the great river, simply because they were entirely destitute of war vessels, they held the country within five miles of the water for a considerable distance above Nankin on the south bank of the Yang-tze.
The army commanded by the Chung-wang consisted principally of veteran troops, natives of the south of China, who originally joined the movement, and was by far the best in the Ti-ping service. Its strength of fighting men was not less than 50,000, while numberless refugees, prisoners, coolies, and others, far more than doubled those figures.
From the intelligence conveyed in his despatches, the General knew at once that only one course—an instant retreat by forced marches—was possible, either to save his army from destruction, or succour the hardly-pressed garrisons of the cities of the silk district. Gathering all the rice at hand, though it was quite unripe, and foraging everything that could be used as food, though a full treasury could have supplied them with suitable provisions had such been available in sufficient quantity, the army broke ground and commenced its disastrous return to Nankin. The supplies soon proved inadequate to last one half the distance to be traversed; consequently, this retreat proved more terribly destructive to the army than a dozen bad defeats would have been. The latter part of the forced marches these starving men had to perform led through desert places and low marshy ground; and, to add to the horrors of their situation, the Yang-tze having considerably overflowed its banks, the low country for a great distance inland was completely flooded. Through this, and many a weary mile of bamboo swamp, had the exhausted and starving Ti-pings to force their way.
Whenever a piece of firmer ground was reached, it could only be passed after defeating the Manchoo troops in occupation, who, well supplied with food, clothing, and boats, swarmed around the perishing and retreating army in thousands, now that it could be done with impunity. As the unfortunate Ti-pings approached nearer and nearer to the bank of the river, their sufferings (if possible) became increased. Frequently they came to places totally impassable except by swimming, and at such they had to cross exposed to the attacks of numerous squadrons of Imperialist gunboats, stationed at every available position to cut off or harass their retreat. Can anything more dreadful than the state of these unhappy patriots be imagined? For nearly a month they had subsisted entirely upon the grass of the fields, the green tops of bamboo, and the bodies of the dead!—while their march lay through the mazes of dense bamboo jungle, and swamps of mud and water—frequently of a depth which prevented fording. During the whole of this fearful retreat, their rear, front, and flanks were incessantly harassed by the attacks of the cowardly and bloodthirsty enemy, who cruelly murdered hundreds of exhausted men, whom they were quite unable to withstand in fair fight. Thousands perished in this manner, and thousands more were horribly suffocated in the morasses, or drowned among the swamps. Who is responsible for all this misery and loss of life? It was caused entirely through British intervention, and the material aid given to the Manchoo. At last the leading division of the army made its appearance opposite Nankin, and then arose the difficulty of transporting it across the river.
During several days preceding the arrival of the remnant of the Chung-wang's troops, the enemy had maintained an incessant attack upon the batteries and forts commanding the passage of the river, and had particularly concentrated their efforts against a large fort on the opposite side, the capture of which would have placed the whole north bank in their hands, and would also have cut off all retreat. About a week previous, the Anglo-Ti-ping, with my old craft and three junks, had run the Imperial blockade and safely arrived at the Nankin creek, each heavily laden with rice and other provisions. My friend D—— had caught a passing steamer, and proceeded on to Shanghae upon business. P—— remained with the lorcha, and I joined him on board, taking my wife with me, as the Sz-wang and principal chiefs in the city had requested me to assist in the defence of the river forts. Directly the Imperialists became aware of the near approach of the Chung-wang's army, they began their attacks upon the fort on the other side of the river. This work, Kew-fu-chew, as the Ti-pings named it, was directly opposite the batteries (at the entrance of the creek) which extended along the edge of the river, on the narrow strip of land forming the outer bank of the creek until it turned inland towards the city. These batteries mounted a number of heavy guns; though, as nearly all were of Chinese make—huge, unwieldy masses of iron, bigger than an English 68, but with the bore of only a 4 or 6-pounder—few were moveable or manageable. As a rule, until taught by Europeans, the Chinese are wretched artillerists, their guns being usually lashed firm in one position, from which they can neither be moved by the muzzle radius, nor breech-elevating principle; so that, be the object far or near, the guns are fired at the same range in every case. Among the many useless guns, the appearance of which had far more to do with frightening away the enemy than their effectiveness, I at last found five or six that were really serviceable—including an English naval 32-pounder, one 18-pounder, a large French cannon, and several fine brass Chinese guns. As there happened to be nearly thirty European and American trading vessels at the port, I managed to raise a corps of about twenty-five volunteers to work the artillery. My own lorcha carried two beautiful pivot-guns amidships, which proved of no little use during the different actions.