When we arrived at the commandant Mo-wang's palace, a number of wounded Europeans belonging to Burgevine's contingent were being carried inside. These men proved to be the survivors of a series of accidents that had occurred two days previously, when the whole force, accompanied by a division of Ti-pings under the Chung-wang, and the little steamer Ka-joor, which Burgevine had seized from the Imperialists and carried off to Soo-chow, had attacked a position of the enemy established about twenty miles to the east of the city. The expedition was at first successful, having turned the flank of the Imperialist stockades and captured a flotilla of twenty-six large gunboats; but, almost immediately afterwards, by the carelessness—some say drunkenness—of the Europeans working the Ka-joor's pivot-gun, her magazine was ignited, the explosion blowing the fore part of the vessel to pieces, and badly wounding several of the crew.
Soon after this catastrophe, General Burgevine landed a battery from the gunboats accompanying him (the principal way of communication being by water), and opened fire on the stockades, held by a force of disciplined Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries commanded by Colonel Rhode,[50] and a number of Imperialist braves. The enemy were just being driven out of their intrenchments, and a storming party advancing to take them, when the largest of the prizes—a gunboat, full of powder, shells, &c., and mounting six cannon, and in which the wounded from the steamer had been placed—blew up; the fire from her explosion communicating with four more of the captured vessels, they were also blown to pieces, killing outright twelve, and dangerously wounding seventeen of the sixty or seventy Europeans present. These disasters were caused by the free use of the liquors taken from the wreck of the Ka-joor—officers and men alike indulging, and the whole affair forcibly illustrating the rowdy, disorderly nature of the Americo-Ti-ping legion. It is stated, and not without strong reason, that Burgevine himself was in a state of intoxication; still he has this excuse—the pain and debilitating effect produced by an old and terrible wound (received in the service of the ungrateful Manchoo), rendered the use of stimulants necessary.
After the accidents we have just noticed, the attack upon the Imperialist position was abandoned, and the force retired upon Soo-chow, carrying off the wounded and the remainder of the prizes.
As the Mo-wang was outside the city, and Burgevine had not returned with the wounded men, I proceeded to one of the gates with a party of the latter's officers, in order to go to the front of the Ti-ping outworks, where it was expected they would be found. When we had arrived at the gate, however, we were not allowed to pass by the soldiers on guard. This was the first intimation I received that affairs were going wrong with the auxiliary force, and that the Ti-pings were suspicious of their foreign allies. At night, it appeared, they were not without reason for their want of confidence, for, after Burgevine and the Mo-wang had returned, Colonel Morton, the second in command of the contingent, was reported absent against orders, with all the Europeans outside the city. When this fact was ascertained, Burgevine and the officers with him seemed certain that the absentees had gone over to the enemy; in fact, I soon understood that the intention for the whole force to desert had been on the tapis for some little time, only Morton and his companions had, however, taken the opportunity to get clear themselves and leave their co-adjutors in the lurch.
Previous to this report I had obtained an interview with the Mo-wang, and then dined with him. He informed me that the Chung-wang was encamped with an army outside the city; he also gave me to understand the nature of his suspicions against Burgevine, in all of which I entirely agreed with him. After explaining the caution rendered necessary in all dealings with foreigners, because of the treachery and bad faith with which they had always acted towards the Ti-pings—as particularly exemplified by the English breaches of guaranteed neutrality, non-observance of the pledge to prevent Manchoo expeditions equipping at Shanghae, capture of Ningpo by the British, French, and piratical flotilla, &c.—he proceeded to specify his reasons for dissatisfaction with the foreign contingent.
In the first place, he spoke about the extraordinary conduct of Burgevine himself, who, he declared, had made numerous promises, none of which had been fulfilled. That officer had guaranteed to obtain men, arms, and co-operation from Shanghae; large sums of money had been supplied for the purpose, but the only return had been many cases of brandy, brought by him after several visits to that city, and with which both officers and men were made incapable. All the money had been squandered or mysteriously lost, and not a single musket had been shown for the large expenditure. Then it appeared that Burgevine and many of his officers continued to wear the uniform of the Ward force, which they had only left shortly before joining the Ti-pings; while, to place themselves in a still more suspicious position, they made a practice of visiting at night their old friends in the hostile lines occupied by Gordon's troops. This conduct made the chiefs distrust the loyalty of their auxiliaries and fear some organized treachery. Another ground of suspicion was the fact that Burgevine kept his men aloof and distinct from the people he came to serve, at the same time striving to induce the chiefs to sanction his formation of an independent force. This was certainly a bad way to gain the confidence of men so often deceived by foreigners, so accustomed to community of interests, and so much imbued with the religious and patriotic enthusiasm of their cause. Moreover, the Ti-ping leaders had quickly penetrated the selfish and mercenary motives of their unsatisfactory allies, and naturally felt but little faith in their services; neither were they mean enough to desire the support of such ignoble assistance, nor pander to it after the style of their more unscrupulous antagonists.
Regardless of all principles of honour and chivalry, directly the Americo-Ti-ping legionaries found that they could not reckon upon external support, large pay, and much booty, they were not a little disappointed; having no heart in the service they had suddenly adopted, they became discontented and anxious to desert a failing cause for some more congenial and profitable employment. They were certainly not Quixotic enough to fight for honour, glory, or the freedom and religious liberty of a vast empire without some substantial pecuniary recompense.
Out of a strength of 125 Europeans, not more than twenty were of any use to the revolutionists; these few comprised men who were able to drill and organize a disciplined force, and others who were good artillerists; the remainder being sailors and vagrants, totally unacquainted with the smell of powder, and not so useful in the field as the worst coolie spearmen of the Ti-ping army; these facts were also inimical to the existence of the force.
When, added to the circumstances just reviewed, the paroxysms of temporary insanity (during an attack of which he wounded one of his best officers), or the natural extravagance and obliquity of character of the commanding officer himself, and the dissensions among his subordinates, are considered, the failure of Burgevine's enterprise is fully accounted for.[51]