The encampment was formed around a large straggling village; and the people, like those of the neighbouring hamlets, appeared more happy, better fed, and less depressed than those of more distant parts of Ti-pingdom. This was always the result of the Chung-wang's presence in any locality, for he was not only the most able general, but also the most talented organizer and pacificator among the chiefs.
At Ma-tang-chiao the Chung-wang was concentrating an army of relief for Soo-chow; and, with the object of enabling the steamer to participate in the same movement, men were employed to remove several bridges and other obstructions on a creek by which she could reach the Grand Canal. This work was hardly commenced, when two or three fugitives, shortly followed by many others, from the suburbs of Soo-chow, arrived with the disastrous intelligence that the city was in the hands of the enemy. How it had fallen they could not say, further than by stating that it had not been captured by fighting, but by some treachery. The Chung-wang seemed much affected by the report, for Soo-chow was not only the most important and best fortified city, the most abundantly supplied and strongest garrisoned, but the commandant, Mo-wang, was his oldest and bravest brother in arms.
Orders were at once given to break camp and march upon Wu-see; and while the troops were so engaged, I returned with the steamer to the same city. On the following day the bad news became confirmed by the arrival of some hundreds of the garrison of Soo-chow. These men stated that the second in command, Nar-wang, with several other principal chiefs, had assassinated the commandant and then surrendered the city to the enemy. A great number of the Mo-wang's men were massacred by the followers of the other leaders, who commanded about 20,000 troops, while the Cantonese portion of the garrison —some 5,000 strong, and unconnected with the treachery—were compelled to fight their way out of the city. These latter, having placed their wives and children in the centre, proceeded to force the west gate. Unable, however, to effect the narrow passage with their helpless families against the incessant attack by overwhelming numbers of Imperialist and renegade soldiery, they were driven to the horrible extreme of killing their own women and children to save them from the worse fate of degradation and torture, if captured by the enemy. Scarcely a third of the men succeeded in cutting their way through, and of these many were wounded, many were covered with the blood of their wives and little ones, while others had become raving maniacs.
The Chinese nature, although apparently so apathetic, is yet capable of the wildest frenzy of passion; in fact, no people have a more paradoxical and anomalous character. It is a well-known fact that Chinese non-combatants will commit wholesale suicide upon the approach of enemies; but few Europeans would credit the fearful acts which the Soo-chow fugitives were driven in desperation to commit, or the frantic excitement leading to such deeds, and to the insanity of many of the perpetrators. I shall never forget the terrible appearance of the madmen stained with the blood of their own dearest relatives, whom they had themselves killed. They rushed into Wu-see at an immense speed, passed the city, and came to the encampment outside, and then, yelling, shouting, and crying, threw themselves, in paroxysms of grief and frenzy, on the ground before the Chung-wang. Several attempted to drown themselves in a neighbouring creek; and one, a young chief, stabbed himself to death before he could be prevented. The unfortunate men were at last secured and taken into the city.
With the remnant of the Soo-chow garrison came seven Europeans. These men had been sent from the city to join my legion, by order of the Chung-wang, and having proceeded to Ma-tang-chiao, when they changed their route for Wu-see, they were overtaken by the fugitives, and came on with them. These seven men were not a portion of those whom I had sent from Shanghae; all the latter (with the exception of the brave Labourais, who was killed during a night attack on some stockades by the enemy only a few days previously) being within Soo-chow when that city was betrayed, and many of them there perishing. Three of the Europeans had straggled, and did not arrive for some days. Among the four who joined me were Captain Smith, and an engineer (for the steamer) who had hitherto been employed casting shell, guns, and executing other important work at Soo-chow.
As it was absolutely necessary for the increase and establishment of my legion that I should return to Shanghae, I wished to leave as soon as the Chung-wang reached Wu-see, particularly as both I and my lieutenant were in a very bad state of health, and urgently required medical assistance; but the Chung-wang having requested that I would join him in an attack upon the Imperialist force threatening Wu-see and Chang-chow-foo, I was obliged to defer leaving until after the battle. The enemy were intrenched in great strength within fifteen miles of Wu-see, and were assisted by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which gave them entire command of the water communications of the city. It was to drive away or destroy this fleet that an attack was decided upon.
At last all obstructions in the way of enabling the steamer—now named the Ti-ping, and flying the Chung-wang's standard—to participate in the engagement were removed; and I joined the Commander-in-Chief's consultation held before commencing operations on the following morning. One thousand men, composing the élite of the Chung-wang's guards, and the first division of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, were placed under my orders, together with fifteen gunboats, which were to co-operate with the steamer. With this force I was ordered to attack the hostile flotilla, the Chung-wang himself disposing of his troops so as to prevent a junction between the enemy and their vessels. About midnight the army marched to take up its position, and at daylight I advanced with the steamer and gunboats, the men of my legion accompanying me in two divisions, one on each bank of the canal.
The morning was thick and foggy, so that we were enabled to take up a position within cannon-range of the enemy without either attracting their attention or discerning them ourselves. The place I chose for a halt until the fog cleared away was at a large stone bridge, parallel to the Grand Canal, up which we were proceeding, and over a creek leading direct into a small lake, about a mile and a half distant, on which the enemy's flotilla was stationed.
My plan of action was soon formed. I sent the gunboats in advance beyond the bridge, with orders to attack the enemy at the entrance of the lake, and then to retreat in confusion. By this manœuvre I hoped to draw the hostile gunboats into the creek, when I should be able to attack them with the steamer to an advantage. On the creek not more than a dozen boats could form abreast and work their guns, but on the lake the whole number, estimated at 60 to 70, would be able to open a concentrated fire on our advance; and one well-aimed shot could sink the lightly-built Ti-ping, or pierce her boilers.
Taking on board fifty picked men from the Cantonese musketeers of my legion, and making everything ready for action, I had the steamer moved close to the side of the bridge, where she lay perfectly concealed.