For several days the wires were hot with the assertion that all the Powers were united and determined to carry their demands to a successful termination. The Sultan was unofficially informed that if he continued to maintain his stubborn attitude, a forced entry of the Dardanelles would possibly be made.
As previously, and with equal pertinence, at this hour of crisis the continental press devoted much space to the affairs of the Orient, and the Sultan was the recipient of much newspaper advice. One writer in particular urged him to remain master of the situation, and to show himself promptly disposed to fulfil his engagements. In that case the crisis would remain an internal one; but if it should assume an international aspect it would be peacefully adjusted on the basis of the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey which would be asserted by France and Russia, the two Pacific Powers. It was also telegraphed from Constantinople that the Czar, in reply to a personal appeal from the Sultan, consented to waive the Russian demand for a second guardship in the Bosphorus. At the same time she was prepared to resent any aggressive action that England might undertake alone.
The Sultan knew very well that there would be no concerted action of the Powers—that England and Russia would never agree as to any joint action, and yet to give color of necessity to his refusal, it was given out that the Powers had decided to depose him, using for this purpose the forces aboard the second guardship which they demanded should be permitted to enter the Bosphorus. This was to stir up the populace against the Powers. Then to furnish another excuse the report was circulated that the Sultan was in daily fear of sharing the fate of Ishmail Pasha at the hands of the Softas and the Young Turkish party.
The Sultan’s letter to Lord Salisbury was often quoted as a confirmation of the report that the Sultan was panic stricken. It will be recalled that Lord Salisbury in his speech at the Lord Mayor’s banquet on November 9th, declared that, if the Sultan will not heartily resolve to do justice to them, the most ingenious constitution that can be framed will not avail to protect the Armenians; that through the Sultan alone can any real permanent blessings be conferred on his subjects. “What if the Sultan,” exclaimed the British Prime Minister—
“What if the Sultan is not persuaded? I am bound to say that the news reaching us from Constantinople does not give much cheerfulness in that respect. You will readily understand that I can only speak briefly on such a matter. It would be dangerous to express the opinions that are on my lips lest they injure the cause of peace and good order.”
These words seemed to be freighted with some ominous significance, and they would have been, if there had been any purpose to make them mean anything.
In a remarkable letter to Lord Salisbury which he read publicly at a conference in London, the Sultan used a most beseeching tone to show that the possible dissolution of his Empire was lying heavy on his mind. It sounded like a most abject plea for mercy, a cry for the postponement of the fate which the Powers seemed to be preparing for the terrified monarch. In this note the Sultan said:
“I repeat, I will execute the reforms. I will take the paper containing them, place it before me and see that it is put in force. This is my earnest determination and I give my word of honor, I wish Lord Salisbury to know this and I beg and desire his Lordship, having confidence in these declarations, to make another speech by virtue of the friendly feeling and disposition he has for me and my country. I shall await the result of this message with the greatest anxiety.”
It will be noted that the Sultan’s communication contained no denial that there are wrongs to be remedied in the administration of his government in Armenia and elsewhere. There is no plea that the terms of solemn treaty obligations have been observed. The letter is a tacit confession that the interposition of the Powers as far as it had gone was justifiable and that the reports of the atrocities in Asia Minor, which were at first strenuously denied by the Turkish Government, were true.
It was only a shrewd plea of helplessness to persuade the Powers not to enforce their demands and nothing more. In his rejoinder to the Sultan’s letter, Lord Salisbury substantially admits the hopelessness of reform under the Sultan’s government as now constituted and administered.