XXIV
IMPULSE AND RESPONSIBILITY
Not unlike that condition which develops as the result of so-called psychic epilepsy, in which patients perform apparently voluntary acts, while the mind is really clouded by an epileptic attack, are those states in which, as the result of a more or less blind impulse, acts are performed for which the responsibility of the individual is at least dubious. Modern experts in nervous and mental diseases have sometimes spoken of these states as obsessions. This term is adopted from the older writers on mysticism who used it to designate states of mind in which an individual was under the influence of some spirit, though his intellectual and volitional state was not as completely under the subjection of this spirit as in the condition of possession.
It seems clear to the modern student of these obscure conditions that the old mystics and the modern alienists practically talk about the same state of affairs when using this term. As the result of obsession, mystical writers would have conceded that responsibility is not quite complete, though it is not entirely done away with. The modern alienist is just as sure of the diminution of responsibility, though he considers it due to the fact that for some physical reason the will is not able to act or prevent action as it is under normal conditions. The will is sometimes spoken of by certain of these modern psychologists as mainly an inhibitory faculty, that is, a faculty which prevents certain reflex acts from taking place, though permitting one set of reflexes to have its way. Under the influence of an obsession or, as the French call it, une idée obsédante, this inhibition is not [{267}] exercised and as a result an action is accomplished which the agent may very shortly afterwards regret exceedingly.
There is no doubt that impulsions or impulsive ideas may push an individual into the performance of an action which his reason condemns. Uncontrollable anger is a well recognised example of this. Impulses of other kinds may exercise just as tyrannic a sway, though it is harder to recognise the elements that make up the mental condition in other cases. Of course it may well be said that man must control his impulses. It is, however, just such impulses as can not be controlled that lessen responsibility and sometimes seem entirely to destroy it. It would, without doubt, be very easy to advance the uncontrollable impulse as an excuse for many criminal actions. In fact, the discussion of responsibility and its limitation by impulse would seem to be open to so many abuses as to make it advisable, in the present indefinite state of our knowledge, to put the subject aside entirely. The argument, however, from the abuse of the thing, does not hold, and an effort must be made to get at the truth concerning certain mental conditions which modify responsibility.
It is generally conceded that no two men are free in quite the same way with regard to the actions which they may or may not perform. Allurements that are almost compelling for some individuals, for others have no influence at all. Some men are so under the influence of anger that irritation may easily lead them to the commission of acts for which they will be subsequently supremely sorry. This may even be the case to such an extent as to endanger their lives, yet they are not able to control themselves. Many men suffering from degeneration of the arteries of the heart have been warned, like John Hunter more than a century ago, of the extreme danger of a fit of anger, yet, like John Hunter, have succumbed to bursts of anger, notwithstanding the warning, because someone irritated them beyond their rather limited powers of endurance.
It is extremely difficult ever to come to any proper appreciation of the responsibility of a given individual from a [{268}] single act. Preceding acts, however, may very well give evidence of the state of mind and the tendencies to disequilibrium which may make an apparently normal individual irresponsible under trying circumstances. The only way to render this clear is to illustrate such conditions by a concrete case.
Not many years ago one of the large cities of this country was shocked, for one twenty-four hours at least, by the news that a business man had shot his partners and himself, while at a consultation in which the affairs of the partnership were being settled up, after legal dissolution had taken place. The man in question had paid some debts of the firm with his own personal checks, and without taking proper legal recognisance for the moneys paid. When the partnership had been dissolved his partners insisted that instead of obtaining credit for these payments he should, on the contrary, pay his share of these debts once more as a partner. The state of the evidence was such that his lawyers told him it would be useless to take the case before the court at all; there was nothing to do but pay the unjust demands. He went to the meeting of his partners with a certified check for the amount of their claims in his pocket. As he took out his pocket-book to pass it over to them he seems to have realised very poignantly the fact that he was paying money that he knew he did not owe, and that his partners knew he did not owe, and that they were evidently taking advantage of a legal quibble in order to cheat him. Evidently it was an extremely trying situation. It was too much for his mental balance and he took a revolver from his pocket, shot both his partners dead, and then shot himself.
Taken by itself it is extremely difficult to say anything about the responsibility of a man who commits an act like this. In ordinary life he was known as a clever business man; to his friends he was known to be rather irascible and impatient, but a fairly good fellow. He was known to have what is called an awful temper; he had, however, never committed any violent act before. It is possible, of course, that a man should give way to a fit of anger for the beginning of which he is responsible, and then do violence [{269}] much greater than he would justify himself for in calmer moments.
There was another occurrence in the man's life that seemed to throw informing light on his mental condition. When he first came to live in the large city in which he died he began paying attention to a young woman, and the young woman was informed by a friend that he probably had a wife living. The young woman investigated this by putting the question directly to him. He denied it at once, wanted to know the name of her informant, and finally laughed the whole matter out of her mind. Within a week after his marriage to her, while on their wedding tour, he was arrested, charged with bigamy at the instance of his first wife, and it became evident at once that the charge was well substantiated.