But, it may be objected, in Case I. the surgeon ligated the uterine and ovarian arteries to stop an actual hemorrhage, and he permitted the death of the foetus; in Case II. there is no hemorrhage yet, there may possibly be none at all. I answer [{33}] that in Case II. if he operates he ties the two arteries to forestall an imminent hemorrhage which might begin within the next hour if it were not securely shut off, and to forestall sepsis by leisurely and proper precautions, and exactly as in the first case he permits the death of the foetus, he indirectly kills an unjust aggressor. If the lunatic is aiming at me I do not have to wait until he begins firing to licitly shoot at him. The sooner I shoot, servato moderamine inculpatae tutelae, the more prudent my action.

To put it in another form—in Case II. the surgeon is standing before a dam (the stretched Fallopian tube) that is threatening to break at any moment and cause death to a woman below it, because there is a lunatic (the foetus) behind it tearing away the masonry. If the surgeon shunts off the water just above the dam (the ligation of the arteries), he will suddenly let the lunatic who is tearing away the masonry fall down to the rocks at the bottom of the dam and be killed. May he let the lunatic fall? Certainly he may. But perhaps the lunatic will not succeed in tearing away the masonry. He is well provided with tools to do so; the chances are even two in three that he will succeed. Is he or the woman to be given the benefit of the doubt? The woman, by all means; she has a doubt worth in juridic value at the least twice as much as that which the lunatic has.

In any case of ectopic gestation the foetus has a very faint chance indeed of even living long enough for baptism if the expectant treatment is employed. We have seen that between November 1809 and November 1896 there were reported 77 cases of operation for the delivery of viable foetuses. Eleven of these children survived, 67 died within a few months, and many of these died just after delivery. Still, probably all might have been baptised. Judging, however, from the geographical distribution of the cases (see Kelly's Operative Gynaecology, vol. ii. p. 458) and the names of the operators, only about 14 of these children received baptism.

Now, since Schrenck found 610 ectopic gestations reported in five years, this indicates that the average number of cases of ectopic gestation which occur in the civilised world is at the least 122 a year, for many more (twice as many, at the lowest [{34}] estimate) are not diagnosed or not reported when diagnosed. In the 80 years, then, between 1809 and 1896 there were at the least 9760 cases of ectopic gestation in the civilised world; in the uncivilised countries there were certainly as many more with not a child saved, or even brought out of the pelvic cavity. To be sure, by rejecting perhaps a third of the cases through bad diagnoses and neglect of reports, there were 20,000 cases; and in all these hardly 20 children baptised—one in a thousand.

Modern surgical methods and improved diagnosis will do little to better the condition, from the nature of the disease. Between 1893 and 1896 there were 21 cases of operation for the delivery of viable foetuses reported, and this list is approximately correct, because the surgeons that operate on such material are men that as a rule report their work even when it is to their discredit. In these 21 cases, 6 mothers, 28 per centum died, 72 per centum recovered. Even if modern surgery should save all the mothers who had escaped until the foetus was viable, and should bring all the children to baptism, there would not be more than about 7 such cases in the world annually. Increased skill in diagnosis would raise the number of children brought to baptism, but it would more than proportionately raise the whole number of ectopic gestations discovered. If 10 foetuses were brought from the pelvic cavity alive in the 130 cases of ectopic gestation of the year, the chances for an extrauterine foetus to only reach baptism at a viable age (not to live after baptism) are only 7 in 100 at a most liberal estimate. Statistics are unreliable, of course, but I am giving odds of two to one. The foetus has a much better chance for baptism if the coeliotomy is done as early in the pregnancy as possible, but it has a negligible chance of life in any case. Since the creation of man there have been less than 15 extrauterine children saved, and of these 15 four were less than a year old when reported, and three under five years of age: the oldest was fifteen years of age, and all were weaklings.

The practical rule, then, is that the ectopic foetus will die anyhow, and operation only indirectly (mark the word) accelerates the inevitable death of a materially unjust aggressor, [{35}] while it gives the mother the best chance for her life, which is in very grave peril.

Case III. The surgeon before operation diagnoses with the help of consultors extrauterine pregnancy, but he or they can not tell whether the foetus is alive or not. What should he do?

In my opinion he may operate with much more solid probability than that which exists in Case II. If the argument is more for the death of the foetus than for its life, this, of course, strengthens the permissibility of the operation.

(1) The danger to the mother is exactly the same,caeteris paribus, as in Case II.; (2) the foetus is only probably alive. An actual danger to life is opposed to the probable life of a materially unjust aggressor; therefore the surgeon may probably operate at once. Probable here is used in the technical sense of the term.

Case IV. The following case is given because a similar one was proposed in the articles in the American Ecclesiastical Review, but it is not a practical case.