THE ETHICS OF
MEDICAL HOMICIDE AND MUTILATION
THE ETHICS OF MEDICAL HOMICIDE AND MUTILATION
[CHAPTER I]
General Principles Concerning Suicide and Homicide
A Discussion of euthanasia through the use of narcotics in cases of incurable diseases periodically recurs, and the opinions of those in favor of putting the patient out of his misery are expressions of mere sentimentality, as in Maeterlinck's essay, Our Eternity. They think either that the passing of a law by a legislature removes all moral difficulty, or that morality is a trifle which should never stand in the way of expediency. Those who oppose this method of euthanasia base their argument, first, on the fact that many patients supposed by even clever diagnosticians to be incurable recover health; and, secondly, on the fact that the giving power of life and death to physicians is liable to grave abuse. This side misses the central truth and argues from accidental and secondary premises. Whether it is expedient, humane, or impolitic to kill incurable patients are almost irrelevant considerations: the fundamental question to be answered here is, Is there a Supreme Being who alone is master of life, to give it or to take it?
By its very definition such a Being is necessary (as opposed to contingent), self-existent; its essence always has been and always will be actualized into existence, and that from itself alone; it is an individual substance of an intelligent nature, and therefore a person. A contingent being is one that happens to be (contingere); it is of necessity neither existent nor non-existent; it has no logical aversion to existence, but in itself it has no more than a possibility of actuality. A necessary Being, on the contrary, essentially must be; it cannot not be; it is absolutely and essentially its own existence.
There must be such a Necessary Being. If there were not, all things would be contingent, which is an absurdity. The absurdity arises from the fact that if all things were contingent nothing would be actual, nothing could ever come into existence, because there would be nothing to bring the primitive potentiality of the contingent beings into actual existence. The sufficient reason for the existence of contingent beings is either in themselves or in something outside themselves. It cannot be in themselves, because as they do not yet exist they are nothing; therefore it is in a Being which is not contingent, but whatever is not contingent is necessary. Therefore the existence of contingent beings absolutely requires the existence of a Necessary Being, which always was in existence. The ordinary name for this Necessary Being is God. Contingent beings are all creatures, all organic and inorganic beings without exception. There is, then, a God, the first cause or creator of all contingent beings, among whom is man; and since God created man wholly, this creature is wholly subservient to God, under the dominion of God, and his life is owned solely by God; God alone is the master of life and death, and he alone can delegate such mastery.