3 officers and 80 other ranks killed.
28 officers and 292 other ranks wounded.

C/310 came in for a tremendous bombardment on the 15th. For a long time shells were bursting in the position at the rate of about two a minute, chiefly 5.9-inch, varied by an occasional 8-inch. The detachments took refuge in their deep dug-out, and were able to laugh at the Boche's efforts, the effects of which were very slight considering the severity of the bombardment. One gun was buried, but subsequently dug out undamaged; another was blown out of its pit, but though the carriage was knocked to atoms the piece itself was still quite serviceable. At least 400 shells had fallen in and around the battery, and the ground was churned up into huge craters, many dead bodies being exhumed from their graves and scattered about. We felt that the Huns had not got good value on this occasion for the four thousand pounds which, at the very least, the expenditure of ammunition must have cost them.

On the 18th the 6th Corps held an admirably managed horse show at Bihucourt, which gave great enjoyment to a large concourse of officers and men. The artillery competitors came from six divisional artilleries, and we were remarkably successful, gaining the following events:—

Tent-pegging for Officers—1st prize (Major Swain).
Tent-pegging for other ranks—1st prize (B.S.M. Howes of the D.A.C.).
Gun Team—3rd prize.
Pair of Light Draught Horses—1st prize.
G.S. Wagon and Pair—2nd prize.
Team of Mules—3rd prize.

I may mention that all the three prizes for officers' chargers were won by the division, going to Lieut.-Colonel Hore-Ruthven V.C., Major-General Braithwaite, and Lieut. C. Newman respectively; the second of these was a particularly popular win.

By this time the science of protective building and digging had been brought to a wonderful state of perfection in the batteries, as was evidenced by the remarkably small number of casualties caused by the enemy's constant shelling. Rarely a day passed but that the Noreuil and Ecoust valleys were under fire, and the former valley in particular presented an extraordinarily sinister appearance. It was thickly pitted with deep shell craters along its whole length, and a casual visitor would have found it hard to believe that any human beings could go on living in such a shell-swept area. Further investigation would however have shown that beneath all this desolation an active and busy underground existence was being carried on. The gun positions were camouflaged to appear like the surrounding ground, or disguised to represents heaps of debris, and were generally strongly enough protected to resist the impact of a 4.2-inch shell; and from every position at least two stairways led deep down into the ground to a network of passages and sleeping chambers from 30 to 40 feet below the surface. Where all the positions were so good, it would be difficult to discriminate between them, but perhaps the palm should be given to D/310. The Battery Commander, Major R. C. Foot, was a mining engineer by profession, and two of his subalterns, Lieuts. Currie and Casey, had been students with him at the same engineering college; their experience was of great value in a case of this sort, and their scientifically constructed position in a sunken road just north-west of Noreuil was a model of what a position should be, and was visited with great interest by many senior officers of other divisions as well as of our own.

Concealment from view was daily becoming more and more impossible. The enemy's balloons were so numerous, and were poised at so great an altitude, that very few depressions on the ground were deep enough to conceal emplacements from one or another of them. But, in addition to this, as the science of sound ranging was brought to greater and greater perfection, concealment became less and less useful, and overhead protection became the most important consideration. We now adopted a practice which was henceforth followed when possible throughout the war. Each battery had a main position, the guns of which remained silent except in combined "strafes," when every gun in the line was firing; when this happened the gun flashes were so numerous and continuous along the whole front that it was almost impossible for observers in the hostile balloons to take accurate bearings to any one battery, and sound ranging also was impracticable. For the ordinary routine shooting each battery kept an advanced section; this could be moved with comparative ease if the Boche artillery should make the position too hot, and in any case it is more difficult to spot two guns than six, and harder to hit them when found.

On the 21st August B/310 and C/312 were bombarded for several hours by 5.9 and 8-inch howitzers; although a tremendous weight of metal was poured into the positions, no material damage was done, and only two men were wounded.

On the 23rd and 24th the 35th Brigade was withdrawn from my command, and a readjustment of batteries had to be made. The 310th continued to cover the right, or Noreuil, sector, and the left, or Bullecourt, sector fell to the 312th. A/312 consequently moved from Lagnicourt to the Ecoust Valley; to our great delight the Boche threw about 400 rounds into the empty position the day after the battery had cleared out of it.

Sept. 1917.