The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes

by Averroës

Another difficulty which arises is that with the denial of anthropomorphism we shall have to deny movement to God, after which it would be difficult to explain with regard to the Day of Judgment, that He would appear to the people at that moment, and would himself superintend their judgment, as He says, “Thy Lord shall come and the angels rank by rank.”[77] It would also be difficult to explain the famous Tradition of Descent, though its explanation would be, on the whole easier than that of the former in spite of all that has been said about it in the Law. So it is necessary that there should be disclosed to the common people nothing which might lead them to a disbelief in the literal meanings of these things. This would be its effect upon the mind of the people if taken exoterically. But when it is interpreted it would come to either of two interpretations. Either interpretation would overcome the exoteric side of it and of other things like it, thus destroying the Law altogether, and falsifying their purpose; or it will be said about all of them that they are only allegories, which would destroy the Law, and efface it from the mind of the people, while the man doing it would not know the sin he has committed with regard to Law. With all this, if you were to look into the arguments which the interpreters advance about these things, you would find all of them unreasonable, while the exoteric meanings are much more satisfactory, that is, verification through them is more common and much better. This should become clearer to you when we begin to review the arguments which they advance for a denial of anthropomorphism, and discuss the question of direction, as we may shortly do. You should also know that the Law never intended to disclose the question of the denial of this attribute completely to the common people, since it can be done by an explanation of the soul, and the Law has not explained to the masses what the soul was. God says in the Quran, “They will ask thee concerning the Soul; answer, The Soul was created at the command of my Lord; but ye have no knowledge given unto you except a little.”[78] This is so, because it is difficult to establish reasons for the common people for the existence of a thing existing by itself, without a body. Had the denial of this attribute been understood by the masses then it would not have been enough for prophet Abraham to say in his discussion with the infidel, “When Abraham said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and I kill.”[79] On the other hand he would have said, “Thou art a body, and God has not one, for every body is created,” as the Asharites would argue. So also it would have sufficed for Moses in his discussion with Pharoah about his divinity; and for the Holy Prophet in case of the anti-christ, telling the Faithful of the falsehood of his claims for divinity, because he would have a body while God has none. On the other hand he told them that our God was not one-eyed. An argument proving the physical defect in him was enough to falsify him. So you see that all these are innovations in Islam, and have become the cause of its being split up into sects, into which the Prophet tells us that his people would be divided.

Now some one may object that the Law has not made it clear to the common people that God has or has not a body, then what should they believe about him. This is a question which will naturally arise in the mind of every man, and cannot be put away from him. So it would not satisfy the common people to let them know of a thing, the existence of which they should believe, that it is not made of matter. We should say that they should be answered with the answer given by Law—That He is the Light, for this is the quality which God has assigned to himself in His Book, for describing himself, He says, “God is the light of heaven and earth.”[80] The prophet has also assigned to him the game quality in an authentic Tradition. It says that he was asked whether he had seen God, and he answered, “He was Light, and I saw him.” The Tradition of the Night Journey says that when the Prophet neared the lote-tree,[81] it was completely covered with light, which did not hide it from his sight. There is also a Tradition in the book of Muslim which says that God is a curtain of light, which, if opened, would burn the opener, and yet God would not be seen. In some other readings of this very Tradition it is said that He is seventy curtains of light. It should be known that this illustration is especially fit for God, for it comprises the two things, that He can be felt, our eyes and intellect being powerless to see or comprehend him, and in spite of this He is not a body too. Now according to the common people the existent thing is one which can be felt, while the non-existent thing is that which they cannot feel. So light being the best of the things felt, it is but fitting that the best existing thing should be likened unto it. There is another cause for it which should be noticed. The condition of His existence to the learned people, when they begin to ponder over him, is like the condition of the eyes when they look towards the sun. But such is not the condition of the eyes of the bat. So this quality fittingly describes the condition of the two classes of people. Moreover, God is the cause of the existence of things, and of our knowledge of them. This is also the quality of the light in showing colours, and of our seeing them. So God has very fittingly named himself Light. When it is said that He is Light then there remains no doubt as to His Vision on the Day of Judgment. From these it must have become clear to you what the primary belief of the Law was about this attribute, and what are the innovations which rose in it afterwards. The Law is silent about it because there is not found in the universe anything unseen without a body, except that which is found by arguments among things seen as existent with this quality, and that is the soul. As the belief of the soul was impossible for the masses, it was also impossible for them to understand the existence of a Being who exists without a body. Hence they cannot understand it about God.

OF DIRECTION

This is a quality which all the people learned in Law have tried to prove, until the Mutazilites denied it, and were followed by the later Asharites, like Abul Maali and those who follow him. All the exoterics of the Law go to prove it. For God says, “And eight shall bear the Throne of thy Lord on that Day;”[82] and “He governeth all the things from heaven even to the earth: hereafter shall they return unto him, on the Day whose length shall be a thousand years, of those which ye compute.”[83] Again, He says, “The angels ascend unto him and the spirit;”[84] and, “Are Ye secure that He who dwelleth in heaven will not cause the earth to swallow you up? and behold, it shall shake.”[85] There are many other verses of this kind which, if interpreted, would turn the whole of the Law into interpretation; and if taken allegorically, would make it an allegory. All the religious laws are based upon the principle that God is in heaven, from whence he sends down angels to His Prophets with revelations, that from the heaven, the religious books used to descend, and that towards it was the Night Journey of the Prophet, till he reached near the lote-tree. All the philosophers are, moreover, agreed that God and His Angels are in heaven, as is the case with all the religions. The doubt which led them to deny this idea of direction was that they thought that by believing in direction it would be necessary to believe in space, which in its turn leads to a belief in anthropomorphism. But we say that this is not necessarily the case, for direction can exist without space. It is nothing but the surfaces of the body surrounding it, which are six in number. That is why we say that there is an above and a below, right and left and before and behind for an animal. Or they are the surfaces of a body surrounded by another body having the above-mentioned six directions. So the directions, which are the surfaces of the body itself, are not the spaces of the body in any respect. But the surfaces of the surrounding bodies are space for it. The atmosphere surrounding man, and the surfaces of the sky surrounding the surfaces of the atmosphere, for they are the spaces for it. Such is also the case with different surrounding and forming spaces for one another. As to the last sky it is evident that beyond it there must be no body. For had it been so, it would be necessary that beyond it be another body and so on to infinity. So there is no space at all for the last body of the universe, for it is not possible that in it be found any body, it being necessary that there be found a body in every space. So when there is an argument for the existence of a thing in that direction, it is necessary that it be not a body. So one who denies His existence there goes against his own ideas. He is existent, has a body, is not existent without a body. They cannot say that beyond the universe is a void. For the impossibility of a void has been made quite certain in the philosophical sciences. For that upon which the name void is commonly applied, are nothing but dimensions (Abad), in which there are no bodies. For when these dimensions are once removed, there remains nothing but non-existence. But if the void be supposed as existent, it is necessary to admit the existence of accidents in something not a body, for dimensions are accidents by their having a quality. But it is said by the Ancients and established by past religions that that place is the dwelling place of the spirits, God and angels. This place has no space, and is not governed by time, because everything governed by time and space can be corrupted. And it is necessary that the things there be uncorrupted and uncreated. This has been made quite clear by what I have said, for there cannot be found in that place anything but one which is existent and at the same time can be felt, or is altogether non-existent. It is self-evident that an existent object is always referred to by its existence; that is, it is said that it exists, that is, it has an existence. So if anything exists there, it must be the noblest of all, and it is necessary that that existent thing should be referred to by the best portion of the universe, which are the heavens. God has said concerning the nobility of the heavens, “Verily the creation of heaven and earth is more considerable than the creation of man: but the greater part of men do not understand.”[86] All this is perfectly clear to the learned men “Well grounded in knowledge.”[87]

Now it has become clear to you that belief in direction is necessary by religion and reason, and that it forms a part of the Law, which is based upon it. A denial of the principles is a denial of all the religions. The cause of the difficulty in their understanding this, and in their denial of anthropomorphism is, that there cannot be found in the visible world an illustration of such a thing. This was just the reason why the Law did not expressly deny an anthropomorphism. For to the common people verification of an invisible object can only come when its existence be known in the visible world, as knowledge, which being a condition for their own existence as visible, could to them become a condition for the existence of an invisible Maker. Now as the case of the visible was unknown in the visible on the part of the many, and none knew it but those who were well-grounded in knowledge, the Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of the Soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything, then the Law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example did not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then many examples are given, as in the case of an account of the Day of Judgment. The doubt which arises out of a denial of direction, on the part of those denying it, is that the common people cannot comprehend it, particularly so, because they have not been given before hand to understand that God has no body. So it is necessary to take the action of the Law as our example, otherwise we will have to interpret that which the Law itself has not expressly said.

With regard to these problems of the Law, the people may be divided into three classes. In the first place there are people who cannot notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the Law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest in number, and may be described as the masses. Then the second group of men is one which has doubts; but has not power to solve them. These are above the masses and below the learned people. It is for them that there are found in the Law allegorical sayings, and it is they whom God has censured. For there is no allegory in the Law for the learned or the common people, and it is in this light that all the allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood. Their example as regards the Law is like the example of the bread of wheat which though a useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove harmful to some. Such is also the case with religious teaching: it is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. The following words of God point to the same thing. “He will not thereby mislead any except the transgressors.”[88] But this is found only in a few verses of the Quran about a few people. Most of the verses are, however, those which speak of things invisible for which there is no example in the visible world. So they are expressed by the things nearest to them in the visible world, on account of their similarity. Some people take the illustration as the thing illustrated, and hence they fall into confusion and doubt. This is what is called allegorical in the Law, and is not meant for the learned or the common people, which in reality form two groups of men. For these are the people who are really healthy, and delicate food is only fit for them. The other group is a group of sick men who are always few in number. So God has said, “But they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is parabolical therein, out of love of schism.”[89] These are the dogmatic and the scholastic theologians. The worst which these people have done in respect to the Law is that they have interpreted much which they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their interpretation was the thing intended, and that God had mentioned it parabolically only to test and try His creatures. God forbid that we should ever have such an idea about Him. The Divine Book is a miracle of clearness and lucidity. So it is far from the real purpose of the Law for one to say about a thing which is not parabolical, that it is so, and then set about interpreting it according to his own ideas, telling the people that their duty lies in believing his interpretations. They have done so in the case of the verse of Equalisation on the Throne, and others, saying that their exoteric meaning is only parabolical. On the whole many interpretations, which these people maintain to be the real purpose of the Law, when intently looked into and deciphered, are found wanting in arguments, and not serving the purpose which the exoteric meaning would have with regard to the common people. The primary purpose of knowledge for the common people is action, so that which is most useful in action is most suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the Law, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and then discloses it to the common people, is like a man, who finds a medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the health of all, or of a majority of the people; then there came a man with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug commonly known by that name—but another which he really meant, but used this name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. So he took out the first drug from the compound, and placed another in its stead, which he thought to be the one intended by the first physician. Then he told the people that this was the medicine intended. The people began to use that “improved” medicine, and many of them got injured by it. Then there came another group of men, who, seeing the people sick on account of that medicine, thought of curing them. So they changed some of its drugs with some other than the first one, then presented it to the people for quite another disease than that intended by the first physician. Then there appeared another group which interpreted the medicine in quite another way than the two preceding groups had done. The fourth group gave a new interpretation to the drug and prescribed it for a fourth kind of disease. So as time went on with that great medicine, the interpretations of it took hold of the people instead of the drugs, and they changed and transformed it altogether. As a result the people were attacked by many different kinds of diseases, till the usefulness of the medicine was altogether lost. Such is the condition of those sects which have risen in Islam. For every one of them has made interpretations quite different from the others, and maintained that its interpretation shows the real purpose of the Law, which was at last rent to piece, and lost its primary purpose altogether. The Prophet, knowing that a thing like this would necessarily happen among his people, said, “My people will shortly be divided into seventytwo sects. All of them will be in hell, except one.” By this one he meant the sect which followed the exoteric meanings of the Law, without making any interpretations which may be disclosed to the people. If you were to look into the Law and see the corruption which it has suffered up to this time, through interpretations, the truth of this example would become clear to you.

The first to make a change in the religion—the great medicine—were the Kharijites, who were followed by the Mutazilites. They were succeeded by the Asharites, after whom came the Sufis. Last of all came Al-Ghazzali, who went to the extreme and corrupted everything. He it is who explained philosophy to the common people, and disclosed to them the opinions of the philosophers as he understood them to be. This he did in a book called Al-Maqasid, in which he thought he was refuting them. He planned his Refutation of the Philosophers, and charged them with infidelity in respect to three questions, tearing them to pieces, as he thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; and calling them innovators as regards other opinions. In this book he has advanced many specious arguments and confused reasonings, which have led astray many people both from religion and philosophy. Then he said in his book Jawahir al-Quran that the arguments which he had mentioned in his Refutation were controversial in their nature, while in fact they were mentioned in his Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi. Then in his Mishkat ul Anwar he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the first heaven, and that it is not He from whom this movement originates, are precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned in divine science. He has said in many places that divine science exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science. In his book Munqidh min al Dalal he has gone against the philosophers and maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his Kimiya i Saadat. Men have become divided into parties on account of this confusion. One party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other agreed to interpret the Law, and make it conform to philosophy. All this is wrong. The Law should be taken literally; and the conformity of religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people. For by an exposition of it we should be exposing the results of philosophy to them, without their having intelligence enough to understand them. It is neither permitted nor desirable to expose anything of the result of philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no arguments either with the learned people who have a mastery over both the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the Law. So his action brought disorder in respect to both of these things, religion and philosophy, in the mind of the common people, while he saved them for the others. The disorder in religion came through his exposing those interpretations which should not be exposed; and so also the disorder in philosophy was the result of his mentioning those things in his books which should not be put in the works on philosophy. Now it was the result of his treatment of the subjects that many people do not know the difference between the two, because of his bringing both of them together. He has also insisted upon the fact that he knew the cause of doing so, as he did in his Al Tafriqa bain al Islami wa-z Zindiqah. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations and has decided that their interpreters were not infidels though they may go against the consensus of opinion. Since he has done so, he is dangerous to the Law for some reasons, to philosophy for others, and to both for some other reasons. So this man, by disclosing them, has shown that he is dangerous for both the things in reality and profitable to them only by accident. For teaching philosophy to one who is not fit for it, will either falsify philosophy or religion absolutely or will show conformity between them by accident only. The right thing would have been not to disclose philosophy to the common people at all. But if teaching of it was absolutely necessary, then only that section of the people should have been taught who saw that religion was opposed to philosophy, in order to show them that it was not so. And also it might have been taught to those people who thought that philosophy is opposed to religion. This may have been shown to either of these sections, that in reality they did not possess a knowledge of their substance and truth, that is, of religion and philosophy. Moreover, they would know that the opinion about religion, that it was opposed to philosophy was one which was either about some innovation in religion, and not about its principles, or is an error in understanding that is, a wrong interpretation of it, as was shown in the case of knowledge about particulars and other things. That is why we were compelled in this book to explain the principles of religion. These principles, when intently looked into will be found in perfect agreement with philosophy. Such is also the case with the opinion which says this philosophy is opposed to religion. It only shows that the man has not had a sufficient training in either philosophy or religion. This is the reason that we were compelled to explain it in our tractate entitled Fasl al Maqal fi Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia.

Now that this has become clear we would return to our former theme. The only problem which remains for us to solve, out of those which we proposed is that of Divine Vision. It is thought for some reasons, that it forms a part of the problem which we have just discussed, on account of the words of God, “The sight comprehendeth him not, but He comprehendeth the sight.”[90] And hence the Mutazilites have denied it, setting aside the arguments found in the Law, in spite of their greatness in number and fame, a very shameful act on their part. The cause of this doubt of the Law that since the Mutazilites denied physical attributes, and believed in exposing their ideas to every one, it became necessary for them to deny direction also. And having once denied direction they must also deny the Vision, for the thing seen must be in some direction to one who sees it. To prove their point they are constrained to set aside the traditional religion. They neglected the Traditions because they were only isolated things which should not be believed, if found opposed to the teachings of the Quran, that is, opposed to the verse, “The sight comprehendeth Him not.” The Asharites tried to mix together the two beliefs, that is, the denial of physical attributes, and the possibility of vision of One having no body, by means of our senses. It became difficult for them to prove it, and they took refuge in many sophistical and conjectural arguments, that is arguments which are thought to be correct but are in reality wrong. It is so because it is possible to have the same grades in arguments as there are among men. Just as there may be found men with perfect excellence and those below them, till we may have a man who thinks himself learned and yet he is not, being only a pedant, so there are arguments which are extremely certain, and those below them, then, there are specious arguments, and those which though really false seem to be true. The statements of the Asharites in regard to this question are of two kinds: those refuting the arguments of the Mutazilites, and those proving the possibility of the Vision of One having no body, and that there is no difficulty in our believing it. The statements by which they have opposed the Mutazilites in their argument, that the thing seen must have a direction for one who sees it, is that some of them say that it is applied only to the visible, and not to the invisible, world; and that it is not one of those cases in which the condition of the one can be applied to the other. According to them it is possible for a man to see an object having no direction, for he sees by his power of sight only that which comes before his eyes. In this they have mixed together the senses of sight with intelligence, for the latter can perceive that which has no direction, that is, no space; but for the perception of the eye there is a condition, that the thing to be perceived be in a direction, not only that but a particular direction too. So if we take the eye to be endowed with the power of seeing, then it is not possible except under very limited conditions. These are three in number-light, the intervention of a transparent body between the eye and the object seen, and the possession of necessary colours by the object. A refutation of these conditions in the eyes is also a refutation of those primary principles of knowledge which are known to all. It would be a refutation of the sciences of philosophy and mathematics. The Asharites also maintain that one of the conditions as we have said, for example, is that every rational being has a life, it being apparent in the visible world as a condition for knowledge. Hence we say to them that these are also conditions for seeing things in the visible world. So according to their own principle is the case of the visible and the invisible. In his book Al Maqasid Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose the premise that every object perceivable must be in some direction to the one seeing it. He says that a man sees himself reflected in a mirror and sees himself not in any other direction but the opposite one. Hence he can see his self in an opposite direction too. But this is a mistake, because what he sees is not his self but only an image of it. This image is in the opposite direction, being in the mirror, placed there.

Of the arguments which they advance to prove the vision of an object having no body, two are famous ones. Of these the more famous is one which says that an object seen is either because it has some colour, or because it has a body, or it is a colour, or because it is existent. Sometimes they mention many other causes than really do exist. They say that it is wrong to suppose that it must be a body, otherwise, no colour would be visible, it being also incorrect to suppose the space to be the colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions in the premise have been refuted we shall have to believe that only an existent object will be seen. The mistake in this statement is quite clear. For an object is visible because of itself. This is the case with the colour and the body: the colour being visible by itself, and the body through the colour. That is why a thing which has no colour cannot be seen. Had the existence of a thing been the only condition of visibility, it would have been possible to see the sound and the senses. In that case seeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one, which is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to hear the colour, and see the sounds. But this is against nature, as man has understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of seeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite distinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the organ of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn colour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen, should be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily answer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be seen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the sense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which sounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of sound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that it is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If they say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is neither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing both. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the case of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun admit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a philosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous for it.