A Compendium on the Soul

by Avicenna

in which the Proofs of the Essentiality of the Soul, and of Its Independence of Body in its Structure, are set forth in pursuance of the Method of Logicians.

SUB-SECTION A:

Let us however first preface it with premisses, among which are:—

First Premiss: that man conceives universal (generic) notions wherein a greater or less multitude participates, such as man at large, and animal at large. And of these generic notions there are such as he conceives through a particular [or partial, or an obligatory] synthesis, and there are such others of these generic notions as he does not conceive by any synthesis, but singly and individually. And unless he shall have conceived the latter division (class, sett), it is not possible for him to conceive the former. Further, he conceives each one of these generic universal notions only under one form, wholly stripped (abstracted) from all relationship to its concrete sensuous particulars, since the particulars of each one of the generic notions are potentially endless [in variety and number] and no one of the particulars has any right of priority over another particular in respect of that one form of the generic notion.

Second Premiss: that a form, whatsoever body it detaches, reduces, and adorns, and in general whatsoever individual of divisible things it so takes hold of, it clothes the same and exactly fits the same in every one of its parts. And whatsoever clothes and exactly fits a divisible thing in all its parts is itself divisible; and hence every form that has clothed and exactly fitted any body whatsoever is itself divisible.

Third Premiss: that in every generic (universal) form, if regard be had, in the division of such form, purely and simply to its abstract self, then it will not at all validly follow that the parts into which it has been divided shall necessarily resemble the whole in its complete notion; otherwise it must follow that the generic form, whose division has been made in respect of its abstract self, has not been itself divided, but that it has been divided into its constituents, whether these be its various species or its numerous individuals, whereas multiplicity of species or of individuals does not necessarily entail division in the abstract generic notion itself. But it has been laid down as a fact that such division has actually taken place, which is a contradiction. Hence our assertion that the parts of the generic form do not resemble it in its full and complete notion is a true dictum.

Fourth Premiss: that in the mental form, if regard be had to its division, it will not validly follow that its parts are denuded (stripped) of the totality of its notion. This is so because, if we admit such total denudation, and assert that these parts are utterly aloof from the complete conception of the generic whole, then the form will arise, in such parts, only upon their assembling together, so that they are in fact things devoid of that form which will arise in them on their being set together, which is a quality of the parts of materia capax or passive matter which occupies space ([Greek: dektikon: δεκτικον]); [Note: The recipient is the acted upon, and it is called matter, and also place.]; and hence the division has not been effected in the generic form, but in its objective concrete materials. But it has been asserted that the division has come to pass in it: this too is a contradiction. Therefore our assertion: “It will not validly follow that its parts are stripped of the totality of its notion” is a true statement.

Fifth Premiss: which is the result of the two preceding: that in the generic form, if it be possible that divisibility be considered in it, then its parts are neither wholly devoid of the perfect form nor are completely exhaustive of it, and are as it were [component, constituent] parts of its definition and outline (or description).

Given then these premisses, we shall further unquestionably say that a mentally-grasped form—in short all knowledge—claims some abode somewhere, which abode is both an essence itself and a part of man’s self, so that such essence will not be devoid of being either a divisible (material) body or a non-corporeal indivisible essence. I however say, that it is not licit that it be a corporeal body; because a generic mentally-grasped form, if it abide in a body, then it is inevitably possible for divisibility to befall it, as we have shown above. Nor is it licit that its parts be otherwise than resembling the whole from one standpoint, and contrasting with it from another standpoint, in a word each one of the parts contains somewhat of the notion of the whole; whereas there is no generic form whatsoever but of whose parts a compound can be formed that is partly like it and partly unlike it save genera and differentia; consequently these parts are genera and differentia, and hence each one of them is in its turn a generic form; and thus the same assertion repeats itself as above.

Inevitably this will end in a form that is no longer divisible into genera and differentia, owing to the impracticability of progression ad infinitum into parts differing in notions, even if it be established that corporeal bodies are so divided into parts ad infinitum.