1. The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy (ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει). [774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the greatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulness are beheld in motion and energy." But it is not the most enduring pleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by uneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations," and it yields some bitter fruits.
[Footnote 773: ][ (return) ] "Fundamental Maxims," No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.
[Footnote 774: ][ (return) ] Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxviii.
2. The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity, impassibility (ἡδονὴ καταστηµατική). This is a state, a "condition," rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion." [775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the happiness of God; and he who attains it "will be like a god among men." "The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected."
Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad," [776] prudence (φρόνησις), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest and most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of reason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of reason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration of pleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness of a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without wisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and follow after agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will consequently lose "tranquillity of mind." "It is not possible," says Epicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly." [777] The difference, then, between the philosopher and the ordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knows how to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexation hereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment. Epicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as a means to an end, namely, the securing of happiness. [778]
[Footnote 775: ][ (return) ] Id., ib.
[Footnote 776: ][ (return) ] "Fundamental Maxims," No. 7.
[Footnote 777: ][ (return) ] Ibid., No. 5.
[Footnote 778: ][ (return) ] Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 141.