But suppose we are permitted to employ the term "nature" to denote the essential properties of matter, and the various forms of energy,[247] potential and kinetic; and suppose we admit that matter is indestructible, and that the amount of energy in the world is unchanged, the sum of the actual and potential energies being a constant quantity; still we are not entitled from these premises to infer the absolute uniformity in the succession of events—that is, the uniformity of the phenomenal. We have already seen that no phenomenon known to man is the result of a single property of matter or a single form of energy. "All issues in nature are the effects produced upon matter by the resultant of component forces." The phenomena of nature are the result of adjustments, combinations, and distributions of matter and of force in endless variety and complexity. Hence we have in nature the variable, the contingent, the particular, as well as the invariable, the uniform, and the general. This is admitted by Comte: "That which engenders this irregular variability of the effect is the great number of different agents determining at the same time the same phenomena; and from which it results, in the most complicated phenomena, that there are no two cases precisely alike. We have no occasion, in order to find such complexity, to go to the phenomena of living beings. It presents itself in bodies without life, for example, in studying meteorological phenomena.... Their multiplicity renders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had not been subject to any precise condition."[248]
Thus we are led by various lines of thought to the same conclusion. It is certain that we can only learn what the uniformities (the laws) of nature are by experience, and in order to determine whether all the successions of events have been and now are universally uniform, we must have a universal experience. If there have been deviations from general laws under peculiar conditions—if one form of energy has been counteracted and modified by another form of energy, or even by an intelligent Will, so as to give a particular result—experience (= observation and testimony) must be just as adequate to attest the reality of that particular deviation as it is to attest the prevalence of general laws.[249] We have no intuitive and necessary conviction of the uniformity of nature, and therefore we can not affirm in an à priori manner what is possible or impossible. Those scientists who adopt the maxim of Faraday, that in the investigation of new and peculiar phenomena "we must set out with clear ideas of the possible and the impossible," are doomed to move in a vicious circle. They can not be sure that a fact of experience is a real fact until they have ascertained the laws of nature in the case, and they can not ascertain what the laws of nature are until they have ascertained the facts. They must not profess to have learned any thing until they have ascertained that it is possible, and they can not decide that it is possible until they have learned every thing, because the single item of knowledge they are deficient in may be the very principle which warrants a belief in the possibility of the fact. The maxim is obviously absurd. In its theological bearings it is repudiated even by Professor Tyndall, the pupil and successor of Faraday at the Royal Institution. "You never hear the really philosophical defenders of the doctrine of uniformity speaking of impossibilities in nature. They never say ... that it is impossible for the Builder of the universe to alter his work. Their business is not with the possible, but with the actual."[250]
The hypothesis under discussion is further vitiated by the assumption that laws are causes adequate in themselves to the production of all phenomena. So that now Creation by Law (Nomogeny) is the watchword of this school of thinkers. The men who have defined law as "the uniformity of relations among phenomena"—as "an observed order of facts"—now speak of laws as having in themselves a real efficiency; as producing, regulating, and governing powers. Under this high-sounding phrase—"Creation by Law"—there is not only the artful concealment of a difficulty, but there is also the interpolation of a positive error. The uniformities of natural phenomena are the causes of phenomena, or, in other words, the order of nature is its own cause, which is not only erroneous but self-contradictory.
Here, again, we encounter the perplexity consequent on the use of ambiguous phraseology. The term "Law" is employed in an equivocal sense, as denoting, indifferently, property and relation, condition and cause, antecedent and consequence. In such an atmosphere of verbal haze it is impossible to see clearly or think correctly. We must feel our way toward a purer light, and find a less wavering stand-point.
The primary and generic conception of law is "the authoritative expression of Will." This is the most natural, the most obvious, and the most legitimate conception. The true notion of Will is the synthesis of Reason and Power. Power exerted in the forms of reason is self-consciousness. Reason manifested in the forms of power is self-determination. Self-consciousness and self-determination are the two elements of personality. More explicitly, we may therefore define law as "the idea of the Reason enforced by Power." The subjects of legislation are:
1. The actions of Free Beings. To ascertain the laws in this case is to answer the question, What ought to be done?
2. The processes of Thought. To ascertain the laws in this case is to answer the questions, Why do we judge or affirm this or that? and, What are the grounds and criteria of certitude?
3. The facts or events of Nature. To ascertain the laws in this case is to answer the questions, What are the facts in their observed order? How or from what causes do they arise? Why or for what end do they exist?
It is under the last division that we encounter the secondary and symbolical senses in which the term law has come to be used by scientific men, which have well-nigh supplanted the primary and only legitimate signification.
That which lies nearest to sense—the phenomena of nature—first engages the awakening intellect. If the attention is confined solely to the phenomena of nature, the simple question propounded is, What is the observed order of the facts? At this stage science can be no more than a classification of phenomena according to their relations of co-existence, resemblance, and succession, and law must be defined as "the uniformity of relations among phenomena."[251] Here the term is taken objectively, and the facts are simply conceived as perceived by the senses.