Joseph Smith the Prophet-Teacher: A Discourse

by B. H. Roberts

THE PROPHET'S DEFINITION OF TRUTH: Undoubtedly the quest of philosophy is Truth. And again, undoubtedly, Philosophy would be greatly helped in its search for Truth if it had but a clear conception of what it was trying to find; hence the importance of a clear and accurate definition of Truth. It is at this point, however, that the greatest difficulty arises for the human intellect. It is quite generally conceded that up to the early decades of the nineteenth century no satisfactory definition of Truth had been found. When Jesus stood bound before Pilate's judgment seat, and testified that He was born to bear witness of the Truth, Pilate—whether in mockery or in earnest curiosity we may not now know—asked the question: "What is truth?" But the Divine Man made no answer. Most commentators say that, without waiting for an answer the Roman procurator departed from the judgment hall to speak to the Jews clamoring on the outside; and all regret the opportunity that was there lost of receiving a divine answer to the question. One set of commentators, referring to Pilate's question, say to him: "Thou stirrest the question of questions, which the thoughtful of every age have asked, but never man yet answered."

A secular writer presents the same incident as follows: "'What is truth?' was the passionate demand of a Roman procurator, on one of the most momentous occasions in history. And the Divine Person who stood before him, to whom the interrogation was addressed, made no reply—unless, indeed, silence contained the reply. Often and vainly had that demand been made before—often and vainly has it been made since. No one has yet given a satisfactory answer."

Then, by way of historical illustration of this assertion, our author remarks the following:

"When, at the dawn of science in Greece, the ancient religion was disappearing like a mist at sunrise, the pious and thoughtful men of that country were thrown into a condition of intellectual despair. Anaxagoras plaintively exclaims, 'Nothing can be known, nothing can be learned, nothing can be certain, sense is limited, intellect is weak, life is short.' Xenophanes tells us that it is impossible for us to be certain even when we utter the Truth. Parmenides declares that the very constitution of man prevents him from ascertaining absolute Truth. Empedocles affirms that all philosophical and religious systems must be unreliable, because we have no criterion by which to test them. Democritus asserts that even things that are true cannot impart certainty to us; that the final result of human inquiry is the discovery that man is incapable of absolute knowledge; that, even if the truth be in his possession, he cannot be certain of it. Pyrrho bids us reflect on the necessity of suspending our judgment of things, since we have no criterion of truth; so deep a distrust did he impart to his followers that they were in the habit of saying, 'We assert nothing; not even that we assert nothing.' Epicurus taught his disciples that truth can never be determined by reason. Arcesilaus, denying both intellectual and sensuous knowledge, publicly avowed that he knew nothing, not even his own ignorance! The general conclusion to which Greek philosophy came was this: that, in view of the contradiction of the evidence of the senses, we cannot distinguish the true from the false; and such is the imperfection of reason, that we cannot affirm the correctness of any philosophical deduction."

I make these quotations to show that no Teacher satisfactory definition of Truth, either in ancient or modern times, either in religion or philosophy, has been given, and also to call attention to the fact that if Joseph Smith has given a definition of Truth that appeals with irresistible force to the understanding of men, it must be a strongly original utterance; a revelation of the utmost importance. Such a definition, I believe, he has given. In 1833 he said:

"Truth is knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and as they are to come."

This I hold to be the completest definition of Truth found in human literature. It deals with relative truth, absolute truth, and truth unfolding or becoming.

It may be objected that this definition is defective in that it appears to make Truth depend upon knowledge. "Truth," says the definition, "is knowledge of things as they are," etc. This part of the definition deals with relative Truth merely. "Truth as it appears to us," says S. Baring-Gould, "can only be relative, because we are relative creatures, have only a relative perception and judgment. We appreciate that which is true to ourselves, not that which is universally true."

In other words, and using the language of Herbert Spencer at this point: "Debarred as we are from everything beyond the relative, Truth, raised to its highest form, can be for us nothing more than perfect agreement throughout the whole range of our experience, between those representations of things which we distinguish as ideal and those presentations of things which we distinguish as real." That is to say, to each individual, "knowledge of things as they are and as they were" will be to him the Truth, and the fullness thereof, though not necessarily all the Truth there is. There is Truth, however, which does not depend upon knowledge; existences beyond and independent of any human knowledge, at least.

To illustrate: America existed, though all Europe was without knowledge of it for ages; until, in fact, it was discovered by Columbus. The power of steam always existed, but men did not know it until modern times. So, also, with the mysterious force called electricity, it always existed, but not until recent years did man know it as a force that could be utilized; and so as to many other forces and truths in God's universe that are now existing, and have always existed, but man, as yet, has no knowledge of them. The storehouse of Truth is not yet exhausted by man's discoveries. There are more Truths in heaven and earth than are yet dreamed of in human philosophies.