Mr. Van Der Donckt himself says: "Something is limited, not because it is [i. e. exists]: but because it is this or that; for instance, a stone, a plant, a man"—or a person, I suggest. For if God has personality, he is a person, a some-thing, and hence limited, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy; if limited, as he must be when conceived of as this or that, as a person, for instance, then of course not infinite being; and thus my friend's doctrine of God's "simplicity" is destroyed the moment he ascribes personality to Deity. Nor does the difficulties of Mr. Van Der Donckt and all orthodox Christians end here. Not only does revelation as they view it demand belief in the personality of God, but it demands the belief that in God are three persons—the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This further complicates the matter, and removes orthodox Christians still further from the postulate of "simplicity" they affirm of God; for if there are three persons in God, by no intellectual contortions whatsoever can this conception of "three" be harmonized with the orthodox Christian postulate of God's "simplicity." For the Son, if he exists at all, must exist in virtue of some distinction from the Father; so also the Holy Ghost must exist in virtue of some distinction from both the Father and the Son. Each must have something distinct from the other; must be what the other is not, in some particular;* and if each one has something the other has not, and each lacks something which the other has, how can it be said that each of these persons is God, and each infinite as he must be in order to be God, under Mr. V.'s doctrine?
[Footnote A: "Distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has." Dean Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thoughts.">[
If the three be conceived as one God—yet each with that about him which distinguishes him from the other—how can God be regarded as "simple," "not compound?" The orthodox creeds of Christendom, moreover, require us to believe that while the Father is a person, the Son a person, and the Holy Ghost a person, yet there are not three persons, but one person. So with each being eternal and almighty. So with each being God: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God: and yet there are not three Gods but one God"[A] No wonder the whole conception is given up as "incomprehensible." "Their mode of subsistence [i. e., the subsistence of the three persons] in the one substance," says the Commentary on the Confession of Faith, "must ever continue to us a profound mystery, as it transcends all analogy."[B] So the Douay Catechism (Catholic), ch. i:
[Footnote A: See the creed of St. Athanasius, a copy is published in the History of the Church, vol. I, Introduction, p. 87.]
[Footnote B: This Commentary is by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D.D., LL.D., p. 58.]
Q. In what do faith and law of Christ consist? A. In two principal mysteries, namely, the Unity and Trinity of God, and the incarnation and death of our Savior.
"To think that God is, as we think him to be, is blasphemy," is the lofty assertion behind which some of the orthodox hide when hard pressed with the inconsistency of their creed; and if I mistake not, "A God understood is a God dethroned," has long been an aphorism of the Church of which Mr. Van Der Donckt is a priest.
But what is the sum of my argument thus far on Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise of God's absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality?" Only this:
First, his premise is proven to be unphilosophical and untenable, when coupled with his creed, which ascribes qualities, attributes and personality to God. Either the gentleman must cease to think of God as "infinite being," "most simple," "not compound," or he must surrender the God of his creed, who is represented by it to be three persons in one substance; and, moreover, persons possessed of attributes and qualities which bring God into relations with men and the universe, a mode of being which destroys "simplicity." Either one or the other of these beliefs must be given up; they cannot consistently be held simultaneously, as they destroy each other. If Mr. V. holds to the God of his creed, what becomes of all his "philosophy?" If he holds to his "philosophy," what becomes of the God of his creed.
Second, as affecting this discussion, the matter at this point stands thus: Since the gentleman's premise of God's absolute simplicity is proved to be illogical and unphilosophical, it affords no sound basis of argument against the Latter-day Saints' views of Deity, wherein they hold him to be something different from absolute "being"—more than a mere, and, I may say, bare and barren "existence," a metaphysical abstraction. Mr. V.'s premise of absolute simplicity affords no consistent basis of argument against our view that God is a person in the sense of being an individual, in form like man, and possessed of attributes which bring him within the nearest and dearest relations to men that it is possible to conceive.