[Footnote A: Doc. and Cov., Sec. i:31. Also Habakkuk i:13 and Psalms v:4-6.]
[Footnote B: "We cry out for some explanation—for some philosophy which shall show us how evil is consistent with the infinite goodness." (Le Conte, "Conceptions of God," p. 71.)]
[Footnote C: "How terribly large is the proportion of evil? comparing the number of those who are or have been happy, with the number of those who are or have been unhappy, can we say that the great pessimist was very far wrong in calling this the worst possible—he did not say the worst conceivable—world". (Goldwin Smith, discussing "Evolution, Immortality, and Christianity," in North American Review, October, 1907, p. 196.)]
[Footnote D: "The great quest of humanity is happiness. But was the world created to make us happy? I've studied people in all places and conditions and everywhere I've found, when you get below the surface, that it's mostly the insincere individual who says, 'I am a happy man.'" (Thomas A. Edison, the great American Inventor in a Vienna-Austria Interview on "Success in Life," reported in New York World, October 25. 1911.)]
[Footnote E: Habakkuk i:13.]
[Footnote F: See Seventy's Year Book II, Lessons III and IX. Also Year Book IV, Lessons IV and VII and VIII.]
[Footnote G: In order that it may be seen that this is regarded really as doubtful by some powerful minds, and also as a question of grave importance, I quote the following presentation of it by Professor Howison, and which he prints in italics in the work from which I quote it: "Can the reality of human free-agency, of moral responsibility and universal moral aspiration, of unlimited spiritual hope for every soul,—can this be made out, can it even be held, consistently with the theory of an Immanent God? This, for a few awakened minds at least, now becomes the 'burning question.' * * * At all events, the time has come when the question whether this is not so should be raised with all emphasis, and examined to the end. For if our genuine freedom is to disappear when we accept the religion whose God is the Immanent Spirit, then the new religion is in truth a decline from the highest conceptions of the historic faith, and in this regard has no advantage over the religion of the 'Unknowable.'" ("Conceptions of God," p. 30.)]
Professor Le Conte has a valuable passage apropos these questions which I consider too valuable to omit at this point, though it makes rather an extended quotation. On the great question of moral evil, its nature, its origin, its reason—a question inseparably connected with the conception of God, he says:
"In a general way I agree with his [Professor Royce's] explanation of the dark problem of evil. Evil cannot be the true meaning and real outcome of the universe; on the contrary, it means the necessary means of the highest good. * * * Our moral and religious nature is just as fundamental and essential as our scientific and rational nature. As science is not simply passionless acquisition of knowledge, but also enthusiasm for truth, so morality is not passionless rules of best conduct, but impassioned love of righteousness. And this last is what we call religion; for religion is morality touched and vivified with noble emotion. Now, the necessary postulate of science, without which scientific activity would be impossible, is a rational order of the universe; and, similarly, the necessary postulate of religion, without such religious activity would be impossible, is a moral order of the universe. As science postulates the final triumph of reason, so religion must postulate the final triumph of righteousness. Science believes in the rational order, or in law, in spite of apparent confusion; she knows that disorder is only apparent, only the result of ignorance; and her mission is, to show this by reducing all appearances, all phenomena, to law. So also religion is right in her unshakable belief in the moral order, in spite of apparent disorder or evil; she knows that evil is only apparent, the result of our ignorance and our weakness; and her mission is, to show this by helping on the triumph of moral order over disorder. We may, if we like,—as many indeed do,—reject the faith in the Infinite Goodness, and thereby paralyze our religious activity; but then, to be consistent, we must also reject the faith in the Infinite Reason, and thereby paralyze our scientific activity.
So much for a rational justification of the indestructible faith religion has in the Infinite Righteousness, even in the presence of abounding evil. It is founded on the same ground as our indestructible faith in the reign of law in the natural world, and is just as reasonable. Why is it, then, it may be asked, that every one is willing to admit the postulate of science, while so many doubt that of religion? I answer: partly because of feebleness of our moral life in comparison with our physical life; but mainly because the steady advance of science, with its progressive conquest of chaos, and its extension of the domain of order and law, is a continual verification of the postulate of science, and justification of our faith therein; while, on the contrary, the progress of morality and religion is uncertain and often unrecognized, the increase of righteousness and decrease of evil doubtful and even denied. In the presence of such uncertainty, our faith is often sorely tried. We cry out for some explanation—for some philosophy which shall show us how evil is consistent with the Infinite Goodness. We know it is, for that is a necessary postulate. But—how?"[A]