DISCUSSION.
1. Immanence and Personality—a Difficulty: The view here presented of the Immanence of God in the world doubtless contributes in a helpful way to the advanced thought of the modern world in striving to arrive at a knowledge of things as they are, as they have been, and as they shall be—the truth.[A]
[Footnote A: Doc. and Cov., Sec. xciii:24.]
Modern thought has forced the conclusion upon men's minds that there is a power immanent in the world—here and now, and always has been; and so far as man can see there always will be; it is eternal—"both ways"—to use a phrase of Professor Le Conte's, looking forward as well as backward, when using that word "eternal." It is the eternal cause of things, variously named "energy," "force," "spirit," or simply "power," used in some cases with the prefix "mechanical" or "infinite" or "Divine" or the "Unknowable" according to the view point of the speaker or writer; but by most philosophers recognized as "the infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed," and "which is the same power that in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness;"[A] and which by theists of all classes is recognized as God. But those who long to conceive and in their lives feel the need of conceiving of this universal "power" or "spirit" or "force" or "energy"—"the infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed"—meet with the difficulty of forming the conception of a "power, infinite, and all pervasive," and at the same time personal, since it is held by philosophers of high authority—and deservedly so—that "personality and infinity are terms expressive of ideas which are mutually incompatible."[B] How then shall this difficulty be overcome? Professor Le Conte, a most conscientious man of science, and also a most devout Theist, says, "The only rational view is to accept both immanence and personality, even though we cannot reconcile them."[C] This, however, from the standpoint of modern philosophers and orthodox theologians who identify or confound the immanent power absolutely as God himself—and the only Deity with whom we have to deal—is a somewhat forcing of the human understanding—a case of "the heart breathing defiance to the intellect." "Not that the spirit cannot do this * * * but that doing it does not amount to philosophy."[D] I doubt if it amounts to religion either: for religion no less than philosophy requires harmony in things; and is necessarily a concern of the intellect as well as of the heart. Its conceptions must appeal to the understanding as well as to the emotions. As remarked by Mr. Fiske: "Our reason demands that there shall be a reasonableness in the constitution of things. This demand is a fact of our psychical [spiritual] nature as positive and irrepressible as our aceptance of geometrical axioms, and our rejection of whatever controverts such axioms. No ingenuity of argument can bring us to believe that the infinite Sustainer of the Universe will put us to permanent intellectual confusion." That is in regard of spiritual or religious matters; any more than in other matters. "Our belief," he continues, "in what we call the evidences of our senses is less strong than our faith that in the orderly sequence of events there is a meaning which our minds could fathom were they only vast enough."[E]
[Footnote A: Fiske, "Studies in Religion," p. 104; Works, Vol. IX. The parts within single quotation marks are from Spencer, and quoted by Fiske.]
[Footnote B: Fiske Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. IV, p. 227. Also Professor Le Conte says: "No one, we admit, can form a clear conception of how immanence of Deity is consistent with personality." ("Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought," p. 337.)]
[Footnote C: "Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought," 1902, p. 337. The context is also worthy of being brought into view: "No one, we admit, can form a clear conception of how immanence of Deity is consistent with personality, and yet we must accept both, because we are irresistibly led to each of these by different lines of thought. Science, following one line of thought, uncorrected by a wider philosophy, is naturally led toward the one extreme of pantheistic immanence; the devout worshiper, following the wants of his religious nature, is naturally led toward the other extreme of anthropomorphic personality. The only rational view is to accept both immanence and personality, even though we can not clearly reconcile them, i. e., immanence without pantheism, and personality without anthropomorphism.">[
[Footnote D: Professor Howison in "Conception of God"—Introduction, p. 35.
The situation is well represented in the respective attitudes of Mr. Henry L. Mansel, a church of England minister, Dean of St. Paul's in fact, and author of the somewhat celebrated Brampton Lectures on "Limits of Religious Thought"—1875—; and Mr. Herbert Spencer, author of the Synthetic Philosophy. Mr. Mansel in his second lecture, after dealing with the difficulties attending upon finite minds dealing with questions of the "absolute," "infinite" and "first cause;" declares that there is a contradiction in the conception of the infinite as personal (pp. 84-85): and yet in the third lecture he says, "It is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite"; notwithstanding, as Mr. Mansel admits, "we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other, as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity." (p. 106):
Commenting upon this very passage Mr. Spencer says: "That this is not the conclusion here adopted (i.e., by himself) needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing argument, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence: and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I for one admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things." "First Principles" p. 111.]