"The leading positions, and the connection of ideals, in this exceedingly profound, clear, and logical tract of the eleventh century are as follows:
"Beginning with the idea of sin, Anselm defines this as the withholding from God what is due to him from man. Sin is debt. But man owes to God the absolute and entire subjection of his will, at all times to the divine law and will. This is not given, and hence the guilt, or debt, of a man to Deity. The extinction of this guilt does not consist in simply beginning again to subject the will entirely to its rightful sovereign, but in giving satisfaction for the previous cessation in so doing. God has been robbed of his honor in the past, and it must be restored to him in some way, while at the same time the present and future honor due to him is being given. But how is man, who is still a sinner, and constantly sinning, to render this double satisfaction, viz.: satisfy the law in the future by perfectly obeying it, and in the past by enduring its whole penalty? It is impossible for him to render it; and yet this impossibility, argues Anselm, does not release him from his indebtedness or guilt, because this impossibility is the effect of a free act, and a free act must be held responsible for all its consequences, in conformity with the ethical maxim, that the cause is answerable for the effect. But now the question arises: Cannot the love and compassion of God abstracted from his justice come in at this point, and remit the sin of man without any satisfaction? This is impossible because it would be irregularity and injustice. If unrighteousness is punished neither in the person of transgressor, nor in that of a proper substitute, then unrighteousness is not subject to any law or regulations of any sort; it enjoys more liberty than righteousness itself, which would be a contradiction and a wrong. Furthermore, it would contradict the divine justice itself, if the creature would defraud the creator of that which is his due, without giving any satisfaction for the robbery. Since there is no attribute more just and necessary than that primitive righteousness innate to deity which maintains the honor of God. This justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it, is to satisfy God himself.
"Having in this manner carried the discussion into the very heart of the divine nature, and shown that a necessary and immanent attribute of the Deity stands in the way of non-infliction of punishment and the happiness of the transgressor, Anselm proceeds to consider the possibility of satisfying the claims of justice—the claims of Satan being expressly denied. There are two ways, he says, in which this attribute can be satisfied. First, the punishment may be actually inflicted upon the transgressor. But this, of course, would be incompatible with his salvation from sin, and his eternal happiness, because the punishment required is eternal, in order to offset the infinite demerit of robbing God of his honor. It is plain, therefore, that man cannot be his own atoner, and render satisfaction for his own sin. A sinner cannot justify a sinner, any more than a criminal can pardon his own crime. The second, and only other way in which the attribute of justice can be satisfied is by substituted or vicarious suffering. This requires the agency of another being than the transgressor. But here everything depends upon the nature and character of the being who renders the substituted satisfaction. For it would be an illegitimate procedure to defraud justice by substituting a less for a more valuable satisfaction. It belongs, therefore, to the conception of a true vicarious satisfaction, that something be offered to justice for the sin of man that is greater than the finite and created, or, in Anselm's phrase, is 'greater than all that is not God.' In other words, an infinite value must pertain to that satisfaction which is substituted for the sufferings of mankind. But he who can give and has the right to give, out of his own resources, something that is greater than the infinite universe, must himself be greater than all that is not God, or than all that is infinite and created. But God alone is greater than all that is not in God, or the created universe. Only God, therefore, can make this satisfaction. Only Deity can satisfy the claims of Deity.
But, on the other hand, man must render it, otherwise it would not be a satisfaction for man's sin. Consequently, the required and adequate satisfaction must be theanthropic, i. e., rendered by a God-Man. As God, the God-Man can give to Deity more than the whole finite creation combined could render. Furthermore, this theanthropic obedience and suffering was not due from the mere humanity of Christ. This was sinless and innocent, and justice had no claims, in the way of suffering, upon it. And, moreover, only a man's obedience, and not that of a God-Man, could be required of a man. Consequently this Divine Human obedience and suffering was a surplusage, in respect to the man Christ Jesus, and might overflow and inure to the benefit of a third party—in other words, to the benefit of the transgressor for whom it was voluntarily rendered and endured.
"This satisfaction made by incarnate Deity to meet the claims of one of his own attributes, Anselm represents as even more than an equivalent for the sin of mankind."
This brings us to the point where now the view of the Atonement by Catholics and Protestants respectively may be stated.
II.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEW OF THE ATONEMENT.
Original Sin:[A] "Original sin is distinguished from actual, or personal sin, because actual or personal sin is the sin which we personally with our own free will commit, whilst original sin is that sin which our human nature has committed with the will of Adam, in whom all our human nature was included, and with whom our human nature is united as a branch to a root, as a child to a parent, as men who partake with Adam the same nature which we have derived from him, and as members of the same human family of which Adam was the head. The difference that exists between original and personal sin is, that the latter is committed with the will physically our own, whilst original sin is committed with a will physically of another, and only morally our own, because it forms with that other (Adam), who is our head, one moral body.
[Footnote A: I take the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement from "Catholic Belief," by Very Rev. Joseph Faa Di Bruno, D. D., which is based, of course, upon the decisions of the Council of Trent, held from 1545 to 1563, and which among other things declared what the Catholic doctrine was upon "Original Sin" and "Justification.">[