The Seventy's Course in Theology, Third Year / The Doctrine of Deity

by B. H. Roberts

2. Definitions—"Realism:" Realism divides into two classes, extreme and moderate. (1) "Extreme realism taught that universals were substances or things, existing independently of and separate from particulars; this was the essence of Plato's ideas." (Cent. Dict.) The thinking process of the realist is admirably depicted in Note 5, Lesson xxvi, where St. Augustine describes his rise from the conception of the "changeable" to the "Unchangeable," and "thus with the flash of one trembling glance," arrived at the conception of "that which is"—to the real—to the universal—to the apprehension of "God."

"Moderate Realism also taught that universals were substances, but only as dependent upon and inseparable from individuals, in which each inhered; that is, each universal inhered in each of the particulars ranged under it. This was the theory of Aristotle, who held that the individual thing was the first essence, while universals were only second essences, real in a less complete sense than first essences. He thus reversed the Platonic doctrine, which attributed the fullest reality to universals only, and a participative reality to individuals." (Cent. Dict.)

Elmendorf represents moderate realism as recognizing that "the universal has objective reality, as to its contents, in individuals"—(i. e., the universal is expressed through individuals).

Nominalism: Nominalism also divides into two classes, extreme and moderate. "Extreme nominalism taught that universals had no substantive or objective existence at all, but were merely empty names or words. Moderate nominalism or 'conceptualism' taught that universals have no substantive existence at all, but yet are more than mere names signifying nothing; and that they exist really, though only subjectively, as concepts in the mind, of which names are the vocal symbols." (Cent. Dict.).

Mysticism: "Mysticism is a phase of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible of exact definition. It appears in connection with the endeavor of the human mind to grasp the divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communication with the Highest. More specifically, a form of religious belief which is founded upon mysticism, spiritual experience, not discriminated or tested and systematized in thought. 'Mysticism and rationalism' represent opposite poles of theology, rationalism regarding the reason as the highest faculty of man and the sole arbiter in all matters of religious doctrine; mysticism, on the other hand, declaring that spiritual truth cannot be apprehended by the logical faculty, nor adequately expressed in terms of the understanding." (Cent. Dict.). Mysticism may also be regarded as the result of "a despair of reason, a refuge in higher intuitions." (Elmendorf.) These definitions may be regarded as difficult, but I know of no way by which the ideas considered can be more simply explained. The definitions should be discussed until mastered. Perhaps they will grow in clearness after considering the rest of the notes of this lesson.

3. Explanatory: Limiting our inquiry concerning the philosophy of this mediaeval period to the doctrine of God, and selecting an expression of that doctrine from an illustrious representative of each school of thought, may be of assistance in forming a clearer understanding of the definitions given in previous notes, and likewise represent the leading conceptions of God that obtained in the period under consideration.

4. John Scotus Erigena: Extreme realist, and something of a Mystic; "Man finds not God, but God finds himself in man," (Elmendorf) is the keynote of this philosopher's teaching. Erigena was born in Ireland, 800 A. D. Made a pilgrimage to the birthplace of Plato and Aristotle A. D. 825; "and indulged the hope of uniting philosophy and religion in the manner proposed by the ecclesiastics who were studying in Spain."

"From Eastern sources, John Erigena had learned the doctrines of the eternity of matter, and even of the creation, with which, indeed, he confounded the Deity Himself. He was therefore a Pantheist, accepting the Oriental ideas of emanation and absorption, not only as respects the soul of man, but likewise all material things. In his work 'On the Nature of things,' his doctrine is, 'That, as all things were originally contained in God, and proceeded from Him into the different classes by which they are now distinguished, so shall they finally return to Him, and be absorbed in the source from which they came; in other words, that as, before the world was created, there was no being but God, and the causes of all things were in Him, so after the end of the world, there will be no being but God, and the causes of all things in Him. This final resolution he denominated deification, or theosis. He even questioned the eternity of hell, saying, with the emphasis of a Saracen, 'There is nothing eternal but God.' It was impossible under such circumstances, that he should not fall under the rebuke of the Church." (Draper's "Intellectual Development," Vol II, p. 9.)

5. Roscelin of Compiegne: Extreme Nominalist. Sometimes credited with being the originator of the system; but he was "not the originator of the system," says Elmendorf, "but its clearest exponent and sharpest defender in the eleventh century." The same authority says that he regarded "universals" as "merely universal names." A title "for the totality of things. This be applied to the doctrine of the Trinity in the form of tritheism. There are three divine essences or substances, like one another; for only individuals have a real existence"—(Hist. of Philosophy—Elmendorf—pp. 105-6.) "Roscellinus taught that whatever exists as a real thing or substance, exists as one self-identical whole, and is not susceptible of division into parts. This was the part of his teaching which created so much scandal when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity. Roscellinus maintained that it is merely a habit of speech which prevents our speaking of the three persons as three substances, or three Gods. If it were otherwise, and the three persons were really one substance or thing, we should be forced to admit that the Father and the Holy Spirit became incarnate along with the Son. Roscellinus seems to have put forward this doctrine in perfect good faith, and to have claimed for it at first the authority of Lanfranc and Anselm. In 1092, however, a council convoked by the Archbishop of Rheims, condemned his interpretation, and Roscellinus, who was in danger of being lynched by the orthodox populace, recanted his error. As his enforced penitence did not prove lasting, his opinions were condemned by a second council (1094), and he himself fled to England. Forced by a fresh persecution to return to France at a later date, he taught at Tours and Loc-menach in Brittany (where he had Abelard as a pupil), and resided latterly as canon at Besancon." (Ency. Brit.).

6. St. Anselm, Realist: Born at or near Aosta, Italy, 1033, A. D.; died at Canterbury, 1109. Credited with being the founder of scholastic theology. He held that faith is not the pre-requisite, and the regulator of knowledge, but leads to it. Also that "God can be known through reason, attempts ontological, a priori proof, from the concept of the objective existence. That than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot exist in intellect alone; for then a greater can be conceived." His doctrine is set forth in detail by Shedd: "The human mind possesses the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable. But such a being is necessarily existent; because a being whose existence is contingent, who may or may not exist, is not the most perfect that we can conceive of. But a necessarily existent Being is one that cannot be conceived of as non-existent, and therefore is an actually existent Being. Necessary existence implies actual existence. In conceiving, therefore, of a being who is more perfect than all others, the mind inevitably conceives of a real, and not an imaginary, being; in the same manner as in conceiving of a figure having three sides, it inevitably conceives of a figure having three angles." (History of Christian Doctrine—Shedd—Vol. I, pp. 231-2.)