"Company A has done a little extra duty to-day; it will be held in reserve."
"But what extra duty has Company A done, Captain?"
"It has sent one man on special service," said he; "you may say that it was not a great duty; but it was something, and rules must be observed. Of course, if your company happened to be of average number and either of the others was very small, I should take Company A instead. But it does not so happen; so the work you have done to-day gives Company A a rest--if rest it can be called."
"But why not take the whole battalion?"
"Only two companies are needed. The losses of the brigade to-day have been so great that two companies can cover our front. Lee attacks again," he continued sadly; "he has fought but one defensive battle."
"But you must allow, Captain," said I, "that Chancellorsville was a great victory--and to-day's battle also."
"Chancellorsville was indeed a great victory," said he; "but the enemy is as strong as ever. I cannot suggest anything against Chancellorsville, except that I think that we should not have stopped on Sunday morning after taking the second line of intrenchments. General Lee heard of Sedgwick's movement just at the wrong time I dare say. Should he not have pressed Hooker into the river before giving attention to Sedgwick[8]?"
[8] Captain Haskell is wrong here. Hooker's new position was impregnable to any attack the Confederates were then able to make. Hooker himself, as well as his army, wished for the Confederates to attack. Lee's march against Sedgwick, at this juncture, was the right movement. See the Comte de Paris, in loc. [ED.]
"Then you believe in attacking," said I.
"True; I do under such circumstances. The trouble with us has been that we attack resisting troops, and when we defeat them we refuse to trouble them any more: we let them get away. Yet, as you say, Chancellorsville was a great victory; anything that would have sent Hooker's army back over the river, even without a battle, would have been success. But speaking from a military view, I dare say it was a false movement to divide our forces as we did there. We succeeded because our opponents allowed us to succeed. It was in Hooker's power on Saturday to crush either Jackson or McLaws. Yet, as you suggest, General Lee was compelled to take great risks; no matter what he should do, his position seemed well-nigh desperate, and he succeeded by the narrowest margin. Even on Sunday morning, before the action began, if General Lee had only known the exact condition below us at Fredericksburg, I dare say Hooker would in the end have claimed a victory, for General Lee would not have assaulted Hooker's works."