It was a sudden inkling of these things which now dawned on the public mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm. For the first time since Treaty relations with the Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced world-politics within its scope. The Confucianist conception of the State, as being simply a regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient because it was locked to the past and indifferent to the future, had hitherto been supreme, foreign affairs being the result of unwilling contact at sea-ports or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet. To find Chinese—five years after the inauguration of their Republic—ready to accept literally and loyally in the western way all the duties and obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and fine discovery. It has been supposed by some that a powerful rôle was played in this business by the temptation to benefit materially by an astute move: that is that China was greatly influenced in her decision by the knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties would instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity and pour into the depleted Central Treasury a monthly surplus of nearly two million Mexican dollars. Paradoxical as it may sound in a country notoriously hard-pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no part whatever in convincing the Peking Government that the hour for action had arrived; nor again was there any question of real hostility to a nation which is so far removed from the East as to be meaningless to the masses. The deep, underlying, decisive influence was simply expediency—the most subtle of all political reasons and the hardest to define. But just as Britain declared war because the invasion of Belgium brought to a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German policy; and just as America broke off relations because the scrapping of undertaking after undertaking regarding the sea-war made it imperative for her to act, so did China choose the right moment to enunciate the doctrine of her independence by voicing her determination to hold to the whole corpus of international sanctions on which her independence finally rests. In the last analysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th February to the German Government was a categorical and unmistakable reply to all the insidious attempts which had been made since the beginning of the war to place her outside and beyond the operation of the Public Law of Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light that her future actions must be judged. The leaders who direct the destinies of China became fully prepared for a state of belligerency from the moment they decided to speak; but they could not but be supremely anxious concerning the expression of that belligerency, since their international position had for years been such that a single false move might cripple them.
Let us make this clear. Whilst China has been from the first fully prepared to co-operate with friendly Powers in the taking of war-measures which would ultimately improve her world-position, she has not been prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into foreign hands. The argument that the mobilization of her resources could only be effectively dealt with by specially designated foreigners, for instance, has always been repellent to her because she knows from bitter experience that although Japan has played little or no part in the war, and indeed classifies herself as a semi-belligerent, the Tokio Government would not hesitate to use any opportunity which presented itself in China for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the spot she is the most competent to insure the effectiveness of Chinese co-operation, attempt to tighten her hold on the country. It is a fact which is self-evident to observers on the spot that ever since the coup of the Twenty-one Demands, many Japanese believe that their country has succeeded in almost completely infeodating China and has become the sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, as well as the pacificator of the Eastern World. Statements which were incautiously allowed to appear in the Japanese Press a few days prior to the Chinese Note of the 9th February disclose what Japan really thought on the subject of China identifying herself with the Allies. For instance, the following, which bears the hall-mark of official inspiration, reads very curiously in the light of after-events:
... "Dispatches from Peking say that England and France have already started a flanking movement to induce China to join the anti-German coalition. The intention of the Chinese Government has not yet been learned. But it is possible that China will agree, if conditions are favourable, thus gaining the right to voice her views at the coming peace conference. Should the Entente Powers give China a firm guarantee, it is feared here that China would not hesitate to act.
"The policy of the Japanese Government toward this question cannot yet be learned. It appears, however, that the Japanese Government is not opposed to applying the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference, in so far as they concern purely economic questions, since Japan desires that German influence in the commerce and finance of the Orient should be altogether uprooted. But should the Entente Powers of Europe try to induce China to join them, Japan may object on the ground that it will create more disturbances in China and lead to a general disturbance of peace in the Orient."
Now there is not the slightest doubt in the writer's mind—and he can claim to speak as a student of twenty years' standing—that this definition of Japanese aims and objects is a very true one; and that the subsequent invitation to China to join the Allies which came from Tokio after a meeting between the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Allied Ambassadors was simply made when a new orientation of policy had been forced by stress of circumstances. Japan has certainly always wished German influence in the Far East to be uprooted if she can take the place of Germany; but if she cannot take that place absolutely and entirely she would vastly prefer the influence to remain, since it is in the nature of counterweight to that of other European Powers and of America—foreign influence in China, as Mr. Hioki blandly told the late President Yuan Shih-kai in his famous interview of the 18th January, 1915, being a source of constant irritation to the Japanese people, and the greatest stumbling-block to a permanent understanding in the Far East.
Chinese suspicion of any invitation coming by way of Tokio has been, therefore, in every way justified, if it is a reasonable and legitimate thing for a nation of four hundred millions of people to be acutely concerned about their independence; for events have already proved up to the hilt that so far from the expulsion of Germany from Shantung having resulted in the handing-back of interests which were forcibly acquired from China in 1898, that expulsion has merely resulted in Japan succeeding to such interests and thereby obliterating all trace of her original promise to the world in 1914 that she would restore to China what was originally taken from her. Here it is necessary to remark that not only did Japan in her negotiations over the Twenty-one Demands force China to hand over the twelve million pounds of German improvements in Shantung province, but that Baron Hayashi, the present Japanese Minister to China, has recently declared that Japan would demand from China a vast settlement or concession at Tsingtao, thus making even the alleged handing-back of the leased territory—which Japan is pledged to force from Germany at the Peace Conference—wholly illusory, the formula of a Settlement being adopted because twelve years' experience of Port Arthur has shown that territorial "leases," with their military garrisons and administrative offices, are expensive and antiquated things, and that it is easier to push infiltration by means of a multitude of Settlements in which police-boxes and policemen form an important element, than to cut off slices of territory under a nomenclature which is a clamant advertisement of disruptive aims.
Now although these matters appear to be taking us far from the particular theme we are discussing, it is not really so. Like a dark thunder-cloud on the horizon the menace of Japanese action has rendered frank Chinese co-operation, even in such a simple matter as war-measures against Germany, a thing of supreme difficulty. The mere rumour that China might dispatch an Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia was sufficient to send the host of unofficial Japanese agents in Peking scurrying in every direction and insisting that if the Chinese did anything at all they should limit themselves to sending troops to Russia, where they would be "lost"—a suggestion made because that was what Japan herself offered to do when she declined in 1915 the Allies' proposal to dispatch troops to Europe. Nor must the fact be lost sight of that as in other countries so in China, foreign affairs provide an excellent opportunity for influencing the march of internal events. Thus, as we have clearly shown, the Military Party, although originally averse to any action at all, saw that a strong foreign policy would greatly enhance its reputation and allow it to influence the important elections for the Parliament of 1918 which, sitting as a National Convention, will elect the next President. Thus, in the extraordinary way which happens throughout the world, the whole of February was consumed in the rival political parties manoeuvring for position, the Vice-President, General Feng Kuo-chang, himself coming hastily to Peking from Nanking to take part in this elaborate game in which many were now participating merely for what they could get out of it.
On the 4th March matters were brought to a climax by an open breach between President Li Yuan-hung and the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, at a Cabinet meeting regarding the procedure to be observed in breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. Although nearly a month had elapsed, no reply had been received from Berlin; and of the many plans of action proposed nothing had been formally decided. Owing to the pressure Japan was exerting from Tokio to get China to come to a definite arrangement, popular anxiety was growing. Over the question of certain telegrams to be communicated to the Japanese Government, of which he had been kept in ignorance, President Li Yuan-hung took a firm stand; with the result that the Premier, deeply offended, abruptly left the Council Chamber, handed in his resignation and left the capital—a course of action which threatened to provoke a national crisis.
Fortunately in President Li Yuan-hung China had a cool and dispassionate statesman. At the first grave crisis in his administration he wished at all costs to secure that the assent of Parliament should be given to all steps taken, and that nothing so speculative as a policy which had not been publicly debated should be put into force. He held to this point doggedly; and after some negotiations, the Premier was induced to return to the capital and resume office, on the understanding that nothing final was to be done until a popular endorsement had been secured.
On the 10th March the question was sent to Parliament for decision. After a stormy debate of several hours in the Lower House the policy of the Government was upheld by 330 votes to 87: on the following day the Senate endorsed this decision by 158 votes to 37. By a coincidence which was too extraordinary not to have been artificially contrived, the long-awaited German reply arrived on the morning of this 10th March, copies of the document being circulated wholesale by German agents among the Members of Parliament in a last effort to influence their decision. The actual text of the German reply was as follows, and it will be seen how transparently worded it is: