Shall we then make the present President a monarch? Of course the President will not consent to this. But leaving this aside let us suppose that the President, in consideration of the permanent welfare of the country, is willing to sacrifice everything to satisfy the wish of the people, do we expect that he will become a mere figurehead? A figurehead monarch is, to adapt the saying of the west, a fat porker, a guinea-pig, that is, good as an expensive ornament. Will it be wise to place so valuable a personage in so idle a position at a time when the situation is so extremely critical?
Even if we are willing to suffer the President to become a figurehead it will remain a question whether a responsible cabinet can ever be formed. I do not say that the President will not allow a responsible cabinet to exist under him. My contention is that there is no one, within my knowledge, who commands respect enough and is capable of taking over the responsibilities of President Yuan. For who can replace the Great President in coping with our numerous difficulties? If we select an ordinary man and make him bear the great burdens, we will find that in addition to his lack of ability rendering him unequal to the occasion, his lack of dominating influence will disqualify him from exercising authority. It was for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the existing conditions that the Cabinet system was changed into a Presidential system—an excellent substitution for a weakened administration. Conditions in the next two or three years will not be very much different from what they are now. Therefore, the contention that the administration will be changed overnight for the better after a change in the form of the State is, if not a wicked untruth to deceive the common people, the ridiculous absurdity of a bookworm. Thus the theory that a constitutional monarchy will immediately follow, if the President consents to become a monarch, is also fallacious.
Can it be possible that those who are now holding up the constitutional principle as a shield for their monarchical views have a different definition for the term "constitution"? The Ching (Manchu) Dynasty considered itself as possessing a constitution in its last days. Did we recognize it as such? Let me also ask the critics what guarantee they have to offer that the constitution will be put into effect without hindrance as soon as the form of State is changed. If they cannot give any definite guarantee, then what they advocate is merely an absolute monarchy and not a constitutional monarchy. As it is not likely to be a constitutional monarchy, we may safely assume that it will be an imperial autocracy. I cannot regard it as a wise plan if, owing to dislike of its defects, the Republic should be transformed into an Imperial autocracy. Owing to various unavoidable reasons, it is excusable in spite of violent opposition to adopt temporarily autocratic methods in a republican country. But if the plan proposed by present-day critics be put into effect, that on the promise of a constitution we should agree to the adoption of a monarchy, then the promise must be definitely made to the country at the time of transition that a constitutional government will become an actuality. But if, after the promise is made, existing conditions are alleged to justify the continuance of autocratic methods, I am afraid the whole country will not be so tolerant towards the Chief Executive. To assume outwardly the rôle of constitutional government, but in reality to rule in an unconstitutional manner, was the cause of the downfall of the Ching Dynasty. The object lesson is not obscure. Let us take warning by it.
V. FALLACIES OF THE MONARCHISTS
If, on the other hand, the present-day critics are really in earnest for a constitution, then I am unable to understand why they believe that this cannot be secured under the Republic but must be obtained in a roundabout way by means of a monarchy. In my view the real hindrances to the adoption of a constitution at the present day in China are the existing conditions, viz. the attitude of the officials and the traditions and intellectual standards of the people. But these hindrances have not resulted from the adoption of republicanism. Therefore they cannot be expected to disappear with the disappearance of the Republic. For instance, from the President downward to the minor official of every official organ in the capital or in the provinces, every one inclines to be independent of the law, and considers it convenient to deal with affairs as he pleases. This is the greatest obstacle to constitutional government. Now has that anything to do with the change or not of the form of State? Again, the absence, on the part of the people, of interest in political affairs, of knowledge of politics, of political morality and strength, and their inability to organize proper political parties to make use of an inviolable parliament, are also hindrances to the attainment of a constitution. Now what have these things to do with a change in the form of the States? If I were to go on naming such hindrances one by one, I should count my fingers many times over and I should not be through. Yet it is quite plain that not a single one of these hindrances can be attributed to republicanism.
To say that what we cannot get under the republic can be secured immediately upon accepting a monarchical régime, or to say that what can be secured under a monarchical régime can never be secured in a republican period is beyond the understanding of a stupid man like myself, although I have searched my brain for a valid reason.
My view is that if China is really in earnest for a constitution, the President should set the example himself by treating the Constitutional Compact as sacredly inviolable and compel his subordinates to do the same. Every letter of the compact should be carried out and no attempt should be made to step beyond its limits.
Meantime give the people as many opportunities as possible to acquaint themselves with political affairs, and do not stifle the aspirations of the people or weaken their strength or damp their interest or crush their self-respect. Then within a few years we shall be rewarded with results. If, instead of doing all these things, we vainly blame the form of State, we are, as Chu Tse says, like a boat that blames the creek for its curves.
The most powerful argument of those who advocate a change to a monarchy is that there is every possibility of disturbance at the time of a Presidential election. This is a real danger. It is for this reason that ten years ago I did not dare to associate myself with the advocates of republicanism. If the critics want to attack me on this point to support of their contentions, I advise them not to write another article but to reprint my articles written some time ago, which, I think, will be more effective. Fortunately, however, we have discovered a comparatively effective remedy. For, according to the latest President Election Law, the term of the President is to all intents and purposes a term for life. It is therefore impossible for such dangers to appear during the life of the President. What concerns us is therefore what will happen after the departure of the present President for another world. This, of course, is a question that we do not wish to touch upon; but since every one, even the patriarchs, must die some day, let us face the matter openly. If Heaven blesses China and allows the Great President to devote himself to the country for ten or more years—during which he will be able to assert the authority of the government, cleanse officialdom, store-up strength, consolidate the country, and banish all hidden dangers—then there will be nothing to choose between a republic or a monarchy. If, on the other hand, Heaven should not be pleased so to favour us and takes away our Great President before he is half through with his great task, then the fate of China is sealed. No changes in the form of State will avail under any circumstances. Therefore the question whether China will be left in peace or not depends entirely on the length of years the Great President will live and what he will be able to accomplish in his lifetime. Whether the country is ruled as a republic or a monarchy, the consequences will be the same.
Do you still doubt my words? Let me go deeper into the analysis. The difference between a republic and a monarchy lies only in the methods of succession of the head of the nation. It is evident that although a certain law of succession may be made during the lifetime of the Head, it cannot take effect until his death; and whether or not the effect thus intended will come up to expectations will depend on two factors: (1) whether or not the merits and personal influence of the predecessor will continue effective after his death, and (2) whether or not there will be unscrupulous and insubordinate claimants at the death of the Head, and, if any, the number of such men and whether the point of dispute they raise be well-founded. If these are taken as the basis for discerning the future we will arrive at the same conclusion whether the country be a republic or a monarchy.