In his justly renowned Analogy, Bishop Butler begins with a chapter on a future life. He says with great truth that if there is an idea that death will be the destruction of living powers, that idea must arise either from the reason of the thing or the analogy of nature. ‘But it does not arise (he proceeds to say) from the reason of the thing; for we do not know what death is. Again, we do not know on what the existence of our living powers depends; for we see them suspended in sleep, for example, or in a swoon, and still not extinguished. Neither does it arise from the analogy of nature; for death removes all sensible proof, and precludes us consequently from tracing out any analogy which would warrant us in inferring their destruction.’ Now, it is well known that since the days of Bishop Butler a school has arisen, the members of which assert that they have at length learned what Death is, and that in virtue of their knowledge they are in a position to tell us that life is impossible after death. It is one of the main objects of this volume to demonstrate the fallacy which underlies the argument brought forward by this school. We attempt to show that we are absolutely driven by scientific principles to acknowledge the existence of an Unseen Universe, and by scientific analogy to conclude that it is full of life and intelligence—that it is in fact a spiritual universe and not a dead one.
But while we are fully justified by scientific considerations in asserting the existence of such an unseen universe, we are not justified in assuming that we have yet attained, or can easily or perhaps ever attain, to more than a very slight knowledge of its nature. Thus we do not believe that we can really ascertain what death is.
To those, therefore, who assert that there is no spiritual unseen world, and that death is an end of the existence of the individual, we reply by simply denying their first statement, and in consequence of this denial, insisting that none of us know anything whatever about death. Indeed, it is at once apparent that a scientific denial of the possibility of life after death must be linked with at least something like a scientific proof of the non-existence of a spiritual unseen world. For if scientific analogy be against a spiritual Unseen, then evidently it is equally against the likelihood of life after death.
But if, on the other hand, we feel constrained to believe in a spiritual universe, then though it does not follow that life is certain after death, inasmuch as we do not know whether any provision has been made in this unseen world for our reception, yet it does follow that we cannot deny the possibility of a future life. For to do so would imply on our part such an exhaustive knowledge of the Unseen as would justify us in believing that no arrangement had been made in it for our transference thither. Now, our almost absolute ignorance with regard to the Unseen must prevent us from coming to any such conclusion.
We have been accused by some of our critics of being dogmatists. So far is this from being true that in the first part of our argument—namely, that which relates to a spiritual unseen:—we are content to develop from the present recognised condition of things. We take the world as we find it, and are forced by a purely scientific process to recognise the existence of an Unseen Universe.
We are likewise led to regard the Unseen as having given birth to the present universe, a conclusion to which one of our leading critics has apparently given his assent.
Here, however, we join issue with the materialistic school. They continue to insist—against all analogy as we take it—that this Unseen Universe is a dead one, having no life worthy of the name, although it must have existed for inconceivable ages before the present Universe arose.
Let our readers remark that in all this we introduce no dogma—we do not require to assert or even assume the existence of God. We are content to develop our argument from a position which is common to our adversaries and to ourselves.
An objection has been raised that our argument tends to the Swedenborgian doctrine of a spiritual body. Now, the same principles which guide us from the continuous existence of the outer world to acknowledge an Unseen, lead us on the assumption of our own existence after death to acknowledge what we may term a spiritual body. In other words, our conception of something which retains at once a hold upon the past and a possibility of future life assumes the form which we clothe in this or similar language.[1] But why Swedenborgian? Why not Pauline? Was it not the great Apostle who first gave utterance to his belief in these very words? If it be said to us that the way in which we regard the spiritual body is decidedly Swedenborgian, we would reply by asking our critics to tell us in what way we regard it.