The unseen universe

by Balfour Stewart; Peter Guthrie Tait

Here then, it is argued, we have a breach of the Principle of Continuity, inasmuch as certain things of the universe (brain-particles) have a function assigned to them in their association with consciousness, which other things (gold, silver, etc.) do not possess in any measure, if the distinction between organic and inorganic be an essential one. To avert this breach, it is essential that all matter should be considered as in some sense alive. It is furthermore argued, that by this hypothesis there is no difficulty in accounting for the introduction of life, inasmuch as life always accompanies matter, the mode of manifestation of the one being regulated by the mode of collocation of the other.

241. Now it appears to us that this school of thought is justified in declining to accept a hypothesis which attributes to certain substances of the universe a power which is entirely wanting in others, or that gives to the same substance at one time a fundamental power or property that is entirely wanting at another. It is not so much the premiss as the conclusion of this school to which we object. For let us consider for a moment what is implied in the astounding inference that the atom is the true abode of immortal life in the universe, and that its life is of an extremely simple kind.

It implies, in the first place, that the atom is eternal, and to this we object. It implies, in the next place, that the atom is extremely simple in its constitution, and to this we object. It implies, thirdly, that for the antecedents of the motions of the atom it is unnecessary to resort to anything beyond the atom itself, and to this we object.

242. We have in other places sufficiently set forth our objection to regarding the atom either as eternal or as extremely simple in constitution, let us now state our objection to regarding the motions of the atom (in this generalisation) apart from the surrounding universe.

Our objection is, that in order to conceive the nature of the forces by which atoms act upon each other, we are driven at once, if not to the very hypothesis of Le Sage, at least to something which implies the existence and agency of the Unseen Universe.

But when once we have taken this step, we are not permitted to rest, for another journey is before us, and after that another, and so on. In fine, there is no end to the process, and no halting-place for the mind, except in the belief that the universe as a whole participates in every motion which takes place even in the smallest of atoms.[64]

Undoubtedly as regards certain practical scientific results, it is allowable to regard the atom as a thing by itself, and to sum up the apparent actions of the various atoms as if each were independent of everything else. But when we come to a generalisation so fundamental as this hypothesis regarding life, we are forced to ask whether the apparent and visible action of atoms on one another is really everything which takes place, and then we find, as we have just shown, that we are driven at once into the Unseen Universe, and thence into an endless complexity of antecedent.

In fine, we conclude that inasmuch as the universe in its various orders participates in every conceivable motion, the consciousness which accompanies this motion cannot logically be confined to the apparently moving body or atom, but must in some sense extend to the Unseen Universe in its various orders. But this is only another way of expressing the conclusions at which we have already arrived, for (of course) if we imagine a Divine Agency to be resident in the universe, we cannot but suppose that every motion of any kind is accompanied with a consciousness of this Divine Agency.

In fine, we maintain that what we are driven to is not an under-life resident in the atom, but rather, to adopt the words of a recent writer, a Divine over-life in which we live and move and have our being.

243. Here it is desirable to consider what we gain by this hypothesis. Our gain is simply in the way in which we regard the functions of matter, and a little reflection will convince us that neither form of this hypothesis, whether we hold by an under- or an over-life, will enable us to explain the introduction of life into the visible universe by natural laws alone, and without resorting to some peculiar action of the unseen. As a matter of fact we are led by science to receive the law of Biogenesis as expressing the present order of the world. But the introduction of life into the world does not become more consistent with this law by virtue of an hypothesis which associates a consciousness of some sort with every motion of the universe.