The British Government, whose original intention had been to refrain from any action in the Soudan whatsoever; which had been compelled by force of circumstances, including the most frightful bloodshed, to change a wholly negative policy to a definite scheme of evacuation; now perceived, of course too late, that if the European population was to be brought away, at least some measure of military force must be employed. What Her Majesty's Ministers were unable to see, or what, if they saw, they chose to ignore, was the plain fact that the same force and the same measures and the same promptitude would be required for the salvation of Europeans in face of the enemy, as for the reconquest and reoccupation of the country. In this delusion, or dereliction, resides the explanation of an affair which has left an indelible stain upon British honour.
On 28th February, 1884, Graham defeated the enemy, inflicting upon them severe losses, at El-Teb, near the spot upon which Baker's disastrous action had occurred some three weeks previously. On 13th March, after a hard and at times a dubious fight, Graham won another victory at Tamaai, and the power of Osman Digna was broken. Graham was then ordered to return, and the expedition was over.
By withdrawing Graham's troops, the Government both threw away the fruits of his success, and deliberately abandoned the control of the Souakim-Berber route from Khartoum, by which alone Gordon could have brought away the refugees. Berber was the key to the Soudan. Thenceforth, the Souakim-Berber route was impracticable; and it was for this reason that Lord Wolseley was obliged to take the much longer Nile route.
On the very day after Graham's victory at El-Teb, and before Graham had left Souakim, Gordon had telegraphed from Khartoum as follows:—
"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better. You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."
On 2nd March he telegraphed again to the same effect; but Lord Granville declined to accede to General Gordon's suggestions. A few days later, when the Eastern Soudan and the Souakim-Berber route had been definitely abandoned, Sir Evelyn Baring strongly advised the British Government to obtain command of the Souakim-Berber route. But the advice was refused by Lord Granville, and the most urgent appeals continued to be addressed to him in vain.
Deserted by the Government, Gordon tried, and failed, to raise money privately for the purpose of engaging Turkish troops. Early in April, Khartoum was closely besieged. At this time, Lord Wolseley urged upon the Government the necessity of relieving Gordon. In May, preparations for war were begun. A part of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt was sent up the Nile; and Commander Hammill and other naval officers were employed to report upon the navigation of the river. These facts did not prevent Lord Hartington from informing the House of Commons, early in July, that the Government had no intention of sending an expedition to relieve General Gordon, unless it were made clear that by no other means could he be relieved, and adding that the Government had "received no information making it desirable that we should depart from that decision" (Royce, The Egyptian Campaigns). On 24th July, Lord Wolseley made a spirited protest against the procrastination of the Government. The pressure of public opinion could no longer be entirely withstood. On 30th July, Gordon sent a message in which he declared his retreat to be impossible.
On 5th August, Mr. Gladstone asked and obtained a vote of credit. Then, and not until then, were the preparations for war begun in England. Having decided, upon the advice of Lord Wolseley, to follow the Nile route instead of the Souakim-Berber route, the Government ordered 800 boats. These were 30 feet long, having six feet six inches beam, two feet six inches draught, fitted with 12 oars, two masts and lug sails; each designed to carry two boatmen and 10 soldiers with provisions, arms and ammunition. Eight steam pinnaces and two stern-wheel paddle-boats were also fitted out; the Nile steamers belonging to the Egyptian Government were taken over; and 380 voyageurs from Canada were engaged. The total force of troops selected numbered 7000. Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son contracted to transport the whole expedition to above the Second Cataract. Lord Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief; General Sir Redvers Buller was chief of staff; General Earle was given command of a brigade; special service officers were: Colonels Sir Charles Wilson, Brackenbury, Harrison, Henderson, Maurice, Lord Anson (Royce, The Egyptian Campaigns). Lord Charles Beresford was attached to Lord Wolseley's staff.
Even now, the Government failed to recognise the plain facts of the case. Their instructions to Lord Wolseley were that the main object of the expedition was to rescue General Gordon. Her Majesty's Ministers considered that it might be practicable to achieve his release without going to Khartoum, and that in any case it was desirable to avoid any fighting so far as possible.