1. That although recent events had revealed approximately our deficiencies in the event of war with a second-rate maritime Power, no measures had been taken to prepare a plan showing how the requirements were to be met.
2. That other countries possessed departments charged with the duty of preparing plans of campaign and of organising their every detail so that they could be instantly carried into execution.
3. That the deficiencies in the numbers of the personnel known to be required, were such and such.
4. That the Medical stores were deficient in such and such respects. (They were kept in bulk, so that in the event of war, the medical stores would have had to be selected and distributed: a system I was able to alter.)
5. That there existed no organisation of any kind with regard to the use of merchant shipping in war for the transport of coal, ammunition, and stores, and for hospital ships.
6. That there existed no organisation for rapidly mobilising the reserves.
7. That in order rightly to fulfil these requirements, there must be designed plans of campaign to meet all probable contingencies.
8. That in order to obtain such plans of campaign, there should be created a new department charged with the duty of drawing them up.
There followed a detailed scheme for a new Intelligence Department, at an increased expense of no more than £2251.
The Memorandum concluded as follows: