The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these deep columns were very different from the small columns which I proposed,—a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery.
I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines. He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act in the same manner under all circumstances."
To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the most suitable,—which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.
The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.
If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.
This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms of the French. We give the same name of division to masses of four regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,—which is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813 should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the following formations:—
1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight battalions.[[57]]
2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:—
