The Art of War

by baron de Antoine Henri Jomini

I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was beaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in position on the heights of La Belle Alliance?

I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my Summary of the Art of War was written.

Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813 from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small columns instead of three—

It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion. Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria.

The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies, but by divisions of two companies,—that is, in three or four columns, according to the number of companies.

Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in the columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed, according to circumstances, localities, and the morale of the troops. Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not aware whether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza and Novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their camps of instruction.

Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be considered:—

"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now recognized principles of tactics?"

If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was because the Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side.